

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 39, Number 1, Winter 1995

Poor Richard's Almanack:
Running the State Department

IMAGINING THE PACIFIC CENTURY

How to Rebuild America's Stature

Karl D. Jackson

The Essential Alliance with Japan

James E. Auer

The Prudent Course in North Korea

Paul Bracken

Moving APEC Off the Drawing Board

Jonathan Clarke

The Northeast Asian Triangle

Gilbert Rozman

China's Coming Constitutional Challenges

Arthur Waldron

Martin Malia's *The Soviet Tragedy*

Michael Radu

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
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President Abraham Lincoln hoisting the American flag with thirty-four stars upon Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 22, 1861. Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia.

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This issue of Orbis, which focuses on East Asia, is dedicated to the loving memory of Roberta (Bobby) Hall Luxenberg, wife of Alan Luxenberg. Expert in Japanese language and culture, Bobby saw the understanding of other societies as essential to enlightened American citizenship.

May her memory be for a blessing.

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Editor's Column	1
Poor Richard's Almanack	5

IMAGINING THE PACIFIC CENTURY

How to Rebuild America's Stature in Asia	Karl D. Jackson	11
China's Coming Constitutional Challenges	Arthur Waldron	19
The Imperative U.S.-Japanese Bond	James E. Auer	37
Risks and Promises in the Two Koreas	Paul Bracken	55
A Regional Approach to Northeast Asia	Gilbert Rozman	65
APEC as a Semi-Solution	Jonathan Clarke	81

Documentation

The Rules of Engagement for U.N. Peacekeeping Forces		
in Bosnia: A Response	Major-General John A. MacInnis	97
Rejoinder	Bruce D. Berkowitz	100

Review Essays

Presidential Politics and Dynastic Pretensions	Irving Louis Horowitz	101
The Peace Movement's Last Hurrah?	Guenter Lewy	113
The Soviet Tragedy	Michael Radu	120
How Do Countries Become Rich?	Patrick Clawson	125
Hung Out to Dry or All Wet?		
Water in the Jordan Valley	Adam Garfinkle	129

La Longue Durée	139
------------------------	-----

Auguries	141
-----------------	-----



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Editor's Column

To change, wrote Washington Irving, is to shift one's position and be bruised in a new place. But to change not at all, from inertia or fear, is to be already dead. As a minister to Catherine the Great put it, "that which ceases to grow begins to rot."¹ We cannot predict how much *Orbis* will grow, but in this issue—the first of 1995 and third of my stewardship—the journal continues to change. The white cover should prove more striking yet restful to the eyes, and the buff paper more friendly to the touch. The historic print of Independence Hall that serves as frontispiece, and the Liberty Bell logo, express our pride in Philadelphia and symbolize the nation whose well being and values *Orbis* endeavors to serve.

We introduced two courses to the menu last summer: this editor's column and the new book review section. This time we offer three more delectations to complement our entrées—an hors d'oeuvre at the front and a pair of truffles at the close. "Poor Richard's Almanack" is a meditation (inspired by Benjamin Franklin's threadbare philosopher) on the institutions and process by which foreign policy is made in our curious republic. "Auguries" alerts us to current events that, though overlooked

in the mainstream media, signal important future trends in world affairs or mark the completion of an historic change. "La Longue Durée" is an exercise in institutional memory, recalling the not infrequent occasions on which past *Orbis* authors have, for better or worse, read the signs of their times with rather more imagination than their conventional peers.

Let us know if you enjoy these new features. But if, as Irving predicted, we earn only bruises, pray let your blows be gentle.

In These Pages

"Will the power and prestige of the white man in the Far East be what it has been in the past?" asked Pearl Buck in 1940. With the Japanese marching under the slogan "Asia for the Asians," and the European powers preoccupied with Hitler's war, Buck yearned for her fellow Americans to show some "Far Eastern imagination" for a change. But "their shadow upon the future of the Far East lies very light and indistinct, and will continue to do so as long as they do not make it a reality."² It took Pearl Harbor to goad the United States into standing tall and casting that shadow. By 1945, Americans had realized their century-

¹ Quoted in Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 5.

² Pearl S. Buck, "The Future of the White Man in the Far East," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1940, pp. 23-33 (quote on p. 23).

old dream of military and economic hegemony in the Pacific, and Franklin Roosevelt had sold Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek on his blueprint for the Asia of the future. But the Asians themselves perversely refused to play the roles the "white man" assigned to them. The Maoists took over China, then the North Koreans and Vietnamese took matters into their own hands. After fifty years of cold war in Asia, the United States awoke to find itself in military, political, and economic retreat and once again the American shadow lies "light and indistinct" over the Western Pacific.

Of course, we do not refer to the "Far East" or "Orient" anymore—those terms are damned as Eurocentric. So we substitute "East Asia" (even though the word "Asia" began as the Roman name for a province in present-day Turkey, hence no less Eurocentric). But whatever we call it, Asia today is returning, after an interlude of half a millennium, to a natural geopolitical condition, unperturbed either by Western imperialism or ideological conflict. Never, for five hundred years, have Western governments confronted an Asia whose people were sufficiently strong and free to seek their own equilibrium and shape their own political and economic structures. Imagine, therefore, a coming century in which East and West are again in rough technological and military balance, as they were before the European Renaissance, but this time not separated from each other by vast oceans and primitive forms of transportation, but instead bound up in the same global system of communications and trade, armed with world-girdling weapons,

and intimately dependent upon one another.

What would a natural geopolitics of Asia look like? How far afield will China hold sway? Which countries will prove to be natural friends or rivals? How will the regional politics of East Asia influence those of Southeast, South, or Central Asia? Is a Confucian/Islamic coalition against "wicked Western Civilization" in the works, as scaremongers suggest? Or will the very retreat of Western power from Asian affairs prompt the Confucian and Islamic civilizations to clash with each other along boundaries of continental expanse? What, if anything, can Russia or the United States do to influence the struggle for security and pelf in the coming "Asian century"? Of one fact alone can we be certain, and that is that Asians themselves will answer these questions in the decades to come, with or without our input.

In these pages, a roster of distinguished experts surveys the relations among East Asian states and between each and the United States, instructing us on the long-range trends for which we had better be prepared. Karl D. Jackson bemoans the recent American loss of face in Asia, and identifies the necessary antidotes. Arthur Waldron reinterprets twentieth-century Chinese history in terms not of revolution but the quest for constitutional legitimacy, with mighty consequences for its foreign policy. James E. Auer explains why the United States and Japan must strengthen their now historic friendship, and suggests how to do it. Paul Bracken dissects the current and future crises on the Korean peninsula. Gilbert Rozman analyzes the dynam-

ics of the Northeast Asian triangle—China, Russia, Japan—and pleads for a new scholarship to prepare us for its coming importance. Last, but not least, Jonathan Clarke assesses the chances that the Asian Pacific Economic Community can serve as the framework for regional peace and prosperity.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

William Henry Seward, secretary of state to Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant, was among the first to name the Pacific the “chief theater in the events of the world's great hereafter,” and predict an American “encounter [with] oriental civilization on the shores of the Pacific.”³ In 1870, he went there himself. In Tokyo, as Edo had been renamed two years before by the leaders of the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese pressed Seward to tell them how the United States collects taxes, takes a census, and budgets the government. Seward was impressed, but worried. “Japan has especial reasons for prudence,” he wrote, “The empire is a solitary planet, that has remained stationary for centuries, until now it is suddenly brought into contact with constellations that, while they shed a dazzling light, continually threaten destructive collisions.”⁴

³ Walter A. McDougall, *Let the Sea Make a Noise. . . . A History of the North Pacific from Magellan to MacArthur* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 300.

⁴ William Henry Seward, *Travels around the World* (New York: Appleton, 1873), p. 85.

After the last of those collisions subsided in 1945, Japan was obliged to retreat once again from world and regional politics. But now, in the 1990s, its sabbatical is over. Japan has only a matter of years before it must take up an orbit again, however scary the prospect. But it isn't only Japan that must find its true function in the Asia/Pacific system. China and Russia and both Koreas are in massive flux at home, and have no constructive historical models to draw on. Even the United States must reinvent what it means to be an Asian power now that Japanese and Soviet imperialism are extinct, and Chinese communism a sick man. Has there ever been an era of history when so many great powers were adrift at once, and so few known quantities available from which to fashion a stable new order? . . .

The Mandate of Heaven is up for grabs. Any Chinese soothsayer will tell you that the typhoons, floods, and earthquakes that have abounded there of late hint at a change of dynasty. But when a comet breaks into twenty-one pieces and slams into Jupiter, the greatest of planets, with a force of a million hydrogen bombs, all doubt is removed. The Celestial Wheel is about to turn. And if you doubt it, consider that freakish comets and Northern Lights presaged the fall of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, and that the fall of the Ch'ing (Manchu) Dynasty in 1911 occurred just three years after the Tunguska Event, when *something* weighing perhaps half a million tons crashed into Siberia at a speed of sixty-two-thousand miles per hour. I do not say I believe in such omens, but do not say that I don't. That would invite very bad *joss*. . . .

Which reminds me that James Clavell recently died. I could never get through *Shōgun*, and watched the TV series instead. But I recently bought his *Tai-Pan* to read on the endless flight back from Taipei, and devoured every page. How sad to discover a fine novelist only to read his obituary in the next morning's paper. . . .

Recent East Asian history is chock full of irony, not least of which is that the only Asian government with which the Clinton administration has improved our relations is the one in Hanoi. Consider, too, that the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War had to have been the worst thing that could have happened to the Soviet Union. Not only did Stalin have to relinquish all the imperial privileges in Manchuria that he received from his treaty with Nationalist China, he must also have known that China would never play the role of a satellite like Bulgaria or Mongolia, but was bound to challenge Moscow for supremacy in the communist world. And that means that Mao's triumph was also a long-range advantage for the United States and Europe. More curious yet, the loss of the Mainland was the best thing that could have happened to the Kuomintang. Freed of the incalculable burden of trying to govern and modernize all of war-torn China, the Nationalists repaired to the manageable island of Taiwan, and proceeded to make of it the

most dynamic and democratic "tiger" of all.

Likewise, defeat in the Pacific War was a mercy—albeit a terribly severe one—for Japan. Allied military might and General Douglas MacArthur's occupation purged Japan of the military mysticism that had short-circuited parliamentary government and prevented the country from realizing its economic potential. The outcome of the Korean War—stalemate and division—was also the best that the Japanese could have hoped for, although they were too wise and polite to say so at the time. Korea in the hands of some other great power is a dagger pointed at the heart of Nippon—the Meiji military planners themselves said exactly that. Which leads one to ask: who today really wants to see Korea united into a regional economic and military power numbering sixty millions? Not the Japanese, not the Koreans themselves under current conditions. Do we Americans, or the Chinese, or Russians? Like Taiwan, South Korea is making many new friends thanks to its prosperity and emerging democracy. But it remains to be seen whether Seoul and Taipei will win the support they deserve when and if the chips are down. . . .

Then again, I returned from there this summer with a question that wouldn't let go: Is there anything *free* Asians cannot achieve?



Poor Richard's Almanack

by Richard Saunders

Running the State Department

Benjamin Franklin began his *Poor Richard's* almanacs with the confession that he wrote them for money, not only for the "publick good." He filled the almanacs with (as he put it) "moral Sentences, prudent Maxims, and wise Sayings" that we would do well to rediscover. Among those published in the year 1743, for instance, are tips on how to gather grapes, tread them and ferment them into wine, according to a strict calendar stretching from September to Christmas. "These directions," he cautioned, "are not design'd for those who are skilled in making wine, but for those who have hitherto had no Acquaintance with that Art."¹

This author claims no authority equal to that of Franklin, except insofar as he, too, occasionally writes for money (as well as the public good). But insofar as American diplomacy (of which Franklin was the founder) seems frequently to reside with those lacking "Acquaintance with that Art," allow me to tender the following tips on the proper ferment-

tation of foreign policy from the curious vines that flourish in the bogs of Foggy Bottom.

The Secretary's Perspective

The most important quality a secretary of state can bring to his task is perspective, for without a distinctive outlook no chief, however brilliant, can impose meaning, purpose, and direction on the flow of events. But such imposition, which is the essence of policy making, is an unnatural act for any bureaucracy. The State Department, for instance, is well designed to *contribute* to policy but not to make it, for the simple reason that the technical specialists, geographical bureaus, and far-flung ambassadors espy elements of an issue but rarely the whole; or the whole issue, but not the impact of one issue upon another. Indeed, the very routine at State—the meetings, action memoranda, and numerous petty acts required of the Foreign Service by statute—ensures a busy but not necessarily productive day. In short, by attempting to impose policy, the secretary necessarily disturbs his own

¹ Benjamin Franklin, *Poor Richard: The Almanacks for the Years 1733–1758* (Garden City, N.J.: Collector's Library), p. 98.

department's routine and particularisms.

Secretaries of state, therefore, must either "beat 'em or join 'em" by one of two approaches: (1) the strategic gaze, or (2) the case-by-case approach. A strategic gaze permits the ordering of policies to reflect large, related overall goals, but of course it risks overlooking the very details—sometimes crucial details—that desk officers and ambassadors are paid to master. The case-by-case grind, by contrast, risks the missing of the forest for the trees. Seemingly intelligent reactions to immediate conditions in the Balkans or Russia, for example, may add up to profound folly in the absence of savvy about the connections between the two. But whatever the merits of the two approaches, the fact is that secretaries-as-strategists encounter a great deal more friction with the natural rhythms of the State Department than do those who adopt the case-by-case approach.

The Secretary's Management Style

The perspective of the secretary, in turn, dictates his management style. Consider, for instance, foreign policy by cabal (Henry Kissinger comes to mind) or by institution (George Shultz, in part).

Foreign policy by cabal restricts the action to a select few in the secretary's ambit (ten to twenty) and excludes the rest of the department from policy making and indeed from any information about it. The Foreign Service hates cabals because professionals (whether or not they

agree with a given policy) do not like to be made to feel useless.

The cabal offers swift, decisive action, often free of damaging leaks. In fact, Kissinger discovered that one cannot run a cabal unless the secretary himself becomes the chief leaker, further humiliating an unhappy bureaucracy and tempting it to try to thwart him. What is more, a secretive secretary and his principal agents are subject to early "burn out," perhaps even losing their ability to think strategically because of overwork. In such a war of attrition against one's own department, the "cabalero" is bound to lose sooner or later as the bureaucracy begins to get the better of him through its legion of domestic and foreign contacts.

An institutional approach, by contrast, makes use of the State Department's resources but runs the risk of the secretary's becoming either a prisoner of compartmentalized thinking or a votary of the case-by-case approach. Shultz attempted to avoid this (as did Alexander Haig) by relying on the Office of Policy Planning and an inner circle to keep him trained on the "big picture" and alive to new elements. But Policy Planning has not always been very effective, largely because the director and the staff tend to become "operational" themselves—that is, concerned with the daily business of the State Department in a way that replicates the secretarial schedule.

Judging between the two styles, the cabal best serves a secretary who does not plan to stay long and who wants to do only a very few things. The institutional style is much to be preferred for the longer haul but only if Policy Planning or some

other office can be made to function well—that is, to help the secretary retain a secretarial perspective, despite the rush of events, crises, and the daily schedule.

The Role of Policy Planning

Theoretically, the Office of Policy Planning takes the secretarial perspective (or gives him one) and turns it into a strategy: where the United States should be going and why; the elements of the plan; the steps to be taken; and something of the marching orders. The Policy Planning staff has another function: monitoring progress or regress and suggesting corrections. Lastly, because it is the repository of strategy, Policy Planning is the logical bailiwick of the secretary's speechwriters. But these multiple functions are just what make Policy Planning a difficult place to work. Is it a high-level, semi-operational bureau "clearing" telegrams, memoranda, and cables; or is it a cloistered, in-house "think-tank"? To the extent that it is the former, the director is bound to end up in turf fights with tattle-tale bureaus. To the extent that it is the latter, it risks falling into irrelevance because of its lack of information. The speechwriters, meanwhile, are usually the most frustrated of the lot.

There is a draconian cure for all this. First, the director of Policy Planning must share the secretary's confidence on all issues. Hence, they had better like and respect each other. Secondly, the director and secretary must understand that the secretary's *mind*, not the department's desks, is the true arena of policy planning.


Thirdly, the director must discipline himself to ignore the daily cable traffic and concentrate only on whatever crosses the secretary's desk. Fourthly, the speechwriters need time with the secretary—not much, but enough to get a feel for his style and thought so that a given speech need go through only three drafts, not thirteen. First drafts of substantive speeches, moreover, should always be prepared by the regional or functional bureaus, *not* Policy Planning. That forces the bureaus to be constructive and saves the speechwriters for more aesthetic and intellectual activity.

Policy Planning's product should consist of three items only: the "strategic" memo, or overall planning document; the "review and advance" memo that monitors a policy's progress and suggests revisions; and the speeches that give expression to, and rally support for, policy.

Other Bureaus and Posts

We have now arrived at a State Department that is run institutionally, but subject to secretarial perspective nourished into strategy and policy by Policy Planning. The rest of the bureaus and posts may be divided conventionally into the *thinking* function, the *monitoring-enforcing* function, and the *action* function. To put it visually:

The secretary will find that the political/military and economic divisions do not have the horses to do much more than keep track of essential business but that such a monitoring function is vital to knowing what the other big bureaucracies are doing.



The deputy secretary, under secretary for policy, and counselor are “enforcers” charged with the execution of the secretary’s wishes once decisions are made. One of these three, therefore, ought to know the bureaus and their tribal habits very well; he ought to have a nose for disasters in the making.

The job of counsel is a hunting license, but one best used for limited, specific tasks. The rule is, the smaller the office, the less stamina for the longer haul.

The best vehicle for coordinating all the bureaus is an early or late meeting (sometimes both) of the principals so that planners at the top can move the institution without being swamped in hourly operations.

The Departmental Culture and the Foreign Service

The Foreign Service resembles the military in that it possesses expertise, rank, hierarchy, and—to judge by the suits and ties—even its own uniform. In fact, its expertise is often squandered by the rotation system, its rank falsified by “networks,” and its hierarchy long on chiefs and short on Indians. Typically, for example, an assistant secretary will spend much of the day in exhausting meetings, then return to his paperwork at 4 p.m. only to face an angry executive secretary demanding overdue memoranda. Such memoranda inevitably end up being composed by the most junior people in the bureau—the ones whose lack

of experience and clout disqualify them from the meetings. The results are predictably poor.

Not much can be done about the cycle of meetings, because the interagency process, not to speak of the Department of State, often requires it. But the key element is this: loyalty down means loyalty up. That is, the Foreign Service and the political appointees want above all to be a part of things, to do the job they think they are responsible for and qualified to do. If a secretary of state actually looks like he is making policy, and if that secretary gives his Foreign Service the time of day and the courtesies

of participation, then the Department of State will be a happy (even modestly efficient) place.

It should therefore not be counted a diminution of political authority to have as executive secretary or under secretary of state a Foreign Service officer—someone who knows the system, knows how to assuage egos, and knows how to keep the secretary's mind off of mind-numbing routine. The secretary, in turn, should possess the qualities deemed essential by Poor Richard himself in all who travel uncharted terrain: "a hog's nose, deer's legs, and ass's back."²



² Ibid., p. 46.

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How to Rebuild America's Stature in Asia

by Karl D. Jackson

With the implosion of the Soviet Union, a second Pax Americana should have dawned across the Pacific with a brilliance unrivaled since the closing days of World War II. America's economic, military, and ideological rival for the hearts and minds of Asia had utterly collapsed, and the U.S. system of bilateral alliances reigned supreme. A coalition of moderate, democratic, market-oriented nations had triumphed over a statist, authoritarian system burdened by imperial overstretch and pressured by resolute Western policies. Moreover, the American economy, in sheer size and adaptability, outperformed those of its strategic allies. In the late 1980s, America was creating jobs and increasing productivity and competitiveness while Europe lagged behind on both counts, and Japan fell into a hubris-shattering, post-bubble retraction. By all measures, the United States, leader of the triumphant Free World, should have enjoyed a renewed dominance, not only in day-to-day political affairs, but as a model for societies throughout the world.

This did not happen. In just a few short years, thanks to macro-economic changes in Asia and American errors of omission and commission, the United States has become marginalized, demonstrating the increasing irrelevance for Asia of both American power and the American model. The alliance system fostered since the 1950s has been allowed to atrophy. The Philippine bases are gone. The linchpin of peace and stability in the Pacific, the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement, has been so dramatically reduced in vitality that at present Japan would be incapable of providing meaningful help in a military crisis, even in Korea, Japan's own backyard. Attempts to bend China to U.S. human-rights standards have been rejected, not only by the Mainland's communist octogenarians, but by governments across Asia that formerly followed America's lead. North Korea has fabricated nuclear bombs, or at least developed the wherewithal to do so. The ensuing diplomatic dance between Washington and Pyongyang has demonstrated the absence of political and military will on the part of the United States, thereby undercutting the global non-proliferation regime and the

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adequacy of American deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Because of Congressional activity and the absence of strong White House leadership, the fourth largest country in the world, Indonesia, no longer looks to the United States for the overseas training of its officer corps. In addition, among elites throughout Asia there has been a precipitous decline in American credibility. America's general inattentiveness, high-caste political moralizing, and unpredictability combine to dilute the authority America might have exercised in Asia after the cold war. Instead, America is charged with interfering in Asian internal affairs (through its human rights and trade policies) while displaying at home the moral decadence and social pollution that communist and noncommunist Asian societies alike strive to avoid.

A balanced assessment must also acknowledge some successes of U.S. policy in Asia. First, the Bush and Clinton administrations brought the Uruguay Round to a beneficial conclusion. Secondly, Bill Clinton's APEC summit in Seattle in November 1993 gave fresh impetus to the process of transpacific economic integration begun under George Bush. Thirdly, the U.S. government increased the emphasis placed on the promotion of U.S. exports and investment abroad. Fourthly, in China, the Clinton administration delinked human rights from Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Fifthly, President Clinton avoided a trade war with Japan by backing away from its own goal of numerical targets for trade. Sixthly, the Cambodian civil war has been brought, at least temporarily, to a close, and the process of U.S. normalization with Vietnam has begun.

Unfortunately, the decline in American credibility and Washington's neglect of security arrangements will, at the end of the day, reduce the importance of these six achievements as Asians march off in several directions, relatively free from American influence.

Historic Sources of Marginalization

Why is the United States in danger of being "marginalized" in the coming Asia-Pacific century? First, the Asia of old was dominated by the West because Asian poverty remained so conspicuous in the midst of vast human and natural resources. But the Asia of the last decade of the twentieth century, populous *and* brimming with profit, is less willing to accede to the blandishments of any outsiders. Throughout Asia there is a heightened sense of Asia's new importance and the degree to which its achievements are homegrown rather than the product of Western tutelage. Hence, part of the decline in American credibility is the inevitable by-product of successful growth. Taking just China as an example, the coastal population of nearly three hundred million (roughly the size of Western Europe) has expanded its income at nearly 10 percent per annum for the last ten years and is dragging the remaining nine hundred million Chinese towards economic rebirth.

Secondly, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and Singapore all believe they have found faster, better ways to achieve economic development and social change than the West. With important variations, they believe in the

superiority of an export-oriented, state-directed, semi-protected variant of market-oriented economies over the domestically led, individualistic, free-trade model characteristic of the United States and Western Europe.

Thirdly, the ability of any U.S. government to force Asia to do America's bidding has declined in direct relationship to the proportion of a country's exports being sold in the U.S. market. Other Asian markets have begun to absorb Asian goods. A Japan can more readily "say no" in the 1990s because the proportion of Japanese exports sold in the United States has declined from 40 percent in the 1980s to 28 percent.

Self-Inflicted Marginalization

Although part of Asia's new confidence and self-assertiveness can be directly attributed to rapid economic growth and declining dependence on the U.S. marketplace, economic trends alone cannot explain the rapidity with which the American sun has been setting in Asia over the last several years. Policies emanating from Washington have significantly increased the speed with which America is being relegated to the role of just "another outside power" rather than "the indispensable other power" without which major undertakings simply cannot be executed.

International credibility is derived from a combination of realistic goals, proportionate capabilities, a coherent alliance system, and the ability to execute policies under crisis conditions. The United States has suffered from a precipitous decline in credibility around the globe because it has simultaneously expanded its goals while shrinking capabilities, weakening vital alliances, and displaying disturbing indecisiveness in situations of crisis.

The Bush administration planned to cut U.S. military forces by approximately one-quarter, and the Clinton administration plans to cut more deeply. Morale in the U.S. armed forces has plummeted, and levels of readiness have suffered from budget shortfalls. American forces have been used in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda and are on call for Bosnia. Overextension and underfunding have led most knowledgeable military experts in the Pentagon to conclude privately that the present force structure could not fight and win two regional conflicts simultaneously. Both U.S. political parties agree that the defense budget is underfunded, although they disagree over whether underfunding equals \$40 billion or \$140 billion over the next five years. If current shortfalls remain unrectified, America's capability to fight more than one war at a time will be dramatically reduced, replaced in a few years with a win-one, hold-one strategy that for political reasons will become a win-one, abandon-one strategy. A single contingency defense strategy presents an open invitation to aggression by a Baghdad or a Pyongyang whenever the United States becomes committed to any other contingency. Friend and foe alike in Asia will include such considerations in their calculations of American credibility in the late 1990s.

The shortfall in force capabilities is exacerbated by the Clinton administration's inclination towards universalistic goals such as the "enlargement" of

democracy and western-style civil liberties and rights around the globe, and the use of American military force in humanitarian relief roles in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and wherever television cameras intrude next. Lives will be saved, but military capabilities will erode—especially when multi-billion dollar expenditures are subtracted from operations, maintenance, and training budgets. For Asia and the Pacific, this will mean a *de facto* decline in U.S. presence as carriers, aircraft, and troops decrease their operating tempo to make up for funds expended on non-military missions.

Alliances can provide a structure for peace and stability even in an era of declining capabilities and expanding missions. Rather than single-handedly funding and fighting Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States mobilized a coalition specifically tailored to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Personal relationships among heads of state, alliance habits from the cold war, and the interests of regional powers combined to produce overwhelming force at little cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

Alliance *tending*, however, has been conspicuously neglected by the Clinton administration, and this marks a strategic departure from the conduct of American foreign policy over the past forty-five years. President Bush's habit of personally cultivating foreign-policy makers through Oval Office meetings and telephone diplomacy has largely been abandoned. Now, instead of investing in personal contacts that can be mobilized during subsequent crises, the Clinton administration initiates contacts chiefly when Washington needs something. Japanese prime ministers Kiichi Miyazawa and Morihiro Hosokawa were denounced on the White House lawn over trade rather than lavishly praised as loyal allies; neither Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata nor his successor Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama has turned up in Washington, breaking the tradition of consulting the American president immediately after assuming office. In combination, the dovish inclinations of the Murayama government, the declining relevance attached to the security treaty by Washington, America's waning credibility, and Japan's chronic pacifism probably preclude Japanese participation in any Korean military contingency or even U.S. use of Japanese airfields and ports. Under such circumstances, a Korean military crisis might just explode the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

On balance during the cold war, the United States refrained from sacrificing the good will of major allies in order to curry favor with domestic political constituencies, or offending allied or friendly major powers (such as Japan and China) over issues not vital to national security (such as human rights and sectoral trade problems). Nor did the United States expend major military assets for famine relief or peacekeeping in nonstrategic areas. Under the Clinton administration these prudent inhibitions no longer apply and more time is spent consulting with Russia than on maintaining NATO or U.S.-Japan security arrangements.

Why has the current administration jettisoned valuable personal diplomacy and alliance tending? In part, it is because the locus of foreign-policy making has moved out of the Oval Office and State Department and into the offices of domestic special interests groups (as in the case of Haiti and Cuba)

or the United Nations Security Council (as in the case of Bosnia and North Korea). The Clinton administration arrived in office convinced that America should pare down the international burden it carried for so long. Pushing foreign-policy decision making out of the White House allowed President Clinton to function primarily as a domestic policy specialist. In contrast, the Bush administration used the United Nations as a symbolic spearhead for a grand coalition organized and orchestrated by a hands-on president making critical decisions in the Oval Office. Unfortunately, decreased interest in foreign policy in Washington and the institutional incapacity of the United Nations to enforce its will decisively, especially in situations requiring the use of force, have resulted in more resolutions than solutions to collective security problems. The international system has not yet learned to function well without an American president who is fully involved and committed to carrying out his role as leader of the Western alliance.

The Clinton administration's disheveled appearance in times of international crisis has contributed to America's declining credibility in Asia. Apparently, neither intelligence briefers nor the secretary of state can get the president to allocate time systematically to foreign affairs until a problem reaches crisis proportions. With the exception of former president Carter, there seems to be little delegation of authority, in spite of the fact that President Clinton spends less time on foreign-policy matters than his predecessors. As a result of these unique organizational arrangements, U.S. foreign policy has had a stop-start quality featuring rapid reversals that leave friend and foe alike to await the next alteration from Washington before making firm commitments of their own.

For Asians, the proliferation crisis in North Korea is a litmus test of American seriousness. Korea is the only challenge, on a *vital* national security matter, heretofore faced by the Clinton administration. The statements of the president himself are contradictory, alternatively bellicose and conciliatory, changing sometimes within just a few hours. That characterizes the administration as a whole. At the Pentagon in the morning, the secretary of defense may talk tough only to have his position diminished by conciliatory statements from the White House in the afternoon. Nearly anarchic decision making became a public spectacle when the present president allowed former president Carter to go to North Korea, and the whole world watched as President Carter changed U.S. policy on CNN. President Clinton expressed his anger to the press by saying: "Look, the policy of the United States is what I said it was yesterday." The underlying causes of the crisis were papered over without being resolved, and the credibility of North Korea vis-à-vis Washington foreign-policy makers was enhanced.

An inability to coordinate policy within the administration has been matched by strong dissent from allies who feel their views and interests are being ignored. For almost forty years, American policy avoided direct U.S. negotiations with North Korea because this would have undermined the international position of South Korea and allowed the North to play the United States off against its southern ally. In its attempt to diffuse the proliferation crisis, the opposite has been allowed to happen. The United States is directly negotiating

with North Korea, and the president of South Korea has publicly denounced the softness of the U.S. position. In turn, on a background basis, American officials are telling newspapers that the South Koreans are intentionally trying to undermine the talks and that Washington policy makers cannot contemplate tough measures in Korea before the November 1994 elections. From a tactical point of view, the situation could hardly be better for Pyongyang. North Korea is negotiating directly with the United States, the United States and South Korea are denouncing one another in the press, and high-level U.S. officials are telegraphing the weakness of American political will on the Korean peninsula.

Alleviating Marginality

For the United States to return to the position of dominance it occupied in Asia at the end of the cold war is probably impossible. The world has changed, and trying to resurrect the past would be frustrating and futile. The current free fall in American credibility can, however, be halted.

First, Washington needs a full review of all its policies towards Asia. Interagency turf battles usually preclude coherent policy design, but the NSC could conduct such an internal review. All policy goals are not created equal, and the conclusion of an NSC review should be used to prioritize the demands of other agencies.

Secondly, that global policy review must prioritize U.S. national interests and emphasize the need to restore the military capacity and political will necessary to insure peace and stability. On a global basis, the review must differentiate among interests that are vital to U.S. national security, which are very important (but not vital), and interests that are less important. Protecting and defending the United States and its citizens remains our most vital national interest, and this is why higher accord should be given to the North Korean problem than to any other short-term problem in Asia. Similarly, preservation of peace and stability in Asia is a vital long-term national security interest. This requires increased emphasis on the importance of the alliance system as the structure for maintaining peace. In the future, APEC will assume greater importance for similar reasons.

Thirdly, after protecting and defending the United States and stabilizing the structure of peace in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy should aim to ensure the prosperity of the United States. Trade and human rights, while important national interests, are less critical than buttressing the structure of peace on which everything depends. That is why neither trade nor human rights should be allowed to jeopardize either the U.S.-Japan security agreement or a friendly relationship with China. The United States should seek to open markets, but a balanced and coherent foreign policy would integrate trade interests with overall national-security goals. Japan should be pushed to open its markets and deregulate its society, but these ends are best accomplished through quiet, not noisy, diplomacy. Talk of trade war is fool's gold, all bluff and few positive consequences outside of ephemeral domestic political advan-

tages. By emphasizing the importance of the U.S.-Japan security agreement, an American president gives his Japanese counterpart the political cover at home behind which he can craft reforms that will improve trade. Trade hawks advise diminishing the emphasis given to the security relationship, as a means of putting pressure on Japan, but this tactic is counterproductive because it weakens the ability of Japanese prime ministers to deliver meaningful concessions.

Fourthly, we should continue to promote American values in Asia, but with a sense of realism and proportion. China is too massive and too old to be changed by sermons from Washington. Time, trade, and social modernization can be abetted by a strong declarative human-rights policy that stops short of trying to coerce those who are too big, too powerful, and too proud to be moved by empty threats.

Fifthly, the United States must fund fully a military establishment commensurate with its geopolitical goals. Credibility will be restored if Congress and the president fully fund the shortfalls in the military budget while continuing to reshape the military to make it more mobile.

Sixthly, foreign policy is the essence of the presidency, and not a sideshow staged only as domestic issues permit. There is no substitute for presidential leadership. The president should be briefed daily, and his foreign-policy team should be strengthened.

Lastly, putting the U.S. domestic house in order is critical to the re-establishment of the United States as a model to be imitated rather than scorned. Asia recognizes that America has already put part of its economic house in order through widespread private restructuring. Successful re-engineering has made U.S. manufacturing and service industries world leaders once again in many areas. The United States consumes more than it produces and inevitably runs a trade surplus. The much more rapidly growing proportion of elderly in Japan will expend savings and reverse this trend. Likewise, removing taxes on savings in the United States, and shifting taxes partially to consumption, over time, will resolve the trade deficit and make America a more productive society. Likewise, we must break the crime epidemic once and for all. In sum, we must stop preaching and return to leading by example, by the example of what the most powerful, productive, and benevolent society in the world can become in the twenty-first century. For the alternative is simply that there will be no "Pacific century"; there will be only an "Asian century."





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EA4

China's Coming Constitutional Challenges

by Arthur Waldron

As the years of Deng Xiaoping's paramouncy draw to a close, the most fundamental issues facing the People's Republic of China today—official pronouncements notwithstanding—are in essence the same that confronted the USSR a decade ago when Konstantin Chernenko died: namely, regime transition and constitutional structure. Moreover, the manner in which the Chinese solve, or fail to solve, these issues will affect far more than domestic governance alone. The influence of domestic change in China, as in the Soviet case, is bound to spill out, perhaps messily, into the international arena and bring with it either promise or threat to East Asia, all of Asia, perhaps the world.

These facts are worth stressing if only because so many China watchers today are necessarily preoccupied with the short term. When will Deng Xiaoping die? Can Jiang Zemin hold on as general secretary and Li Peng as prime minister? Or will palace politics make a turning, with perhaps Zhao Ziyang, the disgraced reformer, reappearing? But the short-term rearrangements of the current communist leadership—important as they are—can tell us little about the middle and longer term, dominated as it is by the questions: What is the future of the People's Republic as a regime? Does it have a future? And what are the implications of that future for the rest of the world?

China's striking economic progress, and the openness and pragmatism associated with it, are causes for substantial optimism. But the picture is by no means entirely positive. Domestically, none of the basic causes have been removed that produced the democracy movement and Tiananmen massacre of five years ago: neither the grievances of the people nor the inflexibility of the government. Internationally, China's neighbors are increasingly dissatisfied by Beijing's almost total lack of flexibility in dealing with territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Taiwan, and worried by its steady military buildup. It is no exaggeration to say that China's present situation, if it is projected *without change* into the future, must provoke some sort of crisis within a few years:

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domestically, a major strike, perhaps, in which the regime's survival will depend on the loyalty of this or that element of the People's Liberation Army, or a foreign adventure, such as a serious sea battle in the Spratly Islands, or a combination of domestic and external conflicts.

Yet despite such possibilities, U.S. policy makers can sometimes seem blandly optimistic about both the future of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and of Asia in general. Thus, the complex and potentially destabilizing linkages between economics and politics in the People's Republic of China are summed up by Winston Lord, an architect of policy in both Democratic and Republican administrations, as a matter of "restoring firm foundations for cooperation with China when political openness catches up with economic reform,"¹ as if that process were straightforward or simple. As for East Asia as a whole, another policy architect, Richard Solomon, describes it today as "a region that really is not burdened by major security threats."² True, we hear some talk about the need to adjust to China's incipient superpower status—in the next century. But the United States's Asia policy today seems implicitly to assume a stable PRC that will play a more or less positive role in Asia and the Pacific.

Why? The reason is perhaps the same that operated in the Soviet case. It is not that policy makers are unaware of, or underestimate, the difficulties facing China. Rather, they assume, as they did with Mikhail Gorbachev, that the new generation of Chinese leaders will be able to solve them, and do so more or less within the frameworks, domestic and international, with which we are familiar. In short, we assume that China *must* move in the "right" direction, because to assume otherwise would force us to call into question every other aspect of our military and economic strategy.

This optimistic assumption in turn informs our thinking about the whole range of China-related issues. As the Soviet Union did, the People's Republic of China promises to bequeath to its successors a list of difficult, and even explosive, problems in foreign relations. To name but a few: as these words are being written, the future resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is not determined; the future of Hong Kong is in question; Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries are drifting into collision with China over territorial claims in the South China sea; relations between Taiwan and mainland China are still threatening; problems with China's Tibetan and Muslim populations are unresolved. How these China-linked problems are resolved will affect other questions at least as important: Will ASEAN become a military bloc? Will India and China compete or collaborate? Will Japan undertake a larger security role in Asia? The common thread in all these questions is that none can be answered except in light of China's future course. More consideration ought perhaps be given to the less optimistic possibilities for that future, and their implications.

¹ Winston Lord, "U.S. Goals in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Michael D. Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 9.

² Richard Solomon, "Post-Cold War Security Structures," in Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century*, p. 245.

Political Change Is Inescapable

That China has wisely avoided the mistakes of the USSR is close to common wisdom today.³ Support for the argument can seem very strong. Economics is the main piece of evidence: the USSR that Chernenko bequeathed to Gorbachev was an economic shambles, and Gorbachev has often been criticized for not reforming it before undertaking political changes. By contrast, the China that Deng Xiaoping leaves behind is economically vigorous. But what exactly are the implications for China of this contrast? Is it that China can avoid facing political and constitutional issues, or that doing so will be substantially easier in China than in Russia?

Let us assume that Gorbachev had done what his critics urged, put economics first, and achieved growth comparable to what China has enjoyed. At what point should he then have turned his attention to political questions? Specifically, would a decade of growth in Russia, comparable to what China has enjoyed, have brought him to that point? If the answer is yes (as it really must be), then one can ask how different the results of that political opening would have been? Would prosperity have smoothed the way for continued one-party Communist rule? Or would it—as it seems to do elsewhere—have undermined that possibility? And would resolution of the political issues whose consideration had been deferred—legitimacy, individual rights, and constitutional form, among others—have turned out to be significantly easier? The fact is that while economic development may make political change easier, it also intensifies and deepens demands for that change.

The real lesson of the USSR for China is that political change is both inescapable and bound to be difficult. In the USSR, perestroika was begun and failed; in China, not even economic changes are fully institutionalized, while political change has not only not begun, it has been resisted. For China, the hurdle where the USSR tumbled still lies ahead.

That is true even though what might be called the transition out of communism in the visual and rhetorical realms has already been largely achieved in China. The red flag with five gold stars still flies there, of course, and Mao Zedong's portrait still hangs at the Gate of Heavenly Peace. But the streets and shops of Beijing, not to mention those of the booming south and coast, Guangzhou for example, have lost the socialist character that was once so pronounced. The enterprises are commercial and many are effectively privately owned; the crowds of shoppers dress in fashion; even the style of signs has changed: traditional and modernistic calligraphy instead of the once uniform, red-painted simplified characters on a white background. The same is true of the intellectual landscape: communist ideas are barely visible, except in official publications, and ring false when expressed; they seem out of place in today's

³ With some dissent, see, for example, "Where Russia and China Meet," *The Economist*, Sept. 3, 1994, pp. 20–21.

China, rather like the occasional poor, stranded statues of Mao Zedong that one still encounters.

But this hollowing out of communism cannot, as some observers seem to expect, itself create a new regime. A functional state requires institutional structures. Moreover, these are not spontaneously generated; they must be designed and built. Yet in China today, what we see is a growing gap between the codified institutional structures of government, and the needs, behavior, and realities of everyday life. Society and government are disentangling themselves and going their own ways, which is not good for either. Society cannot exist ungoverned nor can an economy grow without a legal system, nor, in

the end, can a government survive without a social base. Talk of pragmatism, and the use of rhetorical resolutions, such as "one country, two systems," which are the staple both of Chinese officials and optimistic commentators, are simply not sufficient responses to the needs and challenges.

Nor is talk about Chinese nationalism. Some commentators believe that nationalism can function as the glue that will hold the People's Republic together after the last vestiges of communism wither away. This would seem to be at least part of the government's plan as well, for, since Mao Zedong's death in 1976, it has increasingly discarded the rhetoric and symbolism of communism (which was the avowed enemy of the inherited Chinese culture) and embraced instead the idea of China's traditional greatness and its five thousand years of history, most recently even Confucianism.

These expedients, however, are likely to prove inadequate. Like pure pragmatism in administration and economics, nationalism as a unifying ideology will not prove sufficient in politics. China's last hundred years are a story of creating national-

ism, to be sure, but an especially conflictual form of nationalism. Far from unifying China, national pride and a shared awareness of the need for national strength have regularly intensified internal political conflict. The political contenders of twentieth-century China have all been avowed nationalists—Yuan Shikai, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, even Wang Jingwei. But they have quarreled bitterly about the political expression of that nationalism, be it monarchy, militarism, communism, a constitutional republic, even collaboration or confrontation with the Japanese or Western imperialists. As for Confucianism, it has always served as the moral basis for a system of rule, and not that system itself.

For all its antiquity, greatness, and strength, China is like Italy or Germany in the sense that it is a civilization that has not easily found its modern political form. To be sure, cultural cohesion has repeatedly sustained China when politics failed. But culture or civilization are not substitutes for politics, and the economic and social changes now irreversibly under way in China pose political questions that require answers. As at earlier times in this century, culture provides the materials and sets the limits for the debate about those questions. Any attempt to understand China's future, and its implications for the rest of the world,

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cannot neglect these large questions of legitimacy and, above all, political form that are once again moving to the top of the Chinese agenda.

How will Chinese attempts to resolve these issues affect their foreign policy and the interests of other states? No question is more important in international relations, yet it is a question that has repeatedly caught the world by surprise, and may do so again. During the 1920s and 1930s, an anti-imperialist China, becoming stronger and more assertive than expected, began the disruption of the Asian order, and of Japan's position in particular, eventuating in the Pacific War. During the 1950s and 1960s, Asia was again disrupted by a China that had unexpectedly chosen communism and, for a decade, aligned itself with the USSR. These examples may seem like ancient history today, for in its next international incarnation a strong China was cordially aligned with the United States against the USSR. But this association was the product of specific circumstances: first, a Soviet threat that China could not credibly meet alone, hence the imperative to find a great-power ally; secondly, a strong Chinese leadership able to enforce the policy. Today both those preconditions have disappeared, and China is already demonstrating that its foreign-policy agenda does not necessarily match that of its neighbors and the United States. But in making China policy, most states continue to talk and act as if the rather smooth relationship of the late cold war period could still be assumed, and as a result behave rather reactively and passively.

There are, of course, good reasons for that. The most important is the simple fact that because of its size and power, China is not easy to influence. The United States discovered this most recently in the Most Favored Nation (MFN) debacle, but the approach itself goes back much further. Arguably, it was born in the aftermath of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857–58, when Britain took direct control of most of India and discovered just what a thankless and difficult task it was for a small European state to administer a large Asian society. The idea of dividing China among the powers largely perished at this time, to be replaced by an attempt to support the existing Chinese government while coordinating foreign policies so as to avoid the sorts of rivalries in China that regularly led to the threat of war in Africa and elsewhere. The Open Door notes were part of this general approach, as was the willingness of the powers, in the late 1920s, to accommodate the victory of Chiang Kai-shek's revolutionary party, even though doing so undermined treaties and international law.

Pragmatism might dictate such a policy. The MFN confrontation showed that an untargeted attempt to coerce China economically would hurt the United States at least as much. As for military coercion, the American forces that look impressive in the Caribbean or the Persian Gulf disappear in the Pacific; China, moreover, is a nuclear power. But an important assumption lies at the basis of such flexible and accommodating policy towards China, or at least of any belief that it will succeed. This assumption is that China, freed of outside interference, will constitute itself into a relatively stable polity, and one that will cooperate with its neighbors, albeit perhaps for its own reasons. Problems have arisen, according to this line of argument, not so much because China had difficulty

doing this, but rather because other powers interfered, and thus prevented it. The influence of this approach is still felt today.

What “Revolution” Conceals

The notion that China, once free of foreign pressures, will naturally constitute itself into a stable state and play a positive international role is, of course, a very major assumption, but one that, at least in the pragmatic version of the China-policy argument, is largely concealed. It is articulated directly, however, when analysis is linked to the concept of revolution. At least since the 1920s, revolution has been taken as the primary theme in China’s internal development. How to respond to that revolution has, therefore, become the primary concern of those who think about foreign policy. Books with the word “revolution” in the title can be read, one after the other, to cover the whole extent of China’s twentieth-century history, from *China’s Revolution* by Edwin J. Dingle to *China’s Second Revolution* by Harry Harding.⁴ And in official historiography as taught in the PRC since 1949 (as well as, interestingly, in much of historiography as officially presented in Taiwan) the only events that receive sustained attention have been those that mark stages on the road to “revolution.” And almost by definition, the concept of revolution posits a brief, perhaps violent, period of transition that ushers in a new regime that is solidly grounded and genuinely stable for the long term—far more so than the regime it displaces.

Until recently, such a concept of “revolution” has played a central role in thinking about China and its foreign policy. The approach has its origin in the 1920s, in the debate about whether or not to embrace the revolutionary Kuomintang, and it was easily translated in the 1940s when the communists became the revolutionaries.⁵ In October 1950, John K. Fairbank lamented American weakness in “dealing with the Asian revolution,” by which he meant, in effect, accepting and accommodating changes he believed drew on the deepest historical roots.⁶ The writing of diplomatic history shared this approach, portraying China’s revolution as conclusive, and American policy, therefore, as faced with the choice between accepting it and pretending it had not happened.⁷ Policy makers finally embraced it in the 1970s: the diplomacy that began with Richard Nixon was suffused with a sense that, for better or for worse, the

⁴ (New York: McBride, Nast & Co., 1912); (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).

⁵ A good example is Dorothy Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925–1928* (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947), which chronicles American dealings with the Kuomintang, while implying strongly that the same mistakes should not be made again; this time we should embrace the (Communist) revolution.

⁶ John K. Fairbank, “The Problem of Revolutionary Asia,” *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1950, pp. 101–13.

⁷ The best statement is probably Warren I. Cohen, *America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations*, 2d. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980).

People's Republic was China's definitive modern form; the same conviction, perhaps not quite so firmly held, fundamentally orients the policies of the United States and most other countries today as well.

Yet the conviction can no longer seem as clear or obvious as it was twenty years ago, when to query the PRC was to invite not reasoned argument but ridicule or dismissal. The idea of revolution is not what it once was, even as recently as the bicentennial of the French Revolution. As a tool of historiography, the concept is exhausted. A few so-called revolutionary regimes still exist, but new ones are not being built, nor does revolutionary rhetoric retain much of its once powerful appeal. Fundamentally an artifact of nineteenth-century thought, the concept of revolution in fact seems unlikely to survive into the twenty-first century.

Certainly it has far less practical importance than at any time over the last two hundred years. The cultural and political reconstruction of the former communist states ranging from Germany eastward is being based not on revolutionary inheritances but on everything the revolutions sought to expunge. Civilizations like Russia and China are ransacking their cultural attics, looking for the furnishings the revolution drove out of sight, above all for the components from which to construct politics on something other than a revolutionary basis. Often only dimly remembered by the Russians or Chinese themselves, and almost completely unfamiliar to foreign experts, these objects, moved to the floors where previously decor had been strictly socialist, remind us of the possibilities that communism temporarily suppressed.

Students of foreign policy are discovering that this unfamiliar material is what they need to grasp if they are to understand the future of the world. The blissful sweeping simplifications that came with revolution are gone; in the service of foreign policy, as for other reasons, history is being rediscovered and recast. In China, the whole revolutionary tradition, from the 1920s of course, but particularly since the 1940s, is looking increasingly uninformative as a basis for understanding the present. Communism looks to have been a circuitous and ultimately wasteful detour; as it rediscovers the highroad, China is reviving and rebuilding its pre-1949 self.

That pre-1949 China (which is unfamiliar both to Chinese and foreigners) was preoccupied with the same search for a constitutional form that is beginning again today. That search will have important implications for foreign policy.

A Transition to Constitutionalism?

Modern China has a long and well-developed tradition of debate about constitutional forms and attempts to put them into practice, although it is rarely recalled or studied. In fact, the events considered as revolutionary were generally aspects of that tradition. For example, China's revolution of 1911, to which today's Nationalist and Communist regimes look for legitimation (the first directly, the other collaterally), began over an issue of central versus local authority with respect to railway investment. That was fundamentally a constitutional issue,

as was the grievance that prompted the unsuccessful so-called second revolution of 1913, which attempted to halt Yuan Shikai's flouting of the democratic constitution. The Nationalist revolution of the mid-1920s was different: it expounded social change and national strength through an avowedly dictatorial system (although one envisioned as transitional, and leading eventually to democracy, in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's ideology). But Chiang Kai-shek's victory did not put an end to agitation for constitutional rule: these demands were taken up by elements in the Kuomintang itself, as well as by the opposition parties, Communists included—demands that led to the democratic constitution of 1947 and China-wide elections the following year. Even the Communist victory did not expunge formal constitutionalism: elections were promised, and the first PRC cabinet had a Communist majority of only one.

Grasping this history puts China's present in a novel light. Not revolution but rather the search for a constitutional order to replace the dynasties has been the most important theme in twentieth-century China's history, and it remains so today. The long personal rule of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping has only obscured this stubborn fact. But when Deng dies, the search for constitutional order is certain to resume, and although the quest may prove as abortive as it did before 1949, its implications for the rest of the world will nonetheless be very important.

In two parts of the Chinese world, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the explicit search for such an order is already well under way. Since the end, in 1987, of the state of emergency in the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC), the 1947 Chinese constitution, substantially amended, has increasingly become the basis of government there in fact as well as in theory, a process that has raised key questions about Taiwan's future as a "China" or part of China. As for Hong Kong, although Governor Chris Patten's modest expansion of the democratic franchise there evoked bitter condemnation from the Chinese government, Beijing's ultimate response has, if anything, made its problem with democracy worse. PRC law now provides that the existing system of government in Hong Kong, including the elected legislative assemblies, will be dissolved when the PRC takes control on July 1, 1997, which means that, over the next three years, the PRC must draft an entirely new constitution for Hong Kong. What will it be? It is hard to see how Beijing can avoid facing, in one small but important corner of the Chinese world, the issues of legitimacy and governmental institutions that cast a shadow far beyond the returning British colony.

The basic resource in constitution making is usually some form of assembly. Twenty years ago, considering how to deal with the situation that would exist once Mao Zedong had died, the late prime minister Zhou Enlai planned to use the National People's Congress, China's nominal parliament, to consolidate the political succession and re-institutionalize, if not constitutionalize, the PRC government. China at that time lacked a fully constituted government, and the Communist Party was so divided as to be incapable of acting in its place. To correct this condition, Zhou planned "to convene the National People's Congress—a body which, in spite of its sovereign status, had not met since the winter of 1964—and present to it a long list of candidates for government office

and a twenty-year development program. He also planned a Central Committee meeting, so that those he had chosen for government office could be given the backing of high-party rank.”⁸

Zhou died before Mao, so this precise scheme was never followed, and we cannot know how far Zhou intended to go in the direction of constitutional rule. What happened instead was that, although structures of government were reconstituted compared to what they had been after the Cultural Revolution, they were not made constitutional, for ultimate authority found its way, once again, into the hands of a single individual, Deng Xiaoping. But choosing Deng's own successor(s) is only one of the forces propelling constitutional questions to the fore.

Today's China is an immeasurably more complex society than was the one in which Zhou Enlai laid his plans; hence social and economic considerations, as well as those of elite politics, make constitutional questions inescapable. That is evident in the area of relations between the central government and the regions—the very issue that toppled the Qing dynasty. China is more prosperous now than it has ever been, but the central government's budgets are chronically in deficit. The reason is that Beijing draws its revenues above all from state enterprises, and these are mostly in the red. Supplementary revenues come from customs receipts and taxation of major centers such as Shanghai, but nothing like a comprehensive system of taxation exists. Now the central government is attempting to install such a system, but this attempt is eliciting local resistance that has perhaps broader implications.

Throughout history, taxation has repeatedly posed the issue of governmental legitimacy. No one would claim that the government of the People's Republic of China is truly legitimate, at least not by the standards generally applied today. It was created through a military victory a generation ago and has perpetuated itself since then through elite struggle and the laying on of hands: it has never faced any sort of election. So it taxes at its peril those who are not represented. Coexistence between center and regions up to now has rested on a sort of division of property, that is, a tacit agreement about which areas of the economy each will tap for revenue. The largely extra-legal status of the vigorous market economy, moreover, has kept its profits out of state revenue streams. Clearly, something has to be done to put finances in order, but forced recentralization by a weak government carries risks.

The obvious answer is a devolution of power, accompanied by general political relegitimation. Many of the pieces are now in place for such a development. The most important is probably the vigor of China's southern and coastal regions, now more than self-sufficient economically, and also

Not revolution but rather the search for a constitutional order to replace the dynasties has been the most important theme in twentieth-century China.

⁸ Richard Evans, *Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China* (New York: Viking, 1993), p. 201.

increasingly autonomous administratively. Hong Kong and Taiwan, both outside the jurisdiction of the People's Republic, demonstrate, furthermore, what economic and political autonomy can do for a Chinese territory, while providing economic (and, in the case of Taiwan, potentially political and even military) resources for the coming recasting of China's political system.

One concept of such devolution, so-called *liansheng zizhi*, or federalism, has been present in the Chinese constitutional debate since the early years of this century. The 1924 Chinese constitution, for example, was explicitly federalist in character. Anathema to the centralizers, both Nationalist and Communist, the concept is now being advocated by a number of Chinese political thinkers as the most practical solution both to the domestic problems of center and province relations, as well as Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.⁹

But although economic development is forcing some devolution in fact today, the idea of genuine and legally sanctioned devolution remains out of the question for China's present leadership. Their defining crisis was the democracy movement and the Tiananmen massacre five years ago, an event that focused a whole series of constitutional issues.

The development of that crisis demonstrated just how ineffective and weak both government and party had become—ineffective because they had failed to prevent the high inflation that stoked the protests, weak because of the great difficulty they had in overcoming them. Although the foreign media focused on Beijing, the protests were nationwide, and they drew many government, army, and party people into their ranks, as well as ordinary citizens. The crackdown was driven as much by the need to reassert central political power over the country as by the immediate imperative of retaking control of the capital.

But like the other critical turning points of the post-Mao period, beginning with the coup against Mao's widow and her followers, the suppression of the democracy movement was conducted in an extra-constitutional manner. This fact was not lost even within the circles of government. During the period immediately before the Tiananmen massacre, a substantial number of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC)—nearly a third—were involved in signing petitions calling for the convening of an emergency meeting of the NPCSC, an event known as the "Signature Incident." If it had succeeded, and the NPCSC had become involved in discussions of the grievances of the Democracy Movement and possible ways to resolve the conflict with the government, the dynamics of the confrontation would have changed completely, and it is quite likely that a solution would have been found without bloodshed.¹⁰

In the absence of such a resolution, of course, the military was the only resource, and it yielded an apparent short-term success: the government survived, the economy did not collapse, and, most important, foreign governments either

⁹ See Arthur Waldron, "Warlordism versus Federalism: The Revival of a Debate?" *The China Quarterly*, Mar. 1990, pp. 116–28.

¹⁰ Hu Shikai, "Representation without Democratization: The 'Signature Incident' and China's National People's Congress," *The Journal of Contemporary China*, no. 2 (1993), pp. 3–34.

maintained unbroken their support for Beijing or reaffirmed it after an interval of protest. But this was at best a stop-gap solution that only postponed inevitable change. Today it is becoming increasingly clear that, despite positive economic developments in China since 1989—indeed, to some extent because of them and the aspirations they feed—the massacre cannot be deleted from China's collective memory. There is both a demand, and, more important, the expectation, that before too long the official line will change, the protesters' patriotic motives will be affirmed, and the massacre itself disowned.

Like its kindred demonstrations, also known universally by their dates in shorthand—*wusi*, or May 4, 1919, and *wusa*, or May 30, 1925—the Tiananmen massacre or *liusi* (June 4), marked a stage in regime delegitimation that it also accelerated. The *liusi* also demonstrated that even the security forces were not entirely reliable. In May 1989, as preparations for the movement of troops into Beijing were under way, one letter cautioning against the shedding of civilian blood was sent to the leadership by 150 active and retired senior officers of the PLA. A similar letter, from seven senior retired military leaders, is thought to have been sent at the same time. It was reliably reported after the massacre that 110 officers had seriously breached discipline, presumably by refusing to shoot, and 1,400 soldiers had dropped their weapons and left the scene. Twenty-one senior PLA officers were eventually court-martialed, including one general.¹¹

The Perils of Political Failure

The perils that a repetition of such an incident would bring to East Asia are hard to overstate. To begin with, no leadership succeeding Deng is likely to have the authority necessary to keep the whole military under control; recourse to force, therefore, may well lead to a split within the army, and perhaps usher in domestic conflict. And even if repression should succeed, it will have a chilling effect on trade and investment, which will further weaken a government that already confronts massive budget deficits.

Hence, many in the Chinese Communist Party and the current PRC government understand both the imperative for change and its inescapability. If a post-Deng leadership acts on that understanding, and begins, for example, to enlarge the circle of rulers and systematically to apportion the power now theoretically held at the center, then China may be able to bridge the chasm between the governmental structures it now possesses and those that it needs. Such initiatives will require discarding much of Deng's legacy and will certainly not be unopposed. Their chances for success will be greatly increased if the economy can be kept growing steadily, with inflation brought under control.

¹¹ Michael D. Swaine, *The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1993), p. 161.

But even under ideal circumstances, such a change will not be entirely smooth. There is a moment in any genuine process of reform when the system changes, when real authority passes from the strongman or ruling party into the hands of the people, including the opposition. Such moments can be risky and often highly conflictual—as the gridlock and fistfights in the ROC parliament amply demonstrate.

Furthermore, such transition may fail. The Chinese political situation today is, at root, a product of the collapse in the 1920s and 1930s of China's attempts at democratic and constitutional rule, and its pursuit instead of the largely illusory advantages of corporatism (in the case of the Kuomintang) and communism. What is more, the weaknesses and problems of Chinese society that led to democracy's failure earlier in this century are by and large still present today, which means that if the transition outlined above does not succeed, we could be in for a period of chronic political instability.

Even a China that puts communism behind it and embraces constitutionalism will face serious problems, and these will have important international implications. But they are as nothing when compared to the problems a regime will confront that resists political change, as the current Beijing government is doing.

Earlier in this century, Chinese analysts looking for the causes of so-called warlordism—the military and political struggle for power that smoldered and flamed in the 1920s—found it not in the ambitions of the military but in the failure of civilian politicians. In the 1930s and 1940s, the inability or unwillingness to find a Chinese political structure that could accommodate both Nationalists and Communists brought chronic internal problems, and eventually civil war.

Nor did the victory of the Communists end the danger. Indeed, the substitution of party, and then one-man rule, for any sort of constitutional politics did much to make China more unstable over the longer term, as Mao Zedong himself seems to have realized. The story is told of how, in fall 1973, Mao sent Deng Xiaoping and Wang Hongwen (then a rising young radical politician widely touted as a possible successor) out of Beijing on a joint tour of the country. "When the tour was over, Mao asked the two what they thought would happen in China after he had died. Wang replied that the country would continue to apply the chairman's 'revolutionary line' and would achieve unity on this basis. Deng, shrewder or more honest, said that warlords would emerge and the whole country would sink into chaos. Mao thought Deng's answer the better."¹²

Asked today about China's future, few observers would give Deng's answer of more than twenty years ago. Most are persuaded that the changes Deng has made in China will prove sufficient to spare it that fate, and they may well be correct. But as we have seen, Deng's changes have been almost entirely negative, in the sense that they have removed restrictions, rather than positive, in the sense of creating new institutions. On the political and consti-

¹² Evans, *Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China*, p. 197.

tutional side, Deng's decade and a half of one-man rule has to a considerable extent simply postponed the political problems created by Mao's three decades, while squandering the opportunity to make real institutional changes—like those instituted by Chiang Ching-kuo in the ROC—while the strongman can still preside over them. Such reflections come close to forcing an unwelcome conclusion about the future of Asia: that domestic problems in China may lead, not far down the road, to unpleasant international surprises.

Some Scenarios

The most welcome shape for a future China would be one that was constitutional in form and commercial in ambitions. The second characteristic is already evident, particularly in the east and south, and the shift in the economic center of gravity towards the Yangzi Valley may yet draw political power there as well, as it did from the 1920s to the 1940s. Achieving domestic peace in such a China would require some compromise with Muslims and Tibetans, while peace abroad would require a genuine settlement with Taiwan (already advocated by some in the PRC) and a willingness to put aside claims to the South China Sea (this could be done by following the model of the 1959 Antarctic treaty, which simply does not discuss sovereignty). The benefits of such changes would be enormous, and a bold reformer may try to seize them, but opposition from entrenched interests would be massive.

If the next regime in China attempts to continue Deng's authoritarian ways, then some foreign-policy problems will almost certainly get worse. Remember that a small spark can ignite the train that eventually detonates a massive charge; history is full of examples. So suppose that the current disagreement between Vietnam and China over the Spratlys continues. At the moment, neither side shows any sign of compromising. Quite the opposite, each is acquiring the armaments necessary for a military contest. Vietnam, the weaker party, is also acquiring potential allies through ASEAN. China's calculation seems to be that, in the end, her claims will not be effectively resisted. Vietnam, however, probably realizes that a small increment in military effectiveness will make it possible to interfere substantially with Chinese actions; anti-ship missiles, for example, could prove devastating. If Vietnam and China should come to blows, what will the rest of the world do? ASEAN, quite likely, would tilt towards Vietnam. And the United States? This is not a question to which our current policy provides an answer, because our current policy assumes the question will not be asked.

This scenario is a single example for a whole class, covering most of China's territorial disputes. They share three features. The first is a Chinese calculation that force can be used in a limited or controlled way to achieve an objective, or may not even prove necessary: Vietnam, Taiwan, or whoever, will ultimately prove pliant. The second is a Chinese misunderstanding of the amount of damage a threatened state can do. Vietnam cannot conquer China, nor can Taiwan, or any other power. But modern weapons make it possible for even

a medium-rank power to inflict grievous damage on Chinese forces: to sink a naval task force, for example. Such a setback, moreover, might spell serious domestic trouble for the Chinese government at the time. The third is the near-inevitability that other powers will be drawn into such a dispute, through their treaty relations or calculations of national interest. The best way to avoid such dangers is to deter them clearly and early, both through unambiguous policy statements and through providing military counterweights to new Chinese military capabilities.

Deterrence can probably cope with the sorts of problems just outlined: nearly thirty years of peace in the Taiwan Strait, for example, are owed not to negotiation but to a sustained balance of power. Managing the last sort of problem China may present, however, is not even that easy.

The most worrying, and in many ways also the most likely, possibility for China in the years ahead is that power will be contested domestically. Tiananmen revealed the gulf between rulers and ruled in China; candidate and then president Clinton's responses revealed the policy dilemma. As a candidate, he called for support for the democracy movement; as president he has embraced the PRC government more warmly than any president since Jimmy Carter. And he has forcefully articulated the position of the United States that attributes legality and legitimacy exclusively to the Beijing government.

But suppose that government divides? Suppose that the conflict between liberalizers and hard-liners, already under way, polarizes Chinese politics again, and it is not clear who the winner is going to be? What then should the United States do? Do we simply stand aside, even though a liberal victory would be greatly in our interest, while the hard-liners might bring conflict? Do we intervene somehow? Again, these questions have no easy answers, but they should at least be asked.

Any conflict for power in China will see contenders seeking to mobilize foreign resources of all kinds. Some will be economic: Hong Kong and its wealth will come into play, as well as Shanghai and perhaps Taiwan. Some will be technical: access to print media, to overseas transmitters, to intelligence—all of these could be provided by neighbors of China, and would play a part in a power struggle. Military supplies might play a role: although China is highly self-sufficient in most weapons, certain systems, such as state-of-the-art aircraft, are largely lacking, and could prove decisive. But the most important foreign resource will probably be recognition and diplomatic support. For most of this century, Chinese governments have vied with one another for international recognition, which they have then sought to parlay into domestic legitimation. Whom will Washington choose if the Chinese Communist Party splits, and democratizers in the south declare hard-liners in Beijing to be illegitimate? Western powers have confronted such dilemmas in China repeatedly, ever since the first Opium War.

The point here, however, is not to predict China's future but rather to convey a sense of the sorts of questions that we may well encounter, and for which we are, at the moment, almost completely unprepared. Along every dimension, rapid and deep change is under way in China. That includes political

change, although for the moment it has been halted. But the experience of the twentieth century suggests that it is irresistible, and, once under way, may be the most difficult to manage. China's neighbors, and the rest of the world, must consider now what sorts of outcomes they would like to see from the process of regime change in China, what tools they have to affect the process, and how those tools should be employed.

International Implications

Were China not such an important power, the linkage between its search for a new domestic political order and its foreign relations would not be a matter of such concern for the rest of the world. However, China is very important, not just by virtue of its size and power, but also because of the position it has been given by other powers in the Asian order. Both the pragmatic *laissez-faire* approach of the first part of this century, and the positive assessment of China's revolution in the second, have fed the attitude by which the rest of Asia waits on China, defers to China, and generally expects China to contribute to the solution of problems. Only slowly is the realization dawning that, not least because of its internal political situation, China may itself become a problem.

At the start of this essay, I pointed out that China's current policies, *if projected without change*, will lead to conflicts within a few years—if rapid improvements in military capacity continue, and if solemnly declared policies are enforced in the South China Sea against Taiwan and in other areas. Optimistic Western assumptions about the future are premised on political change that will make China more flexible; this fact should underline the critical importance of domestic developments in China for the peace and security of Asia.

Yet much of what we have said above should indicate just how difficult that domestic change will be. It is not simply a matter of “political openness catch[ing] up with economic reform.” Rather it is a matter of recasting China, and giving it what so many thought communism had, namely, a modern form. The list of issues to be resolved is enormous: how to establish legitimacy; how to structure relations between provinces and the center; how to accommodate the rapid southward shift of the economic center of gravity; and how to find work for hundreds of millions of farmers who have left the land, and for tens of millions of highly educated and ambitious urban dwellers. Beyond China proper, the issues are: how to deal with Tibet, Sinkiang, and other areas of culturally distinct population now incorporated in the PRC; how to develop constitutional mechanisms for Hong Kong and Macao, allowing them to retain their present characters, and for Taiwan to associate itself (assuming anyone on Taiwan wants to).

Just to list these requirements is to suggest how unlikely it is that they all will be met. That means that China is almost certainly bound to pass through a period of instability, a possibility to which nowhere near enough attention has been given among policy makers. Even a smooth and peaceful exit from communism in China would require a good deal of foreign cooperation, patience,

and delicate diplomacy if regional crises are to be avoided. Consider, then, the burden that a rough, or even violent transition in China would place on the world.

The problems the rest of the world are likely to face with respect to China in the years ahead, then, sound broadly similar to those we now face in connection with the former communist world and the USSR: they are a matter of managing not incremental change, as was expected, but regime transition. It is true that China today has advantages that the USSR lacked a decade ago, but the challenges it faces are substantial nevertheless. In magnitude, then, if not in detail, the forthcoming shifts in China will most likely be comparable to what we have seen in the USSR. And, if so, then China's diplomatic and international role is likely to be as nerve-wracking as Russia's is today. Change in China regularly draws in outside players. We can see that today in the economic sphere, where tens of billions of foreign dollars have spurred much of the recent growth, and where the relatively small number of Chinese companies that are wholly foreign-owned accounts for a disproportionate amount of foreign trade. Earlier in this century, we saw the process in politics as well. The British, and then the Soviets, were deeply involved in the affairs of the warring Chinese political parties from the 1920s to the late 1950s; the United States was actively involved in the Chinese civil war and was used by both sides.

Today, either a real contest for power in China, or a dispersal of power away from the center, would make it difficult for China to play the kind of leading role in Asia that both it and the world seem to expect. For at least a period of time, China's neighbors would of necessity become involved in trying to manage change there in directions they favored. At best they might help in the creation of a constitutional and legitimate Chinese state, willing to put into the past the issues that worry Asia today; at worst they might find themselves confronted with an anarchic China in which the "helpers" competed for influence and economic access—or with a China where hard-liners had won a tenuous victory. As we have seen, such speculations raise a myriad of possibilities. What they share, however, is that they would all be results of regime change. It is time we thought more about it.

Managing China

The current situation puts China's neighbors and the rest of the world in a difficult double bind. For short-term stability, the easiest policy is to support the present regime; but for middle- and longer-term peace, it may be in the United States's interest to support regime change. If the post-Deng transition brings a strong liberalizing leadership to power, the difficulty may be avoided. But if that does not happen, then we face unpleasant prospects.

It is often suggested that economic imperatives will keep the temperature of Asian conflicts low. Thus, one can ask hard-line PRC officials when, exactly, the "liberation" of Taiwan would begin? On a day when merchant ships filled

the Taiwan Strait, the coast was bustling with commerce, and tens of thousands of foreigners were in China, mostly doing business? The idea of starting a crisis out of the blue seems absurd. Yet history shows that crises do develop, even against the interests of all involved.

China has a great deal to lose economically in any confrontation in Asia. Not only would one serious shock bring an anti-Chinese coalition of powers into being, it would also choke off the investment on which China's economic development depends. Were that to happen, a domestic financial crisis might follow from an international confrontation, but whether that would escalate or control the problem is difficult to say.

The conclusion would seem to be that the rest of the world ought to be doing now what it should have been doing in the 1980s for the Soviet Union: considering what course it wants unavoidable change there to take, and what concrete steps it ought to take to influence events. That will demand a cooperative and coordinated policy, for all the powers involved. We are far from having such cooperation today: among the major powers, China policy is fundamentally competitive, and although there is some coordination on weapons sales, economics is a free-for-all. No forum brings all the players together, from Russia to Europe to Japan, and some players (Taiwan most importantly, but also Hong Kong Chinese) are simply excluded from consultations, despite their potentially crucial roles.

Greater coordination of policy, and structures to articulate it, need to be created. The problems they face are enormous: not just the natural desire of states to ride free (as in the North Korean nuclear issue), but also issues of understanding where interests lie (with the current regime? with change?) and developing frameworks robust enough to express them.

Realistically speaking, the work of creating such a structure of consultation and a coordinated policy to deal with regime change in China is unlikely to take place until it is forced upon the world. Not far down the road, it most likely will be, perhaps by problems with the transfer of Hong Kong, or conflict in Inner Asia, or a revival of dissent within China. When that happens, we should be as ready as possible.



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The Imperative U.S.-Japanese Bond

by James E. Auer

The most important bilateral relationship in the world “bar none” is how Ambassador Mike Mansfield frequently referred to U.S.-Japan ties during his tenure as U.S. ambassador in Tokyo. Although some of my former Pentagon colleagues demurred that during the cold war U.S.-Soviet relations were even more important, few American admirers or critics of Japan disagreed about the fundamental importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

That good news doesn’t sell nearly as well as bad or sensational news was proven once again in 1991 when the American and Japanese media undertook a plethora of reporting on the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, an interesting historical event that has virtually nothing to do with current U.S.-Japan relations. The media, however, said little or nothing about the fact that 1991 marked the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, which succeeded far beyond the most optimistic expectations.

During the first years of the 1990s, the United States went into a recession remarkable for increasing white-collar anxiety caused by dramatic restructuring of American businesses. Japan was at the same time enjoying the temporary success of the so-called bubble economy. American uneasiness helped popularize a wave of literature dubbed “rethinking Japan,” and its authors were called “revisionists.”¹ Some of that lingers to the present despite the recent and dramatic changes in U.S. and Japanese economic fortunes.

There was no totally common theme to revisionist writing, but a frequent thread was that many American Japanophiles, a listing of which sometimes

¹ *Business Week*’s Aug. 7, 1989, article, “Rethinking Japan,” pp. 44–52, named Chalmers Johnson, professor at the University of California, San Diego, as “revisionism’s intellectual godfather” and brought wide attention to ex-Reagan trade official Clyde V. Prestowitz’s 1988 book, *Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), Dutch journalist Karel van Wolferen’s 1989 book, *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), and journalist James Fallows’s 1989 *Atlantic* cover story, “Containing Japan,” May 1989, pp. 40–54.

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included the likes of Edwin Reischauer and Mike Mansfield, had misled Americans into believing that Japan was evolving into a democracy similar to the United States. Even though some revisionists said Japanese did not possess absolute values, which the West did, and that “fair” competition with such a different culture was impossible since the word “fair” itself had no or a different meaning in Japan, revisionists claimed not to be anti-Japanese but only to be more realistic about Japan’s truly different nature.²

Very late in life, when he agreed to have a discussion with a leading revisionist, Reischauer remarked that the fact that Japan is different from the United States in language, culture, history, and tradition is indeed the starting point of all scholarship. He thus found it difficult to believe a) that the revisionists thought they had discovered something new, and b) that their pronouncements to that effect were being taken seriously by some segments of the American public.³

Although this article is not intended to be yet another bashing of Japan-bashers (a complaint heard from several revisionist writers), the theme of this essay is that despite all the differences that both traditional Japan scholars and revisionists state exist, the United States and Japan have had increasingly similar national interests since World War II, and their interests are likely to become even closer, rather than more disparate, in the post-cold war world.

It’s the Economy, Stupid

Prior to the end of World War II, Congress declared that the United States “expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein.”⁴ And in a 1945 address just a month after Japan’s surrender, President Harry S Truman outlined the fundamentals of American foreign policy:

We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation. . . .

By the combined and cooperative action of our war Allies, we shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful, democratic governments of their own free choice. And we shall try to attain a world in which Nazism, Fascism, and military aggression cannot exist. . . .

² See Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Alan Tonelson, and Robert W. Jerome, “The Last Gasp of Gattism,” *Harvard Business Review*, Mar.–Apr. 1991, pp. 130–38, for the argument that GATT has harmed the United States. In the article, the authors hope for GATT’s demise and argue for a Super GATT of truly like-minded countries willing to abide by a single set of rules.

³ Interview with Edwin Reischauer by Mitsuko Shimomura, “The Depths of Japan-Bashing in the U.S.,” *Asahi Shimbun*, Mar. 16, 1990.

⁴ *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, 89, pt. 6, p. 7725.

We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world. . . .

We believe that full economic collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the world, and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom from want.⁵

These congressional and presidential statements, issued significantly even before the end of World War II and before the Truman Doctrine and the commencement of the cold war, respectively, reflect the motivation of the United States and, it is argued here, increasingly of Japan as well, throughout the cold war and even more so thereafter.

Ronald Reagan was precisely correct that the Soviet Union was the “evil empire,” the only empire to survive World War II and subsequently grow larger. But the United States decided to spend enormously to contain communism, not because of the massive human-rights abuses that took place in Soviet gulags or in China under Mao Zedong. It did so reluctantly, and with great sacrifice, because Soviet and Chinese communism was perceived, as fascist aggression before it, as an abiding threat to the just and lasting peace Congress had resolved to establish and maintain.

George Kennan and others may now believe the United States went too far and that too much money was unnecessarily spent on the cold war, but the intention was always to contain rather than to fight. And the strategy worked brilliantly. Although U.S. defense spending averaged 10 percent of gross national product (GNP) during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, this burden did not prevent the post–World War II economic hegemony of the United States.

Beginning with President Truman, U.S. chief executives, backed by the Congress and the American public, provided financial aid to help Western Europe and Japan rebuild their economies in order to promote the stability of America’s allies. From 1945 to 1965, a period of dramatic postwar economic expansion for the United States, its relative share of world wealth *declined* from 45 percent to 25 percent, approximately where it still stands today despite continued dramatic growth in total world economic strength. The Reagan defense buildup, despite what its critics said about its effects on the American economy, never exceeded 7 percent of GNP spending. As Caspar Weinberger frequently pointed out, a secure world in exchange for less than 7 percent of the national wealth is a bargain; Japan’s bargain was even greater, less than 1 percent. Both countries shared the ultimate benefit of winning the cold war: deterrence worked, saving the truly great financial costs of war and the incalculable costs of human blood.

Japan’s economy grew from ashes to riches during the cold war. By 1980, Japan had become an economic superpower. The revisionists argued that

⁵ “Restatement of Foreign Policy of the United States,” Address by the President, *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 13, no. 331 (1945), pp. 654–55.

Japan was playing by different rules and was threatening America's future, but, more certainly, the commitment of the United States and Japan to cooperate together militarily in 1981 had great impact in Moscow, more than it did in Washington and Tokyo. The credible commitment of the first and second largest economies in the world to cooperate militarily to prevent the third largest economy from interrupting the growth of the first two helped convince the likes of Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze that the Soviet Union had to change course.

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze failed, but the United States and Japan succeeded, and in the post-cold war era now have the opportunity, almost totally unexpected as recently as only five years ago, to push the market economic system into the vast reaches of the former Soviet Union and rapidly modernizing China, and to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East. Even if only the status quo—stability but little or no progress in the former Marxist-Leninist world—is achieved, the United States and Japan will continue as global economic powerhouses. If further market expansion occurs, all participants will profit, but the United States and Japan most of all, and in dramatic fashion.

Containing Japan?

But did the United States, in helping to rebuild Japan, create an economic threat to America and the West as bad or worse than the military menace that the USSR posed? Although James Fallows is not that explicit in his seminal revisionist article of 1989, both the title of his cover story in *The Atlantic*, "Containing Japan," and the following statement therein strongly convey that sinister impression:

Unless Japan is contained, therefore, several things that matter to America will be jeopardized: America's own authority to carry out its foreign policy and advance its ideals, American citizens' future prospects within the world's most powerful business firms, and also the very system of free trade that America has helped sustain since the Second World War. The major threat to the free-trade system does not come from American protectionism. It comes from the example set by Japan. Japan and its acolytes, such as Taiwan and Korea, have demonstrated that in head-on industrial competition between free-trading societies and "capitalist development states," the free traders will eventually lose.⁶

Indeed, if Fallows and other revisionists, not only those concerned with Japan, are correct, the United States in the post-World War II era is the proverbial fumbling, sleeping giant, overreacting to the threat of the Soviet Union and underreacting to the threat of Japan. But if the giant fumbled, it did so quite consciously. In the case of Japan, it should be remembered that, during the initial phases of the American occupation, there was concern the patient might

⁶ James Fallows, "Containing Japan," *The Atlantic*, May 1989, p. 54.

die or be so weak that it would join the communist cause. The miraculous recovery of the Japanese economy was not always a given, to say the least. In general terms, from 1945 to 1970, Japan was a liability to the United States, economically and militarily, although, almost ironically, during that period the United States consistently ran merchandise trade surpluses with Japan as well as with much of the rest of the world.

The intellectual basis for the case against Japan as an economic predator is most clearly made by Professor Chalmers Johnson of the University of California at San Diego. He rejects Japanese culture, free-market strategies, a “free ride” on defense, and easy access to U.S. technology as explanations for Japan’s ascendancy. Instead, Johnson singles out Japan’s bureaucrats who, owing to Japan’s need to catch up with the West, inserted themselves as planners and manipulators of Japan’s export-driven economy, and perfected their techniques through trial and error. Johnson particularly identifies Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) as primarily responsible for Japan’s miracle, stating that “the particular speed, form and consequences of Japanese economic growth are not intelligible without reference to the contribution of MITI.”⁷ If the United States is to level the playing field with Japan, he writes, Americans must give serious thought to copying what he calls the “capitalist development state,” creating some type of MITI-like agency in Washington.⁸ Support for a U.S. Department of International Trade and Industry (DITI) promoting a U.S. industrial policy has been generated in the U.S. Congress, and some believe it to be the preferred strategy of the Clinton administration’s economic team in coping with Japan.

Many economists disagree with Johnson’s analysis of the reasons for Japan’s success. RAND’s Charles Wolf, Jr., calls the views of Johnson, other revisionists, and those such as the chair of the Clinton administration’s Council of Economic Advisers, Laura Tyson—who is in favor of at least limited government intervention on behalf of critical technologies like semiconductors—examples of preferential industrial and trade policies (PITP). According to Wolf, even though PITP appear as reasonable theoretical arguments to “practical men,” there are strong counterarguments that show PITP to be “at best ambiguous, and probably wrong.”⁹

Wolf rejects the thesis to the effect that Japan’s success over two decades is a function of MITI-like industrial-policy practices, “keiretsu”-type industrial organizations, protection of the domestic market, discriminatory regulations, and subsidies for the work of selected industries. Instead, he identifies the most compelling reasons as:

Savings—Japan’s domestic rate averaged 28 percent of GNP in the 1980s while the United States averaged 13 to 14 percent;

⁷ Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. vii.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 323–24.

⁹ Charles Wolf, Jr., “The New Mercantilism,” *The Public Interest*, Summer 1994, p. 98.

Investment—Japan's annual rate of aggregate domestic investment averaged 24 percent of GNP in the 1980s, while the United States averaged 15 to 16 percent;

Labor—Japan's work force is highly disciplined, well trained, hard working, and literate; and

Management—Japanese managers are energetic, competent, experienced, and committed to continuous product improvement and cost reduction.¹⁰

Wolf concedes that Japan may practice industrial policy and strategic neo-mercantilist trade measures but argues that the nation has succeeded *in spite of* these unwise practices and almost exclusively because of the differences in relative domestic investments between the United States and Japan in the 1980s.¹¹

Ronald Morse has found that U.S. public anxiety about Japan does not correlate closely with increases in trade surpluses or any statistic other than slowing domestic American economic growth rates adjusted for inflation, with which fear of Japan correlates directly.¹² Economist and former assistant secretary of state for economic affairs Philip H. Trezise, writing at the height of Japan's bubble and America's recession, went even further:

The current polemics carry an undercurrent of racism, not overwhelming, perhaps, but not pleasant either.

Yet on any rational calculation, economic competition from Japan does not threaten America's national security. If Japanese government and industry engage in conduct contrary to international rules or norms, ample legal, administrative, and economic remedies are available. . . . "Containing" Japan is the offering of a journalist who sees American vulnerabilities that do not exist.¹³

On the positive side, David D. Hale, senior economist for Kemper Financial Companies, has pointed out that during the bubble, Japanese investors, with the full support of, if not coerced by, the Ministry of Finance—the devil of some revisionists—"helped to rescue the United States from currency misalignments, trade imbalances and financial crises."¹⁴ Had Japanese capital not been provided in the 1980s, the U.S. economy and public would have suffered greatly. Instead, it was Japanese investors who were penalized as the value of the yen doubled in the same period of time, halving the value of all dollar-denominated investments held by such Japanese investors.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 103.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 103–5.

¹² Ronald A. Morse, "Healthy Economy Disperses Distrust," *The Japan Times*, Aug. 2, 1992.

¹³ Philip H. Trezise, "Japan, the Enemy?" *The Brookings Review*, Winter 1989/90, p. 3.

¹⁴ David D. Hale, "Global Finance and the Retreat to Managed Trade," *Harvard Business Review*, Jan.–Feb. 1990, p. 160.

Investment capital will be required if Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are to emerge and grow as market economies. The European Union and the United States can be sources of supply, but Japan is the dominant financier of the 1990s despite its current recession and economic slowdown. Coordination of investment strategies for stability is one priority issue for U.S.-Japan cooperation, and Japan may be the senior rather than junior partner for the foreseeable future.

In the area of flexible manufacturing, the United States is committed to downsizing its defense industry after the cold war and integrating civil and defense production. Japan may be able to help the United States in this area because its civil sector has been its forte and it has thus practiced spinning off technologies from civil production to defense rather than vice versa, a direction the Clinton administration's Pentagon under William Perry would like to follow.¹⁵

Common National Interest

During the cold war, the major opposition Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and some of the progressive Japanese media alleged that Japan was endangered by U.S. global strategy, that is, that the United States and Soviet Union would become involved in a war, and Japan would be destroyed owing to the presence of American bases on Japanese soil.

Neither the Japanese government nor a majority of the public were swayed by this argument. Without the presence of the United States, Japan would have quickly fallen under Soviet influence. Had the Soviet Union triumphed over the United States, Japan's fate also would have been sealed. Japan's interests were ideally served by America's postwar goals stated above. Under America's military umbrella, Japan's independence was guaranteed and Japan's economy recovered and grew.

Throughout the cold war, U.S. and Japanese foreign and defense policies were so closely linked that Japanese critics accused Tokyo of being merely a slave of Washington. But such "slavery" served Japan well. Thanks to American might and policy, Japan was not divided as were Germany and Korea and benefitted from a benevolent occupation whose political and land reforms laid the basis for the resurgence of Japanese business. In the decades that followed the NATO and Japanese alliances, the United States often had more difficulty in coordinating political and military relations with Europe than with Japan, probably owing to the ease of dealing with one country as compared to a number, but also to the prickly sensibilities of, for instance, Gaullist France. Finally, during the cold war and after, the presence of U.S. military forces in Japan (USFJ) not only deterred a potential hegemon (as in Europe) but also played a broader stabilizing role in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. And

¹⁵ See, for example, Debra Polsky Werner, "Demise of Milspecs May Spur Industry Upheaval," *Defense News*, Aug. 15-21, 1994, p. 1.

today, Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) could never even consider taking part in United Nations peacekeeping missions, given its Asian neighbors' concerns about a resurgence of Japanese militarism, were it not for the U.S. presence in Asia.

In 1978, Japan began a voluntary program to assume costs for USFJ labor and facilities; sixteen years later these contributions, far in excess of those required under U.S.-Japan treaty arrangements, exceed three billion dollars annually, or an average of more than one hundred thousand dollars per USFJ service person—by far the most generous host-nation support arrangement the United States has ever enjoyed in any country.

The reason the United States bore the costs of rehabilitating Japan during the first two decades after the end of the occupation, and the reason why Japan bears the costs of the U.S. presence today, is not a matter of sentiment or gullibility on the part of either. It is simply a matter of common national interest.

Unknown Success Story

Japan's so-called free ride in defense and U.S.-Japan trade frictions have been the subject of press attention in bilateral relations for the past two decades. But, increasingly since the 1980s, U.S.-Japan defense ties have been a positive story not nearly so well known as should be the case. Western commentaries sometimes contain statements such as "if Japan decides to rearm," or speak ominously of what will happen "when Japan eventually rearms," as if their authors failed to recognize that Japanese rearmament began, by American fiat, in 1950. General Douglas MacArthur directed his staff in 1946 to write a Japanese model constitution outlawing Japanese armed forces *even for self-defense*. When that was done, Japanese officials were shocked, but many in Japan felt a sense of relief, and the constitution that came into effect in 1947 proved quite popular. But following the outbreak of the Korean War and the dispatch of many of the USFJ to Korea, MacArthur changed his mind quite dramatically and ordered Japan to form a National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai), a seventy-five-thousand-man force manned by former imperial army and navy officers of the rank of colonel and below and equipped with tanks, howitzers, bazookas, and other types of equipment not ordinarily associated with a police force. From 1950 on, General MacArthur held that Japan's constitution outlawed only offensive, not defensive, force.

Had Japan decided to do so, it could have taken the course of the United States and many other countries following the proscription of war by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which the U.S. Senate reduced to meaninglessness by ratifying the pact so that only self-declared wars of aggression were outlawed. But Japan tried to live within the spirit of its constitution a) by possessing only weapons that had primarily defensive capabilities, such as fighter-interceptor aircraft rather than heavy bombers, b) by trying to distinguish between individual

nation versus collective self-defense and c) by refusing to allow the JSDF to go abroad for operations.

From 1952 to 1970, unless Japan had agreed to maintain some type of defensive military forces, the United States would not have permitted the occupation of Japan to come to an end or would have continued the original Security Treaty of 1952 under which the United States could store any type of weapons in Japan and wage war without Japanese consent from U.S. bases there. But, since 1970, Japan has been free but declined to return to MacArthur's original view, which is still supported by some of the mass media, and until September 1994 had been supported by the Socialist Party, the largest opponent of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from 1955 to 1993.

Since 1970, both the United States and Japan have been free to abrogate the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) with one year's notice. But both sides have chosen not to do so because of the close common interests noted above. And Japan has not only voluntarily contributed financially to the support of the USFJ, but during the 1980s, began to achieve real military capability, which made a difference in the cold war.

Japan was publicly rebuked by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance for buying Iranian oil in the spot market in 1980 and later the same year by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown for not increasing defense spending as much as the Carter administration would have liked following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

But Alexander Haig stated in early 1981 that the Reagan administration would not criticize its allies in public. Rather, it would talk with them frankly and candidly in private, and not about percentages of GNP spent for defense but about *roles and missions*. To the surprise of many in the United States and in Japan, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki signed a communiqué with President Reagan in 1981 stating that Japan would join in a division of defense responsibilities with the United States and announced separately that Japan would, for its part, defend its territory and air- and sea-lanes to one thousand miles, a close fit to missions that Secretary of Defense Weinberger had suggested Japan consider. Yasuhiro Nakasone became prime minister the following year and announced that achieving Japan's capabilities within a reasonably short period of time, again as the United States had suggested, would be his top priority.

The impact of American-Japanese military cooperation has already been mentioned. Any Soviet air or naval commander venturing forth from the Vladivostok area (the critical operational and support center for virtually all Soviet military activity in the Pacific) had to calculate on detection by Japan's high-technology air defense and anti-submarine network. Japan was in close proximity across the Sea of Japan, meaning the JSDF did not have to go abroad to be in exactly the right spot. Furthermore, the sophisticated, American-designed equipment Japan purchased or licensed in the 1980s made American and Japanese forces capable of extremely close operational coordination of frontline military equipment. Together the United States and Japanese military were able to negate any political gains from billions of rubles of Soviet investment in

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trying to achieve influence in the Pacific. Japan's defense forces came into their own, not as an autonomous military power, but as an effective complement to U.S. capabilities in the Pacific.

Nonetheless, when the USSR fell and both the United States and Russia talked of arms reductions, some Japanese questioned the need for Japan's continued defense efforts and the U.S.-Japan treaty relationship. The Persian Gulf war postponed deliberations on Japan's future defense course. Japan had the capability to contribute to President Bush's multinational coalition, but even members of the LDP could not agree on whether or not it was prudent or legal for the JSDF to go abroad. Still, Japan gave more money to the U.S.-led military effort than any other nation except Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. For all that, it got little credit for its contribution in the West or at home. Stung by domestic and international criticism, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu reluctantly dispatched four minesweepers and two support ships to the Gulf in April 1991, after Desert Storm, to help clear mines left in the aftermath. Noted only briefly outside of Japan, the mission constituted the first overseas deployment in JSDF history.

A large majority of the Japanese public approved the widely reported minesweeping mission, and the result was passage in 1992 of a peacekeeping law. This so-called Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Bill permits overseas dispatch of the JSDF for non-military roles in U.N.-authorized operations taking place in a no-war zone. Under the bill, JSDF personnel have been sent to the likes of Cambodia, Mozambique, and Zaire.

Given what Japan did in the 1980s to achieve a level of military effectiveness that complements United States military power, and given its increasing willingness in the 1990s to find justification to send forces abroad, the way has been cleared for Japan's finally being able to carry out its 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense, which calls for a two-track Japanese defense strategy—that is, supporting the United Nations and coping with aggression by means of U.S.-Japan security arrangements until the U.N. functions effectively. On July 4, 1994, Hisahiko Okazaki, former senior diplomat and still Japan's most respected strategic thinker, announced clearly for the first time in public that previous official explanations that stated that the constitution restricts collective self-defense were the result of political decisions of the LDP and did not define the legal limits of the constitution, despite what Japanese governments have long maintained.¹⁶

Okazaki's point is critically important. If Japan is legally barred from sending the JSDF abroad, even in its own national interest, its ability to contribute meaningfully to U.S. or U.N. efforts in the future is not credible. But if Japan is permitted to decide and act on its own national interest as Nakasone did enthusiastically in the 1980s and as Kaifu, Kiichi Miyazawa, and especially as Socialist prime minister Tomiichi Murayama have done reluctantly in the 1990s,

¹⁶ Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japan Should Awake to Right of Collective Self-Defense," *The Daily Yomiuri*, July 4, 1994. The same article appeared in the vernacular *Yomiuri Shinbun* on the same date.

Japan can and likely will contribute meaningfully to the defense of the Western Pacific in the future.

Will Trade Frictions Spoil the Broth?

Despite the common interests shared by the United States and Japan, despite their successful defense ties during the cold war, and regardless of whether or not Japan's market is unfairly closed, some Americans insist that the size of Japan's trade surplus is politically unacceptable. Unless the United States and Japan can resolve their bilateral trade frictions, they predict, the other two legs of the policy triangle—security and global partnership—will be endangered.

But exactly what is the issue in trade frictions? Clinton's labor secretary Robert Reich has stated frequently that bilateral trade imbalances are meaningless in a global economy.¹⁷ Other administration leaders say that the United States does not want managed trade even as they decry the chronic trade imbalance as evidence of a closed market and demand results-oriented policies. In short, the administration's goal is difficult to define. Given that the United States is the world's largest exporter and that Japan is its second largest customer, it is hard to say categorically that Japan's market is closed. *Per capita*, Japan's consumption of American goods is slightly higher than American consumption of *Japanese* goods.

In July of 1993, President Clinton and Prime Minister Miyazawa agreed to framework talks whereby the United States and Japan were to come up with objective criteria for measuring Japan's progress towards market opening. Japanese negotiators accuse Americans of demanding guaranteed Japanese market shares of framework items (framework items are automobiles and automobile parts, insurance, and government procurement of telecommunications and medical equipment). President Clinton's team denies that this is the case but still cites the 1991 semiconductor agreement with its stated goal of a 20 percent U.S. share of Japan's semiconductor market as the sort of commitment that ought to be applied to other areas as well. Former chief Japanese trade negotiator Noboru Hatakeyama likens this to a teenager who wants to grow bigger and is willing to do special exercises to achieve this goal. One "coach" (Japan) wants to take measurements regularly to assess the teen's progress. But the "other coach" (America) wants to *prescribe* certain growth per month and somehow hold the teenager to it.¹⁸

Frustrated by the recurring Japanese surpluses for almost two decades, the United States has (counter to the spirit if not the letter of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) resorted to unilateral determinations

¹⁷ See for example, Robert B. Reich, "Who is Us?" *Harvard Business Review*, Jan.-Feb. 1990, pp. 53-64, and Reich, "Who is Them?" *Harvard Business Review*, Mar.-Apr. 1991, pp. 77-88.

¹⁸ Noboru Hatakeyama, "The Japanese Market Is Not Closed," *KKC Forum*, June 1994, p. 3.

and sanctions vis-à-vis Japan. This formula can only exacerbate the political problems of both governments, while doing nothing to address the economic problems. Until and unless GATT becomes a truly responsive body, we could do much worse than to negotiate with the Japanese a binding bilateral mechanism to resolve disputes, such as the one contained in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Such a mechanism is bound to be distasteful to elements of the Japanese bureaucracy, but Japan would find it difficult politically to turn down such a U.S. proposal. If U.S. trade officials are so confident that U.S. grievances are justified, they should have the courage to go beyond unilateral declarations and sanctions and submit to binding arbitration.

Both U.S. and Japanese trade negotiators should keep in mind the words of Secretary Reich, senior Japanese diplomat Hisashi Owada, and American business professor Jeremiah J. Sullivan. Reich suggests that the interconnections between businesses of globally competitive companies are so many and varied that the nationality of the manufacturer is far less important than where the value is added. Owada likewise states that, while business people may be already in the twenty-first century, some politicians are still mired in the world of 1648 (when the Treaty of Westphalia codified the nation-state system). Sullivan's comment, though less pithy, hammers the point home:

Productivity, rather than market dominance and job growth, is the source of economic security. Jobs cannot be piled up like gold. And those are America's customers out there in the Pacific; no trade is going to occur except win-win transactions.

What's more, countries don't compete in most business, businesses do. What really counts is firm profitability, and this results from cleverness within a system of reasonably free competition. Japan's people now know this and want very much to demolish the Japan, Inc., model that keeps holding down their standard of living.¹⁹

The views of Owada and Sullivan reflect the increasingly borderless global economy spoken of and written about regularly, particularly by the likes of Reich and Kenichi Ohmae.²⁰ Until American and Japanese politicians and trade officials face these realities, however, resolving disputes through a binding arbitration mechanism might be one way to prevent trade frictions from spoiling the vitally important U.S.-Japan relationship.

The "Enigma" of Japanese Power?

The end of the cold war has brought about a welcome decrease in the possibility of a nuclear Armageddon brought on by an intentional or accidental

¹⁹ Jeremiah J. Sullivan, "Why the New Mercantilists Crash in Flames," review of *The Keys to the Kingdom: The FS-X Deal and the Selling of America's Future to Japan*, by Jeff Shear, *The Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 22, 1994.

²⁰ See Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991); and Kenichi Ohmae, "New World Order: The Rise of the Region-State," *The Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 16, 1994.

nuclear conflict between the two superpowers. An unfavorable side effect of the Soviet Union's collapse, however, is the increase in regional instability. At present, we simply don't know what is going to happen in the former Soviet Union; in China, particularly after the death of Deng Xiaoping; in North Korea, especially since the death of Kim Il Sung; in the Middle East, despite the recent progress; and in Eastern Europe. At present, only the unfortunate residents of Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti have suffered. But sooner or later, the spread of instability will begin to disturb the far-flung tentacles of trade and profit extended by the rich nations throughout the globe. That is when the United States and Japan, whatever their quarrels, must stand together as that 7 percent of world population that controls 40 percent of global GNP—that is, as the mightiest economic interest group on earth. The potential to increase that wealth significantly by expanding the reach of free markets to the former USSR, China, and elsewhere has already been mentioned. Even at the present level, however, the United States and Japan should be very wary of risking their huge stakes in world stability.

Military partners, partners in democracy, and friendly competitors, at least in commerce, the United States and Japan can afford no less. But each must address its equally serious domestic problems if they wish to continue the success they have enjoyed for almost a half century.

The United States has, for more than a decade, chosen to live beyond its financial means and has allowed an underclass to spread across cities that are increasingly unsafe. The social fabric of the United States may still be strong and resilient, but there are limits. At present almost 30 percent of American children are born to unmarried women, and, among African-Americans, the figure is more than twice that. Given the already serious education and crime problems of some American young people, these statistics are ominous. Nor is the middle class blameless for the growing vulnerability of American society. Unless the United States as a nation stops consuming more than it saves and produces, regardless of how much Japan's market opens, the United States will run a deficit that, if otherwise unchecked, will depreciate the dollar further and deplete the capital reserves needed for the investment and infrastructure of the twenty-first century.

Japan's problems are different, but no less serious. Its national politics are in serious need of reform, and excessive governmental regulation needs to be curbed. Despite the presence of highly competitive industries, such as automobiles and consumer electronics, Japan has many industries with low productivity that are dependent on regulation of local markets for survival. Even its most efficient industries may become globally uncompetitive owing to the rising yen, and will increasingly be forced to shift production to low-wage countries offshore. But where is the leadership needed to re-invent Japan for the "post-miracle," post-cold war world? Since Yasuhiro Nakasone was prime minister from 1981 to 1987, Japan has suffered a series of weak chief executives plagued with personal scandals and short-lived, ineffective governments. That is what lends credence to the charge by American and Dutch revisionists, as

well as by some Japanese, that Japan's elected officials lack the power to stand up to the permanent bureaucracy and its allies in business.²¹

The LDP fell from power in 1993 after thirty-eight years, only to regain power as part of a coalition in the summer of 1994. But both the LDP and its major partner, the Socialists (now called in English, but not in Japanese, the Social Democratic Party of Japan [SDJP]) constitute a regime that appears stable but is capable of little more than keeping government running—that is, no innovative policies are likely. New elections must occur by 1997, at which time both parties are likely to lose seats, owing to changes in the election system.

The collapse of the new parties that launched the political reform movement in 1993, and successfully passed a new House of Representatives election law in 1994, has only enhanced the power of the bureaucracy, although curbing that power with political leadership was a major reform objective. Despite the bureaucracy's considerable talent, each ministry is extremely jealous of its turf and will not willingly pursue reforms necessary to improve competitiveness, consumer welfare, and Japan's relations with trading partners, including—indeed, especially—the United States.

Finally, Americans and Japanese must recognize how much they can learn from each other, even (perhaps most of all) from the other's current problems. For instance, although many Americans and some Japanese believe that Japanese have relatively high personal savings rates owing to cultural reasons, Peter F. Drucker's research suggests that U.S.-ordered changes to Japan's tax system during the occupation changed Japan, within six months, from a nation that actually saved considerably less than the United States prior to 1945 into one of the world's leading saving countries.²² If the United States can change Japan's laws, one would think it should be able to change its own someday if it understands what the effects are likely to be.

Gun control is another such issue. A majority of Americans are known to favor certain restrictions on guns, but the influence of the National Rifle Association remains strong in convincing law-abiding Americans that controls will necessarily escalate so that even recreational hunting cannot survive. As any American who has visited Japan quickly realizes, the number of guns allowed there is low, and even huge cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Yokohama are relatively safe.

Japanese are permitted to own certain types of firearms. While serving as executive officer of a U.S. Navy destroyer based at Yokosuka, the naval port of Tokyo, I had a subordinate officer who was an Olympic class marksman and lived in a Japanese home outside the naval base. He was free to transport his guns back and forth between the ship and his home and to compete in matches and hunt on the base and elsewhere in Japan. The Japanese police

²¹ See, particularly, van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, p. 32. A similar view from a Japanese perspective is reflected in Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994), pp. 46–53.

²² Peter F. Drucker, "Japan's Not-So-Secret Weapon," *The Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 9, 1990.

verified his qualifications and checked his home to ensure he had a place to lock his guns and ammunition separately from each other. This officer felt no significant restrictions of his freedom and frequently commented that he wished the United States had similar common-sense regulations.

Some Americans assume that Japanese primary and secondary schools must be much better than American schools, given the higher literacy and mathematics scores of Japanese children. But experts know that Japan has bad schools along with good ones.²³ They also discount extra hours of class per day and shorter vacations for Japanese students. As the experience of the children of Vietnamese boat people in Los Angeles public schools seems to indicate, Japanese success may have much more to do with what goes on at home than what goes on at school. Japanese children spend on average four to six hours per day studying at home or at a *juku* (cram school) whereas that figure represents the daily television-watching time of a number of American youth. American public policy makers might do well to try to learn from Japan about what, if any, types of legislation or government programs have helped promote family stability, especially among low-income citizens.

Instead of working together cooperatively on trade issues or working positively together or individually on domestic problems, on February 11, 1994, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hosokawa announced that the U.S.-Japan framework talks were being broken off. Both leaders tried to put the best face on a situation that had never happened since the occupation ended in 1952. Some said it was better to have no agreement rather than a superficial compromise. The most disturbing aspect of the breakdown was that a significant majority of Japanese seemed to support their government's refusal to agree to U.S. desires for what the Japanese considered managed-trade measures.

That marked a big change from the situation when the United States and Japan engaged in the Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) talks during the Bush administration. Under SII, the United States also asked for major changes in Japanese trade practices, a position that much of the Japanese public believed was more liberal than managed trade and, therefore, good for Japan as well as for the United States. Many Japanese and a number of American legislators, Democrat and Republican alike, believe the United States needs to support Japanese reformers and their causes that are popular with the Japanese public rather than to re-empower the Japanese bureaucracy, which any type of fixed market-share system would tend to do.²⁴

Another U.S. policy action that could be taken quite easily would be to activate annually a mechanism known as "2 plus 2," whereby the U.S. secretaries of state and defense would meet with the Japanese foreign and defense ministers. The U.S.-Japan MST established a Security Consultative Committee (SCC) consisting of the U.S. ambassador to Japan and commander in chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and the Japanese foreign and defense

²³ See, for example, Ken Schoolland, *Shogun's Ghost: The Dark Side of Japanese Education* (New York: Bergin & Garvey, 1990).

²⁴ See for example, Todd S. Purdum, "Bradley Rebukes Clinton on Japan," *The New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1994.

ministers. Because of the (now anachronistic) imbalance in representation, only a subcommittee of the SCC has met since the late 1970s. The "2 plus 2" mechanism, substituting the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, would equalize representation.

The busy schedules of the principals (who do meet regularly in numerous other venues) and even more frequent meetings at the subministerial level have thus far prevented "2 plus 2" from becoming a meaningful institutional dialogue. But, just as a mechanism to resolve conflict through binding arbitration could

alleviate trade frictions, so could an annual, cabinet-level review of the overall U.S.-Japan relationship forestall deterioration of this vital bilateral relationship. Given all that is at stake, it is the least we can do.

Indeed, we cannot even predict how much greater the stakes may grow. Future crises at least as serious as the Gulf war are virtually certain to occur, the only questions being when and where. A nuclear accident in North Korea, or reckless acts by the Chinese military vis-à-vis Hong Kong, the Spratlys, or Taiwan following Deng's death are only among the possible

scenarios. Japan's PKO Bill, while a big step forward, is seriously flawed. Restricting the JSDF to non-combat missions in cease-fire zones means that in many crises, Japan will be unable to participate, seriously complicating planning by Japan's defense guarantor, the United States.

Given their common national interests, the United States and Japan are likely to be on the same side in these future crises and thus should be talking seriously about the other's capabilities and expectations before a crisis occurs. As the Gulf experience indicated, once the war starts, it is too late for the Japanese to go into a huddle and reconsider whether the constitution permits collective self-defense or not. Unfortunately, since 1992, Japan has seemed to be relying on the fact that the PKO Bill exists, and the United States has seemed to be more focused on trade frictions than on this critical item, which is clearly within the purview of the Japanese government and is a legitimate concern of its defense partner.

In the environmental and security areas, the general issue of nuclear proliferation in a high-technology world, potential accidents at nuclear power plants as bad or worse than Chernobyl (now operating under even less stable conditions in the former Soviet Union), Chinese expansionism, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and past and future nuclear dumping in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and in the Northwest Pacific are among issues worthy of far more attention than the U.S. and Japanese governments are presently giving them.

Conclusion

The United States and Japan are the two most dynamically changing countries in a dynamically changing world. Change is exciting and necessary,

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but its pace is so rapid today that the United States and Japan must take stock of a) how wildly successful they have been in the past, b) how much they already have at stake, and c) how great their potential is still.

Serious problems exist inside both countries, and new challenges exist abroad. But in virtually every area, U.S. and Japanese problems will only get worse rather than better if the two largest economies in the world allow a serious political rift to divide them. For the good of the world's five billion-plus citizens, including and especially Americans and Japanese, close U.S.-Japan relations are desirable. But even if they rely only on their own selfish instincts, Washington and Tokyo should remember what Sir Rajaratnam, former foreign minister of Singapore, said in 1989, before the great changes in the Soviet Union made his words even more important than when he spoke:

It is my belief that it is in the Pacific that the next great economic and political revolution will take final shape when primitive national capitalism which we have known for over two centuries is superseded by global capitalism as a prelude to shaping of an integrated global community. . . .

The future of the world economy can be assured only by the United States and Japan, the two most powerful economies in the world, joining forces to play midwife to the only economy that matters today and will matter more in the 21st century—global capitalism. . . .

Given a global market of six billion people who will inhabit this planet, the U.S. share of the \$15 trillion worth of wealth and services the world economy now generates annually would be peanuts in comparison with what global capitalism can create in the next century. The only nation in the world whose political leaders and private corporations come closest to thinking in terms of the imperatives and interest of global capitalism is the United States—with occasional backsliding.²⁵

Many Japanese want the United States to play the role described by this Asian statesman. For then Japan will prosper as well, as it has in coordination and cooperation with the United States for almost half a century.



²⁵ S. Rajaratnam, "From Star Wars to Trade Wars," Opening Address to the Pacific Forum and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Conference, "Southeast Asia, Japan and the United States: Constructive Engagement in the Decade Ahead," Singapore, May 9, 1989, pp. 15–16.

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Risks and Promises in the Two Koreas

by Paul Bracken

North Korea in recent years has linked its survival to that of its neighbors through a dangerous but nonetheless carefully designed military structure that makes its survival press sharply on that of its neighbors.¹ The fragility of its internal position—food shortages, economic deprivation, and the lack of legitimate succession—becomes a perverse strength when linked to nuclear weapons and an army capable of destroying some significant part of the South, even if it is ultimately defeated. *North Korea's national security policy consists of linking internal and external pressures, so that outsiders had better not pressure North Korea where it may implode, or they may cause it to explode.* The essence of the problem is that the North Korean state faces extinction in a world without communist support and protection, and this crisis of the North Korean state becomes a crisis for its neighbors through the mechanism of Pyongyang's military institutions—pulling together nuclear, chemical, and conventional military power for the purpose of protecting the state's continued existence.²

The purpose of this paper is to describe important aspects of the current confrontation between North Korea and the world, one that involves nuclear proliferation but one which also has considerably deeper roots. These roots include the North Korean state's attempt to maintain its existence in a security environment that has changed enormously as South Korean power has increased and as North Korea's allies have either collapsed or withdrawn support. The argument offered here is that North Korea is trying to construct a regional doomsday machine founded upon its military forces—conventional, nuclear, and very likely chemical and biological as well—all in the service of its strategy of linking internal and external tensions.

¹ The term 'North Korea' is used throughout to refer to what is formally the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang is sensitive to this designation, but it has become so common that it is used here without any negative intent.

² This is the argument of my paper "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," *Survival*, Autumn 1993, pp. 137–53.

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Another important aspect of the present crisis has received considerably less attention. The North Korean crisis is certainly an end-game struggle in the cold war. Like Cuba, it is hard to see how North Korea can get out of its current situation with its regime unchanged. But unlike Cuba, the crisis of the North Korean state bears on the desires and concerns of other regional powers. The prospect of a Korea unified on Southern terms, especially, is one that needs more consideration as it will have a direct impact on the three Asian giants in Korea's immediate neighborhood.

An Enlarged Strategy Space

It is useful for a moment to step back and look at North Korean military evolution over a longer period of time. What has occurred is an extension of the strategic envelope of Pyongyang's military capacity from essentially a massive infantry army of only peninsular reach to a force with regional and in selected cases even global impact. Ten years ago the North posed an enormous conventional and artillery ground threat on the demilitarized zone (DMZ) against South Korea. The North then moved to construct more mobile armored forces: tanks, personnel carriers, and so forth. In the mid-1980s, the North created four mechanized corps and an armored corps from smaller tank and mechanized units. Over the past few years, it has advanced on the path to acquiring nuclear weapons, the subject that captures most of our attention. Yet, at the same time, Pyongyang has been developing its tactical missile forces, and longer-range missiles that can reach an increasingly large swath of Northeast Asia, including Japan. Finally, the North has been selling or bartering military arms, components, and munitions to anyone willing to pay for them. Iran has developed as a test range for the new longer-reach North Korean missiles, and, in the process, a likely gateway for sales of arms exports into the Middle East. In the future, the North may sell bomb-grade plutonium through these channels, conceivably even selling packages of atomic warheads on missiles to those willing to pay for them.

Although less is known about North Korean chemical and biological weapons, it would surprise many analysts if a substantial effort were not being made in these areas as well as in the more discernible conventional and nuclear forces. South Korean sources say that tests on political prisoners have been conducted, and that a chemical weapons platoon has recently been added to each regiment of the North Korean Army.³ North Korean research on biological warfare is more uncertain, but one report points to a fairly extensive array of programs.⁴ There is a tendency to treat reports of chemical and biological

³ "N. Korea: Used Detainees in Chemical Weapons Tests, Report," *Dow Jones International Newswire*, Sept. 26, 1994.

⁴ Joseph S. Bermudez, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 1993, pp. 225–28.

warfare with skepticism because evidence is so hard to obtain and because this kind of war preparation has such moral opprobrium attached to it. But this misses the obvious fact that chemical and biological warfare are much less manpower- and capital-intensive than conventional and nuclear armaments, hence its signature is intrinsically harder to read. Indeed, chemical and biological warfare may become a cheaper, more stealthy alternative to nuclear weapons, and we must pay the most careful attention to any indications that “backlash states” (as Anthony Lake has termed North Korea, Libya, and so forth) are exploring this dangerous path.

This “enlargement” of North Korea’s strategic space has not received the recognition that it deserves. U.S. policy for the defense of South Korea has tended to lag, partly because of our narrow focus on the threat of a ground attack, and partly because of the extraordinary swiftness of the North Korean program in nuclear, missile, and perhaps chemical and biological technology. The United States, therefore, has some “catching up” to do. Consider that for most of the cold war era, North Korea’s military threat to Japan was scant. Aside from minor naval harassment and possible terrorism, there was little or nothing that a backward rural society like North Korea could do to project threats outside the peninsula. But today it is not implausible that one of the world’s poorest countries could inflict significant destruction on one of the world’s richest, Japan. Discussions of exactly *why* North Korea would do this or how Pyongyang would be deterred are beside the point. North Korea has the capacity to harm Japan, and while deterrence is likely to work, a latent potential remains. Left unchecked, North Korea could do to Japan what Soviet Russia did to Europe in the 1950s: create a ‘hostage’ situation in which the mere threat of missile attacks with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads could hamstring U.S. policy. We are no longer facing the North Korean threat of 1975.

Another reason for the dangerous lack of emphasis on the North’s evolving military capacities lies in the character of the global response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty and the missile components control regime have a presumption of cooperation in them. They have not been designed to deal with actors who behave strategically to evade their norms. These separate regimes have had a tendency to fragment rather than to integrate our assessments. Not enough attention has been given to synthesis and integration of information over long periods of time. Without such context, questions about whether the North has built this or that device will not be as useful to policy makers as they could be if interpreted against a broader picture of developments. Moreover, the fragmentation of our threat analysis encourages us to make false distinctions about whether we should focus on the (small) nuclear danger or the larger conventional one, when in fact we have to deal with both.

An overall interpretation of the North Korean military program of the past ten years would suggest that the leadership in Pyongyang, recognizing a shift in economic power on the peninsula, and observing the dissolution of its

One of the world’s poorest countries could inflict significant destruction on one of the world’s richest.

alliance system, has attempted to build a military capacity that could inflict unacceptable damage on its neighbors, chiefly South Korea and Japan. But its ability to threaten such damage inevitably influences the Chinese calculus of their interests in Northeast Asia. This system, combining military and political elements in clear relationship to each other, is best described as a regional doomsday machine, that is, a device that can cause great but by no means total levels of damage in a region. Unlike the cold war metaphor of a doomsday machine popularized conceptually in the 1950s, the North Korean 1990s version is tied to state and regime survival, not tactical or even strategic interests. It appears to be reserved for what is called in the Middle East “existential deterrence”—a last-ditch threat to be used only when state survival itself comes into question.

Like its 1950s counterpart, the North Korean version has a peculiar set of command and control arrangements. Its control lines are murky. Certainly to the outside world, but likely even within the confines of the North Korean government itself, the actual chain of events that might lead to the decision to launch missile attacks against South Korea or Japan, and/or a conventional attack on the South, is probably not clearly thought out in advance. In addition, the nature of the control lines suggests a threat *meant* to leave something to chance. The elements of chance involved here, however, may include domestic as well as external threats and occurrences. It is not impossible to imagine that certain levels of external pressure—a naval blockade or a military attack on the nuclear production sites are examples—could interact with a domestic struggle for power to produce the ultimate suicide of the North Korean state.

Another novelty sets the North Korean case apart. While there is an attempt to build such a doomsday system, there is no reliable guarantee that it would work in practice. The capacity of North Korea successfully to implement complex projects is extremely limited, and the reliability of this system to perform as envisioned by its leaders must be considered a major potential weakness. If the ability of Saddam Hussein to control his military forces for strategic purposes was limited, that of Kim Jong Il must be considered even more so.

Poison Carrots and Sticks

Heretofore, the Western negotiating strategy with regard to North Korea has been to assemble a package of benefits—or carrots—and of threats—sticks—and to arrange the two so as to reach agreement. In the case of North Korea, however, it must be asked whether or not many of the alleged benefits would not constitute a greater threat to its security than would the threats.

North Korea's population is impoverished and fed the propaganda line that only the existing regime can protect them from malevolent outside forces. Were this population introduced to the standard of living found elsewhere in Asia, certainly in South Korea, it is difficult to imagine that the system of political and social control could endure. Thus, by offering promises of economic assistance and joint-venture investments that would surely be accompanied by

increased Western penetration of the closed society in the North, the United States and Japan are asking Pyongyang to undermine the social basis of its own power. No communist leader has yet figured out a way to accomplish economic modernization without disruptive political change. The difference is that the North has seen how poorly handled reform can topple regimes, as occurred in Eastern Europe, then in the USSR.

For these reasons, what to the West looks like a sophisticated carrot-and-stick approach looks to Pyongyang like a choice between poison carrots and sticks. It is this character of the negotiations that makes progress so difficult. We should be under no illusions about the prospect for quick diplomatic breakthroughs, yet we should continue to pursue these options because others offer no better prospects for success and introduce greater dangers and risks.

Strategic Warning

We are now, and have been for some time, in a period of strategic warning with regard to North Korea, that is, a state of alert prior to the initiation of a threatening act. The threatening act(s) in question include: 1) the likely construction of a nuclear weapon; 2) construction of a missile force with sufficient range to cover part of Northeast Asia; 3) North Korea's attempt to marry its nuclear and missile programs to produce a short tactical-warning danger to its neighbors; and 4) a change from a national security policy built on a ground threat to the South to one that threatens more countries, including the South.

The reason for introducing the notion of strategic warning is to emphasize information that already exists and that should alert us to dangers of hostile intent. These may not occur for a number of reasons, but warning information exists to suggest that it may occur—that is, that hostile activities are not simply the creation of scenarists but rest on evidence of preparatory actions already taken.

The most critical moment for policy makers, of course, would be a strategic warning of war against the United States or its allies. In the case of North Korea's attacking the South, or anyone else, this is something that will always remain uncertain until the eventuality. No one is likely to have special knowledge of what goes on in the minds of the North Korean leadership. It is often said that North Korea poses a large military threat, and that because of the forward deployment of its army, this is a threat that could be launched with very little advance warning. Many observers point out, however, that this is a situation that has obtained for decades, and that no special increase in the danger has taken place.

This proposition—that the risk of war is essentially unchanged—is so important that it and the assumptions and information it is based on deserve to be analyzed from every perspective. After all, it is not in anyone's interest to create a war scare, or to proclaim an imminent crisis that could actually worsen the situation, conceivably leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy of war, as in Europe in 1914. But neither should the fact that tension has persisted on

the DMZ for over forty years be used as an excuse to avoid analytic responsibilities. Rather, we must strive constantly to manage this tension in a way that contributes to national security.

The statement that the chance of war is unchanged because there has been no underlying change in the military deployment and broader situation of the North is clearly false. There *have* been changes in the North's posture and situation. Development of extended-range military capacities has been noted, as have improvements in its mobile forces. Other reports point to reorganization of army units on the DMZ. On the political side, evidence points to heightened pressure on some overseas residents of North Korean origin to contribute financially to relatives at home, and to increased smuggling on borders with China and Russia. To the extent that the North's security policy has changed in the way described earlier—towards linking internal and external pressures—these seemingly diverse but related facts signal a change in the North's strategic posture.

**North Korean
behavior is
determined by
a loose
collection of
eccentric ideas.**

Finally, the North Korean command and control structure should be considered in any analysis of warning of Pyongyang's actions. Virtually all authority for major actions is tightly held at the top. The North Korean military is not really organized as a hierarchy; its organizational chart is flat because each important unit's real lines of authority and communication go directly to the top. That produces some considerable reductions in its military efficiency. For example, coordination of a complicated attack would be extraordinarily difficult because the top would not possess the information-processing capacity to absorb all of the reports flowing into it. Glaring deficiencies in organization

follow from this. Although North Korea possesses one of the largest special forces in the world, they are not well integrated with regular military units and lack the lift to move them where they could operate effectively. Logistics is not well integrated in the regular army, nor is it obvious that corps and division units could coordinate joint military actions in a rapidly changing situation.

The incoherence in the North Korean military extends to other state activities and suggests that these institutions have not been designed to maximize efficiency. Rather, they have been fashioned to allow the leadership to play off the different departments and cells against each other for the purpose of increasing the security of the regime from internal attack. Military units, especially, are deprived of information and opportunities for coordination among themselves.

Still, none of these shortcomings justify a discounting of the North Korean military threat. What exists is a shaky composite governmental structure with a potential for unanticipated aggression, however inefficient that aggression might prove. It is a structure that can be ordered into action without much (if any) preparation because its parts are conditioned to act without an information-rich picture of their environment. North Korean behavior is determined by a loose collection of eccentric ideas emanating from the top through an incoherent—yet large and deadly—security structure.

The death of Kim Il Sung and the apparent rise of his son Kim Jong Il as heir must certainly enter into this assessment of strategic warning. What can be said about this is a matter of perception and intuition more than of fact and evidence. It appears that the son lacks the widespread support of the father, both within the regime and, importantly, in the larger society. This eventuality had been conjectured for years prior to the elder Kim's death. Now there is an increased flow of defectors, whose testimony tends to confirm this interpretation.⁵ What this most likely means is that the confidence needed to prepare a high command for military operations has declined. The elder Kim's orders were treated as a kind of semi-religious dogma because he was genuinely viewed as a larger-than-life figure. The son must use persuasion, something very different, and something which, by all accounts, he is not particularly good at.⁶

In addition, during the reign of Kim Il Sung, the factions that exist in all governments were silenced by his towering presence. North Korea may resemble Romania, where loyalty to Ceausescu was paramount, but where different opportunistic factions waited silently for a rupture in his authority. Once this occurred, they moved. In other words, a triggering event delegitimized authority, producing a cascade of uncoordinated mass and elite actions that soon went beyond the regime's control.⁷ Relevant here is the episodic character of the regime's command system, with its shaky structure and random semi-application of coercion. It may be especially difficult for this type of regime to control events once authority relations are broken, because its coercive power, while large in theory, is difficult to target effectively.

The Current Crisis and Longer-Term Interests

The role of regional powers such as China and Japan in using their good offices to restrain North Korea's nuclear program is most often advanced as the diplomatic road out of the current situation. China, especially, is seen as a valuable diplomatic ally because of its close historical ties to North Korea and Kim Il Sung. Japan is thought to have relatively less influence, but does retain the financial capacity to assist in the alleviation of some of North Korea's economic problems. Russia, South Korea, and the United States stand ready to work together with these nations to establish a strong international coalition to remove the nuclear threat from Northeast Asia.

The nations listed do have an incentive for avoiding war on the peninsula. Yet identification of some common interests does not mean that a strong international coalition is likely to be formed, and this tells us something important both about how to manage the immediate problem of nuclear proliferation in

⁵ See "North Korean Defectors 27 July [1994] News Conference," transcript in *Pacific Rim Intelligence Reporter*, July 28, 1994.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ This theory of how organizational control dissolves is developed in Paul Bracken, *Communist End Games and Their Relevance for North Korea*, RAND Corporation, PM-134-A, May 1993.

North Korea, and about international politics in Northeast Asia in the longer term. At bottom, there are divergent interests at stake, and in the enthusiasm for multilateral diplomatic solutions to the problem of North Korea, these are too often passed over as subjects of analysis. The reason for the fragile character of the counterproliferation coalition against North Korea arises more from differing interests than it does from any failings of diplomatic execution or procedure, or even from arguments over tactics.

First, the *intensity* of the desire to avoid war varies among states. War on the peninsula would be a terrible thing, but more terrible for some than for others. South Korea would suffer the most, China the least. More fundamentally, Northeast Asia has been an arena of competition for centuries and is not likely to cease being so overnight. Kim Il Sung's greatest political achievement occurred in the 1950s when he successfully maneuvered the Chinese army to exit North Korean territory after its assistance during the Korean War. He accomplished this without relying on Soviet forces, and was thus able to assert his own independent course of national development, something his counterparts in Eastern Europe were notably unsuccessful at doing. To say that China is North Korea's most important ally is true, but it is a truth that must be seen against a background of deep historical mistrust between Korea and China, and against a political culture that defines the world as a jungle in which the strong devour the weak. Trusting the existence of the nation and state to any other country is something unnatural in the world view of Pyongyang's leaders. Rather, they likely view China the way China views them, as a state whose favor yields certain important but always limited benefits.

China has been involved in diplomacy in this part of the world for far longer than the United States has existed. It is hard to see the gain for Beijing in a major American diplomatic success in Northeast Asia, given China's concerns over American military hegemony, which it has articulated since our victory in the Gulf war. A complex web of considerations ranging from trade and human rights disputes also affects China's willingness to pressure North Korea. It might be useful to ask if even a distasteful North Korea does not have some usefulness for Beijing. During the 1970s, many of the Arab states found Qaddafi's Libya distasteful and bemoaned its behavior in private diplomatic discussions. But these states also benefitted from having Libya around to tweak the United States and lead the charge to drive up oil prices. A divided Korean peninsula and aberrant North Korea could, from China's perspective, serve as a convenient limit on Japanese power, and inhibit U.S. action because of the residual risk of escalation contained in the character of the North Korean state. A nuclear North Korea could be a low-cost way to induce caution and conservatism into America's Asia policy.

This is not to say that joint diplomatic actions should be abandoned. Quite the contrary. But unrealistic, or unexamined, expectations about their success could lead to disappointments and cause American policy makers to overlook alternative approaches.

The United States, Northeast Asia, and a Unified Korea

North Korea would not be pursuing its current military emphasis if it had the confidence to negotiate in the world of successful East Asian countries. But by the same token, a strategy of sophisticated, high-tech, military blackmail resting on a backward economy will in all likelihood fail. But failure means disintegration and absorption by the South, as East Germany was absorbed by West Germany. Whether the end comes for Pyongyang with a bang or a whimper, therefore, it is not too soon to begin to analyze what a unified Korea could mean for regional security and for the United States. It would almost certainly mean a re-evaluation of the nature of the security ties between Washington and Seoul. The reason for stationing U.S. ground forces in South Korea has been to deter attack from the North. But if North Korea no longer existed, then the need for U.S. ground forces would be obviated. Another rationale for a U.S. presence in Korea could obviously be fashioned, as it has been for U.S. forces in NATO Europe. Yet it seems more than likely that in the event of Korean unification, there would be strong calls for radical change in the nature of the U.S. security commitment to Seoul.

One possibility is a wholesale shift in the military foundation of the security tie from ground to maritime forces. South Korea has expanded its own navy in recent years, and East Asia is a maritime theater. Thus, one eventuality would be that the U.S. military tie to Korea would involve naval forces, and perhaps air forces, more than ground forces. That raises a number of interesting questions. Currently, the United States has strong naval ties with Japan, and it may be possible to incorporate a unified Korea into these arrangements. On the other hand, the relative absence of comparable naval relations with China may contribute to the appearance of an anti-Chinese association of the United States, Korea, and Japan. None of these countries would want to convey this impression, since it could lead to the estrangement of China. Yet the total withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from Korea seems equally risky, given the long-standing tensions in the region and the rapidity of change that most countries there now experience. Some carefully crafted architecture is needed to allow a unified Korea to feel secure among the other Asian giants, lest a unified Korea pursue some of the same weapons programs now going on in the North, and do so far more efficiently.

A more basic question is simply whether a unified Korea is in the national interest of the United States. Washington has long said that peaceful unification is our goal. But a careful reading of these statements makes it clear that direct benefits from unification are not what they have been referring to. Rather, they have focused on removal or transformation of a dangerous regime in the North. Now that unification may be realizable in this century, it is certainly time to consider the more fundamental question.

A strong Korea *is* in America's interest. A weak Korea has only been an arena for opportunistic Asian powers to advance their own interests. Having

War on the peninsula would be a terrible thing, but more terrible for some than for others.

said this, it is hard to see how Korea could remain a strong actor in the region if it were isolated from the United States, or if it were only tenuously supported by Washington. Some kind of security relationship is a precondition for Korea to flourish. In addition, having an ally that lies between China, Japan, and Russia offers advantages for Washington that even good bilateral relations with the regional great power do not. A unified Korea would have considerable military power that could align with American interests. In economics, Korea is likely to favor liberal trade, something that also squares with American interests. Specifics of the relationship, its military and economic components, and its political dimensions are in need of much more study and debate. But the end game that is approaching in North Korea marks a good time to start this discussion.



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NEW FROM OXFORD

A Regional Approach to Northeast Asia

by Gilbert Rozman

The 1990s pose a test for the world system unlike any before. For the first time in modern history, as many non-Western countries as Western ones occupy the ranks of the great powers. Following half a millennium of Western ascendancy, the balance is shifting, and abruptly. Moreover, the three undisputed great powers of non-Western origin—China, Japan, and Russia—can be clearly distinguished from the United States and the leading European powers by virtue of the fact that they are still struggling to define their own identities and national interests. While they show no hesitation in insisting on their right to influence the shaping of the post-cold war “order,” all three lack a clear sense of what to do with their considerable power. Finally, as we strive to predict the impact of their new roles, it is important not only to consider them individually but also to examine their collective weight as part of what might be labeled the non-Western, or Northeast Asian, triangle.¹ Somehow this mighty, unstable triangular relationship must be integrated into the geometry of any new world order.

The political and academic challenge that task poses cannot be overestimated. Even as the United States struggles to adjust its bilateral relations with Russia, China, and Japan, we must come to grips with the complex of interlocking relations among these three civilizations—relations that will make the northwestern shores of the Pacific a hinge of history in the twenty-first century. That, in turn, requires us to attempt: 1) an interpretation of the recent malaise and tentativeness in American policy making and scholarship on the

¹ Reasoning about strategic triangles has centered largely on the Sino-Soviet-American relationship. This was a peculiar form of triangle with one corner having a much weaker pull and with almost exclusively geopolitical importance. The new types of strategic triangles will have to contend with a wider range of functions and a multiplicity of power groupings and regional combinations of countries. For an analysis of the continued relevance of the strategic triangle concept to Sino-Soviet and, presumably, Sino-Russian relations, see Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications 1945-1990* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992).

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aftermath of the cold war generally; 2) an analysis of the specific problems posed by the Northeast Asian triangle; 3) a discussion of why the diversity, interlocking relations, and uncertain identities of China, Japan, and Russia are bound to be critical determinants of our own future; 4) a research agenda to train American experts to cope with a world in which the traditional theory and praxis of international relations are fast becoming irrelevant. Our task will be nothing less than to coax great non-Western powers, who do not necessarily share our ideals, into assuming responsible leadership roles as part of a global “concert” of powers.

Before proceeding, however, let us anticipate a possible objection to the grouping of China, Japan, and Russia together. After all, China and Japan, China and Russia, and Japan and Russia have all been historic enemies. What characteristics can any two of them possibly share that would justify their being grouped together in a power bloc? Rest assured that “strategic triangle” is not meant here to convey the prospect of a tripartite alliance, or that all three, given their extra-European qualities, will combine to resist the spread of Western-based principles, or even that all three will be united in their outlook because of resentment of American efforts to exercise global leadership. Rather, as explained below, there are other reasons for grouping these three great countries for the purpose of strategic analysis.

Overcoming the Recent Malaise

We can see many signs over the past two or three years of the difficulty the world’s leading powers will face in reaching a consensus on a new world order. In responding to one threat after another to regional or international order, the world community seems to be capable of no more than slow-motion progress. It is not unreasonable to conclude that we are in a race against time lest the costs of inaction mount precipitously. Should the United States not seize the opportunity, with all due speed, to overcome resistance to this or that “new world order”? Perhaps, but let us not overlook the potentially great costs involved in attempting to pressure the other great powers to answer our trumpet, however certain it may sound. The greater the pressure from the West—on human rights, say, or proliferation—the more likely that China or Russia *will* make common cause with its neighbors within the strategic triangle, or perhaps endorse an Asiacentric group of nations of the sort advocated by Malaysia or, *in extremis*, associate with Islamic fundamentalist states opposed to the imposition of Western norms. Likewise, any American policy that fails to coordinate with Japan risks the prospect that Japan will give priority to not offending China. Classic balance-of-power theory, to be sure, would suggest the wisdom of the United States’s seeking to split the strategic triangle apart by playing on existing tensions, or perhaps fretting only about the balance between the United States and each of the countries separately. But such strategies would in fact only complicate the task of stabilizing world power configurations and securing agreement among the leading powers.

Some vocal critics take an uncompromising position that the American president should have pursued a different approach by pressuring a reluctant Russia on Serbia and Bosnia and by insisting at an early point on a confrontation with North Korea against the wishes of China and Japan. They would get tough with China for its human-rights excesses and missile exports, with Russia for any behavior threatening the full independence of the former Soviet republics, and with Japan for its policies that contribute to trade imbalances. These matters deserve persistent attention, and bilateral American actions can at times lead to improvements. But insofar as Washington acts simultaneously against them all, it risks driving the constituents of the triangle closer together in a spirit of resistance and spoiling any chance of enlisting China, Russia, and Japan in U.S. campaigns to resolve regional conflicts and stop proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. In short, the times demand statesmanship, not showmanship, from Washington.

The past few years have not been propitious for beginning to build a community linking old and new great powers, and there have been setbacks as well in connecting the sides of the new triangle within Northeast Asia. The impact of China's Tiananmen repression, especially in Sino-American relations, set constructive dialogue back by as much as five years. Japan, obsessed by continued Russian occupation of four of the southern Kurile Islands (or the Northern Territories), has moved hesitantly on the normalization of Russo-Japanese economic ties, Boris Yeltsin's October 1993 visit to Tokyo notwithstanding.² Beijing's distrust of Mikhail Gorbachev and later Yeltsin, and the initial inclination of the Russians to look to the West, set back Sino-Russian relations as well.³ If we add to these bilateral tensions each country's preoccupation with domestic priorities and weak political leadership, it is no wonder that the post-cold war era's reorganization of great-power relations is off to a slow start.

But as we settle down for the long haul in the post-cold war era, the bilateral chasms separating each part of the Northeast Asian triangle are bound to narrow with serious implications for the relations of each with America. Managing these convergences and divergences constitutes the most important test facing American policy makers in the decades to come.

Although domestic conditions in the three countries will take some time to stabilize (and we can hope they do so soon), we should be prepared for new foreign-policy surprises even before the post-Deng leadership transition is complete, before Japan adjusts to a new electoral system and political parties, and before the results are in from the promised 1996 Russian election for president. The very prospect of a global agenda that gives due recognition to

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the more
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China or Rus-
sia will make
common cause.**

² Edamura Sumio, "Roshia yori kaerite," *Nihon boekikai geppo*, June 1994, pp. 22–23.

³ Articles in the leading Chinese journal on Russia, *Dongou Zhongya yanjiu* or *Eastern Europe and Central Asia Research* (until early 1992 named *Sulian dongou wenti* or *Problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*) allow us to trace the history of attitudes towards the leadership of the great power to the north.

each country's national interests and pride may help to shift the balance in favor of internationalism in the leadership struggles looming in all three countries. Now is the time for the United States to employ foreign policy to influence the domestic politics of the Northeast Asian triangle. For if we choose to delay international initiatives until Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo have "stabilized," it may well take decades to arrange for continuous cooperation.

Past experience, of a time when there existed a smaller number of world powers sharing a common European background, may lull us into underestimating the task before us. Even during the cold war, we grew accustomed to assessing the clashing worldviews of the superpowers in terms of only two perspectives, each presenting in its purest form a universalistic approach to the world. (Russian national interests may often have been clothed in Soviet red, but it is only since the hammer and sickle have been removed that these interests can be fully expressed.) In 1990–91, we anticipated a shift towards even greater simplicity, allowing us to spy a new world order through a single universal lens of Western manufacture, as if, henceforth, we would all be guided by the same set of principles. Since that time, even those observers who do recognize the growing complexity born of diverse great-power interests, worldviews, and identity crises coexisting in this new era usually offer little more than fuzzy suggestions about the need for "rethinking international scholarship" or "reorganizing great power relations." They are right to begin with the assumption that the great powers are still the dominant forces in world affairs, but so far no one has sharpened our image of what the new pattern of great power relationships will be. Among shifting combinations, the one that will in all likelihood stand out will be the triangle.

The Strategic Triangle

The organizing principle for our approach is the strategic triangle, the smallest unit in which two countries not only confront each other but involve a third country in search of support or balance. It applies to global relations, as when we imagine trading blocs led by Europe, the United States, and Japan, but especially to regional relations, and, above all, to Asia. Unlike other continents where there are few great powers, considerable cultural homogeneity, and well-established forces of integration, Asia faces the emergence of multiple regions in each of which we can anticipate competition among great powers. In Southeast, Central, and Northeast Asia, triangular competition is likely to be intense: in Southeast Asia, China and Japan, plus Vietnam, Indonesia, or a cluster of countries in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); in Central Asia, China and Russia, plus Kazakhstan or a cluster of former Soviet republics; in Northeast Asia, China, Russia, and Japan, with the Koreas in the middle. In each case, there will be neither one dominant country with its own sphere of influence nor strictly horizontal relations among countries accepting each other as equals. Rather, at least three power centers will be engaged in competition for regional status and economic, cultural, and geopolitical rewards.

What sets China, Japan, and Russia apart as a triangle is the proximity of these countries to each other in Northeast Asia, the involvement of each country in one or more other regions, and the capacity of each to influence global power relations by dint of their geographic reach and economic or military resources. China, Japan, and Russia not only form a strategic triangle in relation to the United States, they also form a local triangle, extending from Manchuria to Hokkaido to the Russian Far East, where interdependence is greatest, and a regional one encompassing all of Northeast Asia. As they work together more or less as equals and define their expectations with reference to each other, they can become a power cluster that other great powers must take into account. That is not because they will act with the unity of the European Union or even be able to brush aside their strong rivalries but because of the intensity of their relations and their potential import in world affairs in juxtaposition to the United States.

Of course, analysts will pay attention to other global triangles: 1) the one comprised of China, Japan, and the United States, which may be most active in the Pacific region and draw on the largest world economies; 2) the one joining China, Russia, and the United States, which will presume to have the greatest say on global military issues; 3) the triangle of Germany, Russia, and what may be a combination of other members of the European Union led by France and Great Britain working together with the United States, which will contest for influence in Central and Eastern Europe; and 4) the potential commercial blocs led by the European Union, Japan, and the United States. There will be triangles of many types, serving many purposes. Each will grope for its own combination of cooperation and competition.

Unlike the countries in other strategic triangles, the three Northeast Asian powers have the ability to influence just how much of the global agenda desired by the United States will be accepted by world decision makers. What this group of powers will actually determine, more than any other, is the degree to which Western values will inspire the overarching framework of the world order of the twenty-first century. With the spreading danger of violent confrontations drawing together many have-not nations and Islamic fundamentalist states against the West, the triangle of China, Japan, and Russia may also hold the balance in deciding whether a close-knit world authority will staunch the spread of anarchy in the post-cold war world. Not only will the triangle negotiate the divide between East and West, it will have a large say in handling the split between North and South.

Smaller and less-developed countries will be active in regional strategic relationships—sometimes as part of regional associations that face the great powers together and sometimes as the third party in triangles involving two of the powers. They gain room for maneuver by the competition among great powers. Despite the fact that many of them have some prominence in Asia, we should not make the mistake of visualizing them as having comparable influence over as wide an area as the Asian great powers. In the near future, only India may emerge as a fourth Asian great power.

Although the concept of the strategic triangle was widely applied to Sino-Soviet-American relations during the cold war, this does not mean that we already have before us a useful model for the emerging Northeast Asian triangle. When China broke away from its alliance with the Soviet Union, analysts developed strategic triangle studies as a branch of international relations theory specifically with this example in mind. Studies focused on strategic or geopolitical relations conducted on a global scale, on how one side or another gains an advantage by playing the third side as a card in a zero-sum game limited to the triangle's 180 degrees. But however instructive, strategic triangle studies dating from the 1970s are inadequate to describe the nature of great-power relations in the emerging Northeast Asian triangle of the 1990s and beyond.

To understand the relations among China, Japan, and Russia, we need to add the United States to the picture. Each of these countries deals with the

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United States separately and also reacts to the bilateral relations of the others with the world's remaining preeminent power and adjusts its own relations within the triangle and to the United States accordingly. China, for instance, can be expected to turn to Japan and Russia for support. It shares with Russia a post-communist sensitivity to American shock therapy and American universalism over human rights. It shares with Japan the concern that Western protectionism may dampen the dynamism of East Asia. China is likely to take the lead in situations where the whole triangle converges in opposition to the United States. At times, European great powers may also be drawn into cooperative efforts to rein in American power, but more likely are situations

where Russia or even Japan heed China's appeal for support while Europe remains on the sidelines or edges closer to the American position.

In a crisis, Washington may be able to mobilize its resolve and resources in order to make a powerful impact, but it must pick and choose where it intervenes in a massive way, often accepting a secondary role to concentrate on its own domestic priorities or in deference to other powers to which the stakes are higher. In cases where the three Northeast Asian great powers see eye to eye, the United States will perforce be reduced to a bystander role. In the region of greatest population, dynamism, and ongoing adjustments in power relations, a combination of Asian powers with a large, direct stake in any outcome will find itself thrown together in situations that demand decisions and action.

If fundamental security issues are at stake, Japan still is more likely to side with the United States than with Russia or even China. Nor will tension between Russia and China disappear anytime soon. But whether converging or diverging, the Northeast Asian triangle is bound to complicate American diplomacy on issues of security and trade.

Geo-economics, even geocultural relations, will form other long-range arenas of competition. As viewed from East Asian states, they center on the vitality of production for export and the domestic market, on the degree to which young people remain focused on preparing for study and work, and on

the ways tradition is reinvented to offer a compelling sense of national purpose. Each country is positioning itself to gain maximum comprehensive power well in the future, although in the case of Russia, elementary problems of recovery will take precedence for some time, and the politics of resentment threaten to make it a spoiler. In the case of China, continued insistence on a party monopoly of power, with all that entails for suspicions of the outside world, makes for a difficult transition.

The most obvious means of simplifying the equation—from the point of view of the United States—is to single out one power—China, for example—as the target of a new containment doctrine, and attempt to rally all the other regional players against it. But that is unlikely to work because of the interlocking nature of the three countries. Japan is growing closer to China,⁴ and Russia and China are discovering their affinities as post-collectivist continental giants struggling for reform and modernity even as they remain skeptical of Western principles and threatened by Islamic fundamentalism.⁵ If two of the countries were enjoined to enter a great-power agreement against the third, they would likely ask if next time they might not become the target or, at least, if they would not be mortgaging other interests by siding with the United States. The likely outcome of a containment-like strategy would not be a sturdy, NATO-like coalition, nor a “clash of civilizations,” East against West, but a lengthy and dangerous dance among rotating partners desperate to avoid isolation.

Hence, China, Japan, and Russia cannot be expected to dance to any American tune, but neither will they often dance in unison. Their proximity will add local pressures (sometimes favoring cooperation but at other times resisting its consequences) to global ones, while intensifying the urgency with which they take each other into account as they address problems. They will draw on the framework of the triangle to balance each other, to balance the United States, and to seek advantages that would be beyond reach if they acted in isolation. Americans, in turn, will be obliged to set aside the bilateral lens, and instead peer through a kaleidoscope in which all these countries appear, but the lines separating them keep changing. At times, the United States may be called upon to intervene in order to reassure one or more of the parties involved against an imagined hegemony. For instance, Russia's current weakness and problematical hold on eastern Siberia may induce Moscow to play the American card in order to check the danger of Chinese demographic colonization or Japanese financial colonization. Japan's position in the triangle is especially beset with difficulties given its fifty-year-old special relationship with the United

⁴ Hiroyuki Hisamizu, “The Time Is Right for Japan to ‘Asianize,’” *The Japan Times Weekly* (International Edition), Aug. 1–7, 1994, p. 9.

⁵ Observers have often been slow to react to changes in Sino-Russian relations. Interviews in the spring and summer of 1994 with specialists in Moscow and Beijing, such as Aleksei Bogaturov and Li Jingjie, have led me to conclude that the two countries share a strong interest in maintaining stability in Central Asia. That is noted also in commentary on the recent Sino-Russian summit. See “Beneath the Smiles,” *The Economist*, Sept. 3, 1994, p. 39.

States and its enormous economic stake outside of East Asia. These factors make it likely that Japan will play the role of mediator in the triangle. Indeed, for some time to come, the United States and Russia may continue to enjoy a closer relationship than Japan and Russia. What may change that is the long-term prospect of a marriage between the Russian Far East, rich in natural resources and sources of energy, and the Japanese archipelago.⁶ Japan's growing ties with China and other countries in Asia and its already visible differences with the United States on many world issues, suggest that Japan, too, may someday join in a combination of non-Western powers that both limits Washington's super-power status and obliges Washington to work with it on an equal footing if mutually acceptable solutions to world problems are to be found.⁷

Diverse, Interlocking, and Inherently Confident Powers

One should not underestimate the historical and geopolitical forces that distinguish and will inhibit the consolidation of Northeast Asia. The defining feature of the new great-power structure is its diversity, interlocking nature, and fragility born of the fact that China, Russia, and Japan are yet to define their own post-cold war, post-modern identities. What, in particular, will be the potential impact of non-Western civilization, especially the Confucian, on the global international system? We cannot take for granted the comprehensive Westernization of Japan, for to do so means to overlook the rapid "Asianization" of Japan's economy and strategic interests over the past decade, not to mention the questions of national identity now surfacing as Japan steps from under the shadow of American dependency. In the case of Russia and China, we find it difficult to extricate ourselves from the binary distinctions of the struggle against communism, as if the only alternative to a communist system is a democratic one and to a planned economy a market one. To be sure, Russia has one foot in Europe, but its other has always been planted in Asia. China, too, displays more and more cosmetic similarities with the West as it assimilates technology and business techniques. But all three will—indeed must—display deep-seated *non*-Western characteristics, if only because of the importance of maintaining their national identity. Those characteristics are bound to influence their behavior as great powers in the coming decades.

⁶ The dreams of developing a great regional economy are shared in the cities that are gateways to the Japan Sea, although the content differs depending on the local vantage point. Sapporo and the cities of Hokkaido look to Sakhalin and Russia across the Sea of Okhotsk as well as to Vladivostok and points south. Niigata, Kanazawa, and other cities of central Honshu facing the less-developed coastline far from the Pacific eye the areas of mainland Russia along the southern border as well as Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces in China. Finally, further south in Kyushu, the focus is on Dalian and the Yellow Sea, with less interest in Russia. Local newspapers and conferences issue abundant materials on regional relations, which, when combined, offer a running record of evolving perceptions and relations.

⁷ *The New York Times* (International Edition), Aug. 28, 1994.

For China, Japan, and Russia are great powers not only because of their objective attributes—military, economics, Security Council permanent membership, Group of Seven (G-7) political role, or resource potential—but also because of their *subjective* expectations. Each is persuaded by memory and recent experience that it belongs in the first order of powers, and each preserves a distinct historical mission to which it is bound to give expression when placed in a leadership role. Moreover, each is bound to measure its status against past glories and against each other. Mutual perceptions, with the potential for exaggerated suspicions and aroused nationalism, will play an active role in spurring their competition and cooperation.

At present, we can observe different levels of trust in the international system among these three countries. Japan is the most trusting of a collective defense framework, of an economic division of labor with reduced protectionism, and of a system of universal values for the international order. China is still intent on building its national power, objecting to arrangements that would lock in the status quo before it has caught up.⁸ Lacking self-confidence in its economic prospects and even its national character and civilization, Russia is most distrustful of the West and international institutions.⁹ The distrust of ordinary Russians extends to China and Japan.¹⁰ Yet, as the “normalization” of Russian politics provides some limits to the animating idea of the “revival of Russia as a mighty state,”¹¹ Russian leaders are likely to seek leverage rather than isolation. The nature of their disputes with China and Japan is not so serious as to blind leaders to what can be gained from working with them on a global level and using them to balance each other and the United States.

The national identities of these three countries, however rooted in venerable traditions, are only now assuming a clear shape after being overshadowed by the polarities of communism versus capitalism, East versus West, and Sino-Soviet schism. All three countries are uncertain about the nature of their political leadership only one or two years ahead and about what kind of identity the new leadership will prefer for the nation. Their internal flux reverberates on a global scale.

Indicators of crises in national identity are not difficult to find. In China, the very concept of a socialist market economy speaks to the odd combination of reform without de-Maoization and legacies of the Tiananmen suppression

⁸ Larry M. Wortzel, “China Pursues Great-Power Status,” *Orbis*, Spring 1994, pp. 157–75. A history of Chinese attitudes on world power and how the balance is changing could be compiled from the articles in the authoritative journal, *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (*World Economy and Politics*, which formerly also had in its title the words “Internal Reference” or “neican”).

⁹ This mindset emerged clearly when even Andrei Kozyrev, the once Western-leaning foreign minister of Yeltsin's government, shocked Western readers with an op-ed piece warning against dangerous dreams of U.S. hegemony. See “Don't Threaten Us,” *The New York Times*, Mar. 18, 1994.

¹⁰ Articles in the Russian press often attribute Chinese and Japanese behavior to base motives, even to long-term designs on Russian territory and resources. Aleksei Tarasov, “Sibir' tol'ko dlia russkikh,” *Izvestiya*, Nov. 2, 1993; Boris Tkachenko, “Kurily: russkaia zemlia,” *Dal'nevostochnyi uchenyi*, June 1994, p. 3.

¹¹ Stephen Sestanovich, “Russia Turns the Corner,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 1994, p. 94.

mixed with freewheeling economic openness. In 1978–1980, the first wave of Western reporters wrote often about the crisis of belief; in 1989–1991, analyses again concentrated on this theme. Now, with the deathwatch intensifying for Deng Xiaoping and his generation of Communists—with little hard evidence as to which generation, let alone which leader, will win out in the succession struggle—there is no reason to think that questions of identity are soon to be settled. In Russia, the December 1993 electoral success of ultra-nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, indicates that the people are grasping at straws.

(Zhirinovsky continues to hurl outrageous thunderbolts, such as his threat of July 1994 to seize part of Hokkaido and set up a naval base there.¹²) Russia's search for scapegoats continues as newspaper coverage approaches the surreal.¹³ Japan is not immune to signs of deep uncertainties about its identity, caught between West and East and between past and future. The oddity of a governing coalition bridging socialists, long considered to be widely out of touch with current realities, and the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), with positions often diametrically opposed to their new partners, compounds the confusion over what Japan actually stands for. Within the first four months of the coalition's tenure in power, two ministers from the LDP risked certain banishment from office by insisting, in effect, that Japan's behavior in the war years was normal and largely excusable and not a subject for national apologies. The

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ership role.**

struggle over Japan's role in the world accelerated with awareness that the Soviet Union was changing and the cold war was ending.¹⁴ It gained new momentum in 1993 when Japan's political system came unglued.

Though removed from their earlier identities as expanding, and even imperialist, powers, each of the three members of the Northeast Asian triangle considers itself the legitimate heir to a past leadership role. Chinese call their country the "Middle Kingdom" and, having stood for much of recorded history at the center of the only interstate tribute system they knew, are largely united in considering the twentieth century a brief, abnormal interlude when their nation's status sank very low. Optimism about the future of China as a great power runs deep among Chinese, although the preferred official line adds a touch of humility about the need for roughly a half century of economic growth before the country enters the ranks of the most modern.

¹² "Hokkaido Invasion Threatened," *The Japan Times Weekly* (International Edition), Aug. 8–14, 1994, p. 2.

¹³ Depending on the source, the origin of a conspiracy against Russia is: Washington, where the CIA has orchestrated events from perestroika to the collapse of the Soviet Union to shock therapy to the slide in the Russian economy; Beijing, guided by a strategy to annex much of the Far East and Siberia and cleverly using commerce and the demographic weapon of settlement of supposedly short-term visitors; or Japan, driven by its long-term need for raw materials, energy, and fish to gain control over resources on sea and on land.

¹⁴ Gilbert Rozman, *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

Japan rose to preeminence after China's position in East Asia slipped, when (according to analysts eager to show that Japan's recent history was "normal"¹⁵) it strove to build the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in imitation of, and resistance to, Western colonial empires. Now Japanese prepare themselves for a return to normalcy after a half century of living with the memory of defeat and in the shadow of two superpowers. They speak of the need to balance enormous economic power with additional political power and, in the case of some analysts, with military power. But most Japanese also recognize the need for a gradual transition to reassure themselves and former enemies alike that Tokyo can be trusted to wield power responsibly. Debate over how to become a "normal nation" pits those who favor quiet economic diplomacy against more radical voices demanding quick constitutional change, a permanent seat on the Security Council, and military independence. But virtually all Japanese agree *sotto voce* that American behavior is arrogant and that the United States has not come to terms with its own relative decline.¹⁶

Russia rode its manifest destiny, over a span of half a millennium, to expansion from the gates of Muscovy to gateways so far flung that they could simultaneously look out on Central Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, and North America. Reexamining the seventy-five-year history of the Soviet Union, Russians have mixed feelings. On the one hand, their national identity was obscured and their national interest often sacrificed to communist universalism. On the other hand, Soviet power maintained that to which Russians believe they are entitled by dint of geography and culture: geopolitical sway over much of Eurasia. While all aspects of Russian power continue to decline, the national psychology dwells on what must be done to regain the dignity of a great power and take up again Russia's "historical mission" on the steppe and beyond.

What matters is that these three countries are now released from the "prisons"—both domestic and international—that prevented them from enjoying their "natural" pre-eminence in world affairs. Unfortunately, the "natural" ambitions of each conflict with those of the others in the triangle. Russians, for instance, fear and resent the prospect of Japan's gaining a greater say because of its economic clout, or of China, by dint of its population and economic dynamism. Chinese, in turn, only grudgingly acknowledge Japan's claim to Asian leadership, while Japanese are prone to dismiss Russian power and fear China's, even as they recognize the opportunities for Japan in the development of each. With each of the three countries choosing its own criteria for measuring its proper place in the global pecking order of great powers, a difficult balancing act will be needed to satisfy all of them at once.

¹⁵ Speeding the discussion of making Japan a "normal" nation is the book by Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994).

¹⁶ Jeff Kingston, "Striving to Be 'Normal' through Quiet Diplomacy," review of Takashi Inoguchi, *Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), in *The Japan Times Weekly* (International Edition), Aug. 15–21, 1994, p. 18.

Not only is each of these three countries undergoing an abrupt change in worldview while groping to define its national interest in the post-cold war world, they are doing so in close proximity to each other. China and Russia still have the longest border of any two nations. Japan is so close to Russia that its idealists write about the construction of two bridges—from Hokkaido to Sakhalin and from Sakhalin to Khabarovskii krai—that could in a matter of decades link Tokyo to London by rail. China and Japan are encouraging intimate and rapidly growing economic ties, even as they resolve their tortured history of involvement in the politics of the Korean peninsula. The inevitable result is that the three neighbors are coming to see themselves in regional terms, and from all three we hear a message of balance between East and West. While they may not agree on the meaning of “East,” observers from all three countries stress the need for a counterweight to Atlantic power. In 1992 and 1993, Russians rediscovered the concept of Eurasianism, as opposed to the “common European home” promoted by Gorbachev. Japanese talk increasingly of Japan’s “reentering” Asia and of the “Asianization” of Japanese foreign policy in order to counter Japan-bashing and the threat of protectionism in the West, and to position Japan as a leader of the twenty-first century’s most dynamic region. Chinese are the most forthright in proposing a world in which Eastern civilization and Western civilization vie for supremacy. Although careful to recognize the need for continued borrowing from the West and to praise combinations drawing on the best of the West without sacrificing the essence of the East, the Chinese imply that a combination centered in the East is already proving to be superior.¹⁷

The pace of developments in Sino-Russian and Russo-Japanese border relations has become frenzied since 1990. Barriers have been lifted, then partially reimposed. Trade flows have turned first in one direction then in another. After rising precipitously in 1992 and 1993, Sino-Russian border trade has fallen sharply this year, in part because Russia has suspended entry to Chinese without visas, who often were overstaying their welcome. Russians who flocked on shopping expeditions to ports in Hokkaido are turning instead to South Korea. The boom and bust mentality leaves its imprint on plans for regional projects. Many remain in limbo, while others rush to completion. The phase of idealism is ending, as sober calculations, shaped by suspicion, prevail along regional borders. Uncertainty in the Russian Far East remains the most serious barrier to regional integration from the bottom up.

The road to closer relations among China, Japan, and Russia will be a long one. Japanese levels of distrust for Russia and the Russians are close to the highest for any part of the globe. Chinese remain negative towards Russia and Russians and justify their frequent criticisms of Japan by the danger of history repeating itself in a country whose government shows no remorse for its past aggressions, and whose businessmen display arrogance towards Chinese people. The Russians in the Far East again see the Chinese as posing their greatest threat. Conspiratorial theories abound—that anti-Soviet attitudes abroad

¹⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 4, 1992.

have persisted as anti-Russian ones, and that economics is a zero-sum game with other countries out to seize Russia's raw materials and capture Russian markets in order to build their own national power.

Even more compelling barriers to regional ties are taking shape on all sides. North Korea can play a spoiler role if it adheres to the position that nuclear weapons and military confrontation offer the best promise of reshaping the region in its favor. In Japan, the opposition to regionalism comes from the right wing of the LDP in its persistent efforts to whitewash wartime aggression. In Russia, the nationalist opposition raises the specter of the "yellow peril" and warns of illegal or uncontrolled migration from China. Populist governors in the Russian Far East cater to this psychology by resisting, in the course of territorial demarcations, even the tiniest border adjustment where the course of rivers has changed. In China, as recently as 1991–92, party conservatives suspicious of regionalism were pressing for a tougher position against Yeltsin and the "forces that destroyed socialism" in the Soviet Union, and raised the issue of reparations from Japan as debate swirled over Emperor Akihito's plans to visit China. Will regionalism prevail in the domestic struggles now deciding the future in Beijing, Tokyo, or Moscow? Or will nationalism of the sort described win out instead? And how, if at all, can the United States influence the outcomes?

Languages, Multinational Training, and Strategic Triangle Studies

Recent American perspectives on the shape of the new world order display too often a perverse complacency about the Northeast Asian triangle. First, there is the once popular, now discredited, idea that history is linear, that a world community under American leadership is in healthy gestation. In other words, despite the persistence of local conflicts, such as those in Northeast Asia, we are on course for the end of history under a new world order. A second perspective, echoing the cyclical view of history, foresees the rise of new enemies, whether disgruntled great powers or civilizations on the rise, with the power to function as rivals to American security and values. The intellectual implication of the first approach means that we scholars ought to shift from international security studies to what may be called a universalistic approach to global community-building studies. The implication of the second signifies a continuation of academics and politics as usual as we gear up for new bipolar cold wars against Japan in economics, or China. A third perspective—call it the ultimate decline theory—holds that chaos will define the world to come, beginning in the "failed states" of the Third World and spreading to the First.¹⁸ The implication of this approach is that scholars should discard their analysis of great-power relations altogether in favor of the infinite and amorphous agenda of removing the cause of misery or discontent in every corner of every continent.

¹⁸ *The Washington Post* (National Weekly Edition), Aug. 22–28, 1994, p. 23.

According to Stanley J. Heginbotham, vice-president of the Social Science Research Council, one major effect of the end of the cold war era is that “the focus on in-depth understanding of specific adversary or contested countries no longer commands [international funders’] attention.”¹⁹ That, to put it mildly, would be a deplorable trend if it results in a deemphasizing—by universities, think tanks, and foundations—of in-depth understanding of foreign countries, training in multiple languages, and “area specialties” generally. Chalmers Johnson has already noted the pernicious effect of rational choice theory on U.S.-Asian studies at the very time when our need for expertise in Japanese history and culture is at its height.²⁰ To the extent that our international relations experts continue too often to display weak language skills, limited area studies expertise, and modest experience in living and working abroad, we cannot fail to pay a heavy price in terms of the input received by the makers of U.S. foreign policy.²¹

The United States must help to fashion some diplomatic instrument that includes all the great powers.

To comprehend, much less manipulate, a strategic triangle of such diversity and magnitude as exists in China, Japan, and Russia, we will need experts with multiple language skills and a deep understanding of the countries they study. That need, in turn, behooves us to shift the balance of our academic training in favor of: *more* area studies at the expense of conventional theoretical studies in political science departments; more language course work, including intensive summers abroad; more study of cultural cross-fertilization, economic regionalism, and problems of mutual misperception; and more historical study of great-power behavior in triangular relations. Moreover, governmental and nongovernmental experts must strive to live and work not in foreign capitals but in the borderlands along national and “civilizational” divides. For instance, an aspiring expert on Northeast Asia should acquire a feel for Vladivostok, Harbin, and Sapporo, as much as for Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo. There he will find before long multinational communities where Chinese, Russians, and Japanese people and perspectives mix and interact, cooperate, and clash. Unfortunately, ingrained habits in academia and the foreign service are slow to change. But they must, and soon, if Americans are to keep abreast of all the people-to-people dynamics often occurring below the level of governments that are reshaping Northeast Asia. How many specialists exist today to advise the State Department even on *bilateral* relations between China and Japan, China and Russia, or Russia and Japan, much less on all three at once? The gaps may be filled in part by imported talent, as graduate students from abroad come to the United States to contribute their language skills and cultural literacy. Cross-national networks of experts will also spread quickly, aided by Internet,

¹⁹ Stanley J. Heginbotham, “Rethinking International Scholarship: The Challenge of Transition from the Cold War Era,” *Items: Social Science Research Council*, June–Sept. 1994, p. 36.

²⁰ “Wake Up America! Wake Up America! Advice from Dr. Chalmers Johnson, Japan Policy Research Institute,” *Critical Intelligence*, Aug. 1994, p. 9.

²¹ Joseph S. Johnston, Jr., “Internationalizing U.S. Higher Education,” *The Key Reporter*, Summer 1994, pp. 2–4.

and those countries slow to adapt may find it difficult to gain access to the chain of information.

But intensive training is only one means of serving the policy process needed to incorporate the Northeast Asian triangle into a new global order. American public opinion must be prepared to accept a greater degree of diversity in the world system and a reduced sense of control over it. Policy makers, academics, and journalists need to monitor the global "information superhighway" if they are to avoid misperceptions of East Asian events and speed cooperation. Finally, we all need to break the habit of dividing foreign countries into "bad guys" and allies, taking neither conflict nor cooperation for granted.

Nearly all of the disciplines in the social sciences and humanities offer useful perspectives for studying regional dynamics. International relations, political science, economics, the sociology of networks and perceptions, historical analysis, religious studies, literature, and art can all help us appreciate, and anticipate, the policy processes of diverse but intertwined nations. But, so far, our approaches to regional dynamics have been myopic, theoretically abstract, and focused almost exclusively on the "high politics" of state-to-state relations. A new empirical scholarship, inductive and multinational in origin, is needed—however much that may fly in the face of existing disciplinary biases and boundaries. We need to ask faculties not only to allow students to spend a large percentage of their study time acquiring the necessary skills but also to accept the value of regional and strategic triangular analysis in their own right. And if graduate departments do not have enough students in any one discipline to support a program in regional studies, then let regional specialists form cross-disciplinary links to achieve a critical mass.

The U.S. Role

China and Russia are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Since July 1994, Russia has been brought into the G-7 framework of annual meetings. Since at least the early 1980s, the Japanese-American relationship has been credited with a special status, while the legacy of the cold war still endows Russian-American relations with a special mystique. If all of these arrangements are already in place, what purpose is served by raising the subject of the incorporation of these three non-Western powers into the world leadership? Are they not already "leaders"? The answer is that no one of the existing global leadership organizations includes all three of the non-Western great powers, and these organizations are used sparingly by states that do not have a high level of trust in each other. The United States must therefore help to fashion some diplomatic instrument that includes all the great powers and thus reassures all three of the Northeast Asian powers that their voices will be heard, their power respected, and their interests served.

When China, Russia, and Japan find it difficult to take the initiative on issues as varied as border controversies, North Korean nuclear blackmail, and Security Council expansion, the United States can speed the process of discussions

and negotiations. As seen in North Korea, American representatives often have an advantage in getting a recalcitrant party to talk and in rallying the various parties to work together to resolve problems. Located at a distance and no longer seen as playing as active a role in Northeast Asia as in the past, the United States can become a stabilizing force. As the world's leading power, it is well positioned to sponsor initiatives to draw the other great powers into more sustained world leadership. In the past, and especially during the cold war, we were sorely constrained in our efforts to build up trust and confidence with Russia, China, and even Japan in economic matters. Today, we can be far more imaginative. With Japan it should be easiest, despite the trendy fear that the two economic superpowers are destined to become rivals. The Japanese share with Americans the worry that Russians will turn nationalistic and lose interest in working closely to stabilize the world order. And they share our fear that China will plunge into civil strife after the death of Deng Xiaoping. But with Japanese help, the United States can begin the task of enlisting the support of *all* the great powers in the task of incorporating the non-Western great powers into a trusting community in Northeast Asia—without which there can never be a new world order of any description.



APEC as a Semi-Solution

by Jonathan Clarke

Australia's prime minister Paul Keating has rightly pointed out that "the United States faces a fundamental decision on where and how it wishes to place itself in the emerging economic alignments of the Pacific."¹ Indeed, the American agenda in East Asia overflows with multiple and often contradictory objectives. Does East Asia create, or threaten, American jobs? Where is the tradeoff between humanitarian and commercial goals? North Korea aside, do the American defense treaties in East Asia exist, to adapt Lord Ismay's quip about NATO, to keep American forces in, to keep China out, or to keep Japan down?

President Bill Clinton's decision to address these questions by breathing a fresh sense of purpose into the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum through the innovation of an APEC leaders' meeting in Seattle in November 1993 drew media comparisons to President Harry Truman's role in establishing the postwar security and economic structures in Europe. One State Department participant was quoted as saying, "You have to think of this as a bit like being at a NATO meeting in 1950."² Overdrawn though these claims may be, the decision to embrace APEC as a new-generation vehicle for solidifying U.S.-Asian links undoubtedly represents a step in the right direction for which the administration wins due praise.

Amid the euphoria, however, nagging questions remain about whether this initiative will be enough to satisfy the full range of American needs. Does it represent, as the Seattle communiqué claimed, the first stage in the emergence of an integrated East Asian "community"? Or is APEC destined to succumb to the G-7 virus and decline into a glamorous, media-dominated talking shop?

¹ Paul Keating, Address at the Fair Day's Trade Conference at the Sydney Institute in Sydney, Australia, Feb. 8, 1993.

² *The New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1994.

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One central concern stands out: in Europe, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has warned against compartmentalizing security and economic issues. In Asia, APEC does exactly this. It establishes a regional architecture for economic matters but leaves security untouched. That freezes in place the existing cold war security arrangements under which the regional defense burden devolves upon American shoulders through a series of bilateral relationships and a set of war-fighting scenarios based around an American leadership role in each and every case.

It thus takes no account of the shift in the regional threat pattern away from external aggression from a global adversary to intra-regional tensions rooted in local history. Nor does it reflect the changes in American interests brought about by these shifts. The essence of these changes is that while the United States retains a vital stake in East Asian security, it does not want to be forced to take sides in a series of intra-regional disputes.³ The United States has a strong interest in turning Asia into a self-policing community.

Seen from this perspective, APEC may represent a trap for the United States. This article argues that parallel progress on regional security needs to be made. Adam Smith noted in 1776 that "defense . . . is of much more importance than opulence."⁴ If this security dimension is ignored (or allowed to remain in its present cold war straitjacket), American efforts for a revitalized and integrated Asia policy may suffer fatal damage.

As the hoopla of the Seattle summit and its successor in Jakarta in November 1994 dies down and the daily grind of international business reasserts itself, an assessment of APEC's potential will make better sense if we look at it against the totality of American interests in Asia. No net advantage accrues if APEC advances interests in one sphere only to damage them elsewhere. APEC resembles a young athlete of precocious talent. Before any multi-million dollar contracts can be signed, however, the coaches must take a hand. Strengths must be enhanced and weaknesses minimized.

Asia as American Client

In July 1969, President Richard Nixon chose the improbable setting of an officers club in Guam unintentionally to set alarm bells ringing around Asia by announcing at an informal press conference that

as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, the United States is going to encourage and has the right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by and the responsibility for it taken by the Asian nations themselves.⁵

³ See Walter A. McDougall, "The U.S. and Japan: Partners or Else," *The New York Times*, Aug. 8, 1993.

⁴ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Kathryn Sutherland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 458.

⁵ Quoted in Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 224.

The reaction was immediate. A Japanese official pleaded, "Please don't run away from Asia."⁶

These words convey the pervasive image of Asia as an American client. By speaking of Asia's transformation from "dominoes to dynamos,"⁷ President Clinton has sought to dispel this image, but, when the going gets tough, old attitudes bubble to the surface. Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, has commented that the United States is treating China as if it were an aid-dependent "Third World pariah."⁸ During his visit to Washington in February 1994, then Japanese prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa had to listen to stern strictures on how to run his economy and to premeditated insults about the reactionary character of his civil service.⁹ Can anyone imagine American officials addressing Margaret Thatcher or Helmut Kohl in tones of such pro-consular reprimand? Indeed, when an American diplomat made an incautious, pre-retirement speech in Bonn critical of German attitudes, the American embassy made speed to dispatch a note of apology to the Chancellery.

Meanwhile, Asian attitudes have come full circle. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in Winter 1993, Yoichi Funabashi, Washington bureau chief of *Asahi Shimbun*, described Asia as yearning to break free from its American apron strings.¹⁰ This attitude finds repeated expression in Asian actions: the Chinese have refused to give ground over human rights; as tensions mounted in mid-1994 over North Korea's nuclear program, the South Koreans have expressed alarm that American bellicosity over the North Korean nuclear program, far from enhancing their security, was instead imperilling it;¹¹ the Thais have resisted American pressure to widen the scope of their COBRA GOLD joint military exercises on the grounds that this might antagonize China and Vietnam; Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian prime minister and a long-term skeptic about pan-Pacific cooperation, declined to attend the Seattle APEC summit as a protest against putative American hegemonic ambitions for that organization and has instead advocated the formation of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that would exclude the United States. Meeting in Bangkok in July 1994, the nations of Southeast Asia collectively rebuffed American representations to the contrary and decided to press ahead with their policy of "constructive engagement" with Burma.

The tables have turned.¹² C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics and chairman of APEC's Eminent Persons Group

⁶ *The New York Times*, July 30, 1969.

⁷ Address to APEC Host Committee, Nov. 19, 1993, U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, Nov. 29, 1993, p. 816.

⁸ *The Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 11, 1993.

⁹ *The New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1994.

¹⁰ Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1993, pp. 75-85.

¹¹ Japanese commentators have made the same point. See Nakae Yosuke, former Japanese ambassador to China, writing in *Tokyo Shimbun*, Apr. 10, 1994.

¹² Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," *World Politics*, July 1993, pp. 501-25, contains telling statistics on the declining (though still very substantial) role of the United States in the economy of Asia.

(EPG)—a multilateral advisory body—has written that APEC represents Asia's best hope for keeping the United States engaged in Asia.¹³ This is certainly one aspect of APEC, but it would perhaps better reflect current realities to turn this statement on its head and say that the more pressing challenge for the United States lies in finding ways to prevent Asia from running away from America.¹⁴ Yesterday's mind-set based on the presumption that the United States could always call in its chips by drawing attention to its irreplaceable defense guarantee no longer gets the job done.

Asians are behaving with greater self-confidence precisely because they know that the Asian gravitational mass now weighs much more formidably in the scales. For example, while the United States remains the largest single market for most East Asian nations, Asia's intra-regional trade, investment, and aid flows exceed those with the United States; Japan far outstrips the United States in providing Official Development Assistance in Asia; trade with China alone now directly supports some two hundred thousand American jobs (notably, China is Boeing Corporation's largest single customer); from 2001–2010, Asia will *each year* place orders for new aircraft that are three times as valuable as the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas order from Saudi Arabia obtained in February 1993.¹⁵

After the annexation of the Philippines in 1898, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge exclaimed enthusiastically, "We hold the other side of the Pacific, and the value to this country is almost beyond imagination."¹⁶ A hundred years later, the rhetorical belligerence displayed by U.S. officials regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, Chinese human rights, and Japanese trade relations suggests that Americans still expect deference from Asian nations as if by right of destiny (manifest or otherwise). That may have worked when the United States "held" Asia, but today this attitude needs an overhaul. As Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Winston Lord noted in an internal State Department memo, recent American actions in Asia have created "a sense of resentment and apprehension in our relations with the region."¹⁷

The modern challenge for the United States is, in the words of one Washington-based military attaché, to manage the transition from being Asia's "big brother" to being Asia's partner. No one would deny the importance of the American voice in Asia, but today there is nothing self-executing or predetermined about this proposition. Influence has to be won and retained by intelligent policy. APEC may show the way.

¹³ C. Fred Bergsten, "APEC and World Trade," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 1994, p. 25.

¹⁴ For a discussion of this point, see Peter A. Petri, "Is the United States Bowing out of Asia," *Journal of Asian Economics*, Fall 1993, pp. 283–300.

¹⁵ *The Financial Times*, Feb. 18, 1994 (Supplement on Asian Aerospace).

¹⁶ Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles, *America's Rise to World Power, 1898–1954* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 42.

¹⁷ Winston Lord, "Emerging Malaise in Our Relations with Asia" (State Department memorandum). For a partial excerpt of the memorandum, see *The Washington Post*, May 5, 1994.

APEC's New Vision

Two main accomplishments emerged from the November 1993 inaugural APEC summit held in Seattle under the chairmanship of President Clinton. First, the leaders adopted most of the ideas of the EPG for future development of the organization. The EPG recommended that priority be given to achieving free trade in Asia, advancing global trade liberalization, and concrete projects like the harmonization of industrial standards. Secondly, the leaders released a "vision statement" that looked forward to "deepening our spirit of community based on our shared vision of achieving stability, security, and prosperity for our peoples."¹⁸ Despite this invocation of "community" (a term that inspired much pre-summit agonizing behind the scenes), the APEC leaders made clear that they do *not* aim at European federalist structures. In their 1994 report, the EPG explicitly retreated from the "community" concept in favor of the Chinese formulation of APEC as a "big family." Still, the leaders have signalled that they do entertain high hopes for APEC. President Suharto of Indonesia, an initial skeptic, used his APEC chairmanship in 1994 to guide the organization towards faster trade liberalization, investment deregulation, and facilitation of private sector business exchanges.

No doubt these hopes contain a significant helping of hyperbole. We need to remind ourselves that Seattle was not the first occasion on which Pacific leaders articulated grand visions for their region. When making the case in 1989 for the United States to join APEC as a founding member, then secretary of state James Baker praised APEC as having the potential of a "new Bretton Woods agreement" and called it the "top item on our agenda."¹⁹ As Scripps College professor Donald Crone notes, however, that did not stop APEC's agenda in its initial four years from looking "thin and somewhat bemusing."²⁰

A more businesslike approach may now have begun to assert itself. Encouraging evidence exists that the sense of purposeful cooperation engendered in Seattle amounted to something more than a flash in the pan. At an APEC follow-up meeting in Jakarta in January 1994, senior officials achieved unprecedented progress on a code of nonbinding investment principles. At their inaugural meeting on March 18–19 in Honolulu, Hawaii, APEC finance ministers agreed to double the capital of the Asian Development Bank, commissioned studies on financial flows and capital needs for the region, and directed their central banks to hold talks on capital flows.²¹ Environment ministers met in Vancouver, Canada, on March 23–24. Private sector business leaders have met under the auspices of the APEC Business Forum. The wrangles over process and whether or not APEC should adopt a "North-South" agenda, which bedeviled earlier APEC meetings, have not reappeared. American officials believe that APEC

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, Nov. 29, 1993, pp. 833–34.

¹⁹ James A. Baker, "A New Pacific Partnership," U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Aug. 1989, pp. 64–66.

²⁰ For a succinct overview of Asia-Pacific efforts to devise regional structures, see Donald Crone, "The Politics of Emerging Cooperation," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring 1992, pp. 68–83.

²¹ See the Joint Ministerial Statement, APEC Finance Ministers Meeting, Mar. 18–19, 1994, p. 2.

members now accept that the forum is ready to transcend its “start-up,” consultative stage and undertake substantive negotiations. All in all, APEC discussions since Seattle have been characterized by, in the words of the finance ministers’ communiqué, a spirit of “cooperation, consensus, and collegiality.”²²

Looking ahead, APEC is exploring whether, under what conditions, and by what date it might be possible to achieve intra-APEC free trade. Various options are under consideration: the EPG has recommended the date of 2020 to be reached by a form of European Union-style “variable geometry” under which developed countries (for example, the United States and Japan) would proceed faster towards free trade than less-industrialized countries like Indonesia or China. The emphasis has been on keeping collaborative agreements open to all—“open regionalism” in APEC parlance—but free of coercion on those countries which, for whatever reason, may wish to move slowly.

Through all these new links, APEC does appear to offer some significant advantages for a modern American policy towards Asia. It fills the gap in Asian intra-state architecture between the global system represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the network of bilateral relationships. In the words of one American official, it provides the third leg for the three-legged stool.

One of APEC’s obvious appeals lies in its comprehensive membership. The mere fact that APEC brings together the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the United States under a single roof must be counted a major boon. As recent events have shown, American problems with Asia may be bilateral in origin—Japanese and Chinese trade practices, for example—but the solutions are likely to demand a regional approach. Agreements with China on tariffs and quotas for goods entering the American market can, for instance, only be monitored through a coordinated approach in company with China’s neighbors, to whom the last stage of production can be easily transferred or where, regrettably, false labelling can intrude.²³

On the political front, similar benefits accrue from a collaborative approach. Unless the United States is prepared to wage an all-out, unilateral campaign against North Korea, the problem of the latter’s nuclear program can only be managed with South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese cooperation. Environmental issues are also best addressed on a regional basis. An organization like APEC that fosters a spirit of regional identity and a sense of common purpose may therefore fill a real American need.

APEC also allows the United States to project itself into Asia in a neutral context and build up multilateral support for its preferred positions. To some extent, that permits it to outflank the danger from fledgling regional groupings, such as the EAEC, of which the United States would not be a member. Given the vital American interest in maintaining and extending market access in Asia,

²² Ibid., p. 7.

²³ This is a problem worth \$2 billion a year. See *The New York Times*, Aug. 4, 1994.

this represents an important advantage. The United States is still searching for an analogous arrangement in Europe.

Balancing Economics and Security

The apparent success of the Seattle summit should not, however, lead us to think that APEC as currently constituted alone solves the United States's policy puzzle in Asia. Subsequent events have only underscored the fact that, despite the solid technical advances made during 1994 in the APEC working groups, APEC is still struggling to demonstrate its utility on day-to-day subjects. For example, during 1994, the United States pursued disputes on trade with Japan and Most Favored Nation status with China on a strictly bilateral basis without reference to the APEC framework. Indeed, APEC offers at best a half-solution even on the economic issues that constitute its *raison d'être*. Beyond this, the fact that regional security continues to rely on a tangle of bilateral relationships between the United States and various East Asian nations demonstrates that much work still needs to be done on the foundation, not to mention the superstructure, of the post-cold war U.S.-Asia relationship.

In devising ideas to plug this security gap and generally to propose ideas for APEC's future growth, the United States will need to tread carefully. Nobuo Matsunaga, the former Japanese ambassador to Washington, commented about the EPG recommendation for promoting free trade among the APEC members: "If Mr Clinton tries to rush us, he will fail and the whole idea will fail." When he was still foreign minister, Japanese prime minister Tsutomu Hata counselled that APEC should develop by means of "incremental gradualism by consensus."²⁴ The 1994 EPG report endorsed the need for a cautious approach. One American official described APEC as a "baby" that will need constant nursing through the diaper years. The challenge for American policy makers will be that they will face recurring battles for custody of the "baby." They will need to approach the task of parenting with great sensitivity.

The case for an evolutionary approach is well taken. Nonetheless, to interpret this as an excuse for not thinking about APEC's strategic direction may condemn the whole enterprise to atrophy. Alternately, the momentum of bureaucratically driven activity may take APEC in directions unfavorable to the United States.²⁵

Experience in Europe may offer useful guidance. There the United States enjoys excellent institutional links on security but finds itself less well placed on political and economic issues where it is, in the main, forced to handle business through a series of bilateral relationships. Both Americans and

²⁴ *The New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1993.

²⁵ "APEC Summit: Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom," *Issue Brief*, Asia Pacific Policy Center, Washington, D.C., July 28, 1994, p. 2.

Europeans have found this an unsatisfactory situation that they have tried to remedy—with at best modest success—through various devices such as the biannual summit meetings between the administration and the president of the European Commission.²⁶

Based on this experience, the United States should avoid a single-track approach for its East Asia policy. Instead, it should aim at a framework that balances the two key components of economics and security. Speaking in a European context, Secretary of State Christopher spelled out this need in an address to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Athens in June 1993:

Preserving common security across the Atlantic requires us to focus not only on renewing NATO but also on concluding the GATT round. Transatlantic relations cannot be overly compartmentalized—either in substance or, increasingly, in institutions.²⁷

That fits well with President Clinton's own stress on the conjunction of economics and security that he articulated in a speech to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul in July 1993:

The many economic discussions within the [Asian] region also can play a role. By lowering barriers to trade and investment, we can generate jobs, ease regional tensions and, thus, enhance regional security.²⁸

In the light of these remarks, it becomes readily apparent that APEC by itself cannot carry the full weight of American links to Asia. A security dimension either as a component of APEC or, more probably, in a parallel agency is needed. Given the Asian preference for functional rather than institutional arrangements and their dislike for transplanted European architecture, this agency cannot be as formalized an organization as NATO or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A better model might be the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which offers informal, functional links between the former adversaries of East and West Europe. The precise format is less important than the requirement for movement away from American bilateral guarantees towards regionally diffused responsibility.

American officials have not ignored this need. As long ago as 1961, then vice-president Lyndon Johnson expressed American interest in multilateral Asian security arrangements. More recently, in his confirmation testimony in March 1993, Winston Lord spoke of the possibility of “new mechanisms” in the

²⁶ The administration's failure to take account of the European Commission's views when presenting its proposal, “Open Markets 2000,” for a new round of tariff reductions at the G-7 meeting in Naples in July 1994 contributed materially to the failure of this initiative. See *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1994. The uneasy U.S.-EU relationship is covered in depth in Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg, *The United States and the European Community* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993).

²⁷ Intervention by Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the North Atlantic Ministerial Meeting, “U.S. Leadership after the Cold War: NATO and Transatlantic Security,” U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, June 21, 1993, p. 449.

²⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, July 19, 1993, p. 511.

security field and of the need to “integrate our economic, political, and security policies.”²⁹ But the United States has recently soft-pedalled any concrete proposals out of a conscious recognition that its East Asian partners have no appetite at present for regional security arrangements. The latter offer various arguments: there is no unitary threat; the region is too culturally and geographically diverse; there are too many historical antagonisms.³⁰

These contentions reflect substantive concerns that cannot be lightly disregarded. Nonetheless, they also have a slightly self-serving flavor about them—after all, the original six member nations of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) bound themselves into a tightly knit unit despite the fact that three are Muslim and the rest follow a Buddhist, Christian, or Confucian orientation, and despite the fact that their individual security needs differ widely. But, even if for argument’s sake we accept the contentions at face value, they exercise a deleterious effect on American interests.

In effect, they cause regional defense and security to be subcontracted by default to the United States, thus bringing about a division of labor whereby the United States takes charge of defense and the others get on with the business of developing their economies. That may have made good sense to the United States during the period of East Asian weakness and the all-pervasive Soviet threat. It may still serve Asian interests today. As a strategy for protecting American interests in Asia into the next century, however, it leaves the United States dangerously exposed to reckless entanglements or, just as likely, to a series of humiliating retreats from commitments it does not wish to honor. It also leaves East Asian states in the condition of deference and dependence from which they claim to seek release.

As noted above, intra-Asian economic links are thickening faster than trans-Pacific ties. Looking into the future, the United States may confront an East Asian regional trading block on NAFTA lines, but centered on Japan. In these circumstances, it may be tempting for the United States to see its security contribution as a sort of trump card that ensures its seat at the center of East Asian counsels. This approach would mirror traditional American thinking about Europe where former NATO supreme commander, General John R. Galvin, once described his post as “America’s seat at the table in Europe.”³¹

So long as the North Korean menace overshadows the security landscape of Asia, this calculation may be true. For the time being, the Japanese describe their security treaty with the United States as the “nucleus of the relationship.” In Southeast Asia, Singapore and Indonesia have agreed to make bunkering facilities available to the U.S. Navy. Longer-range regional strategy, however, needs to look beyond the preoccupation of the moment. This is not the place to attempt to predict the precise course that North Korea will follow: clearly,

²⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, Apr. 5, 1993, pp. 216, 220.

³⁰ See Mohamed Jawhar, “Implications of the Regional Environment for the Regimes of Confidence- and Security-building for Asia and the Pacific,” *Disarmament*, Sept. 1991, pp. 85–94.

³¹ *The Financial Times*, May 21, 1992.

in the present phase of uncertainty, no major changes in the American security posture in Northeast Asia would be prudent. But the fact that policy is on temporary hold should not preclude looking ahead to the time when the Korean problem will no longer manifest itself in so acute a form.

If and when this happens, the nature of the threat environment in Asia will change drastically. Rather than lying under the threat of a monolithic aggressor, the region will inherit a patchwork of historically potent but geographically localized tensions: territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea and in Manchuria; ethnic antagonisms in Southeast Asia; traditional suspicions among China, Korea, and Japan; unfinished business from World War II between Japan and Russia; ideological and cultural splits throughout the region; human rights abuses; and so on.

The United States should avoid a single-track approach for its East Asian policy.

Chances are that none of these disputes will provide the clear division between right and wrong or the clear threat to vital interests that Americans normally insist on before engaging in costly foreign enterprises. The United States would certainly be loath to risk a cold, not to mention a hot, war against Russia,

China, or Japan over the future of North Korea, the Kurile Islands, or the Spratly Islands. Nor should it be taken as axiomatic that American power is essential to provide, in the Pentagon's words, "the region's irreplaceable balancing wheel" between mutually suspicious Asian neighbors.³²

Experience in Europe indicates that these complex, tangled issues are not susceptible to solutions. This recognition consolidated itself well before the end of the cold war with the foundation of the CSCE in 1975. Today, NATO has more or less torn up the Article V anti-aggression premise on which it was founded and instead launched a process of self-reform that emphasizes cooperation and transparency. NATO is trying to transform itself from a war-fighting machine into an international conciliator and mediator. Europe is riven with many of the same antagonisms as Asia. But no one speaks of an American balancing wheel there. All prefer a genuinely regional approach with the stress given to confidence building.

Asia is not Europe, and the short-term focus on North Korea may well obscure the long view. Once the North Korean problem is resolved, the Koreans will have no interest in maintaining American forces in Asia for any other reason than to keep Japan in check. As this motive comes increasingly to the surface, how will the Japanese people react when they realize that the American forces are there as a garrison rather than a protecting power? Will they be content to continue their host-nation underwriting of some 60 percent of the cost of stationing American forces in Japan? However gratified the reaction in Seoul may be, this will provide cold comfort for the loss of popularity in Tokyo.

Further, how do the Chinese regard the American military posture? If it continues at present levels well beyond the demise of the Soviet threat and

³² U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 49.

in partnership with nations that have disputes with China, how can Beijing do otherwise than conclude that U.S. forces are aimed at them? Perhaps they would be right.³³ They are already smarting from American pressure over human rights. If they came to believe that they were the targets of neocontainment in Asia, Chinese enmity might become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This would represent a disaster of monumental proportions. Ideology aside, there is no country in Asia that is more important to the United States than China. Other countries, including many of the United States's East Asian partners like Korea and Japan (which take the lead in warning about Chinese intentions) are already reaping commercial advantage from the chill in Sino-American relations. Japan and the East Asian "tigers" already contribute over 70 percent of foreign direct investment in China. Two-way trade between China and Japan grew by 32 percent in 1992. With other East Asian nations seeking to profit from China's economic reform, it makes no sense for the United States to cripple its commercial interests by adopting an adversarial posture towards China on behalf of the security of the very states—Japan, Korea, Taiwan—that profit most *in* China.

China presents an extraordinarily complex challenge for the United States.³⁴ Disputes over trade and human rights dominate the bilateral agenda, but the more troubling questions about China arise from its relations with and intentions towards its regional neighbors. The United States is not party to these disputes except on the basis of "the enemy of my friend is my enemy." This would be a dangerous way to do business. A regional security framework that involved China and the United States as well as the rest of Asia in a single body with mediating powers may offer the most promising route to circumvent this danger.

It is also possible to look at this problem through the other end of the viewfinder. American forces play a double role in Asia: they defend allies and they also fulfill a force projection purpose for unilateral American interests. As of today, neither of these roles sparks particular controversy. On the contrary, the American military is welcome in East Asia. In 1991, for example, the Thais and Indonesians were happy to allow American aircraft bound for the Gulf war to stage through Thailand and Indonesia—despite the fact that at the time the United States was applying sanctions against the Thai government for violations of human rights and was denying the Indonesian military the privilege of training under the International Military Education and Training Program.

As the threat environment changes, however, in the direction of a more complex, more internecine pattern, East Asian public opinion may grow more

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reckless
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³³ See Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War—Where It Doesn't," *Orbis*, Summer 1994, p. 360.

³⁴ See Yoichi Funabashi, Michael Oksenberg, Heinrich Weiss, *An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1994).

skittish on the basing of American troops on their territory. The Philippines have already shown the way; the Thais have consistently rebuffed American requests to station troops in their country. It is already possible to detect an increased willingness among mainstream Japanese politicians openly to question the rationale for American bases in Japan.³⁵ As in Europe, restrictions on force activity or deployments could follow. Deteriorating trade relations could also poison public opinion on both sides of the Pacific, as Kunihiro Saito, vice-minister for foreign affairs in the Hosokawa government, has already publicly commented. It is true that this statement is countered by others, for example at the ASEAN meeting in July 1994, stating that trade frictions will not be allowed to interfere with security relations.³⁶ With opinion polls on both sides of the Pacific showing more adversarial U.S.-Japanese attitudes, however, the mere fact that this issue is being publicly ventilated should give cause for disquiet. A framework that allowed East Asians co-responsibility for regional security might obviate this danger.

The Way Forward

In the economic arena, the United States has come to see increasing advantage in regional arrangements like NAFTA that complement and enhance global and bilateral agreements. In Asia, APEC provides that regional forum. But economics are only half the equation. Security issues are no less regional in character yet the American and East Asian response to them remains bilateral. So instead of a security framework based on shared and collective responsibility, an outdated system remains in place whereby the United States combines with a series of lesser powers in a disparate series of compartmentalized relationships.

This arrangement harms American interests. By loading the burden of regional tensions onto its own shoulders, the United States makes itself by default the target of regional enmities and distrust. That in turn allows East Asian nations to interact with one another commercially without taking responsibility for finding solutions to their own security problems. Instead of solving problems, the American military presence simply stores them in a deep-freeze. An observer from Eastern Europe may be entitled to speculate whether this simply makes those problems all the more intractable when the time comes, as it inevitably will, when the American buffer is no longer available.

The conclusion from this analysis is simple: the United States must not allow progress on economic matters within APEC to distract it from the need to advance simultaneously on security reform. Nor should it allow the North Korean impasse to paralyze the whole region. The world has changed dramatically since President Nixon's remarks on Guam. In terms of its economic

³⁵ *The New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1994.

³⁶ "The Struggle to Slim Japan's Surplus," *The Economist*, July 30, 1994, p. 29.

relationships, the United States has recognized these changes. It makes no sense that progress should not also be possible on security.

Merely to assert that a conclusion is simple does not, of course, guarantee that it will be easy to put into practice. No one would pretend that progress towards an East Asian security community will be unencumbered. Previous American interest in regional security proposals has encountered a frosty reception from friends and foes alike, as have similar Canadian and Australian proposals. Getting from “here to there” will therefore require sustained and creative effort of the same caliber that produced the post–World War II institutions in Europe.

Unlike the European institutions that came into being at “big bang” conferences, East Asian arrangements are likely to arise by a much more incremental process. This process may be divided into two stages. The first is to join the intellectual debate. In many ways, East Asian security presents a paradox. Most East Asian policy makers assert that, North Korea aside, they do not face immediate external threats; Southeast Asian nations do not find even North Korea troubling. Against this apparent complacency, Asia is rearming faster than any other region in the world.³⁷

This inconsistency may provide the opening American policy makers need to bring home to their East Asian counterparts that new realities are steadily rendering the current security arrangements obsolete. The premise on which they were established—a weak and outgunned Asia threatened by the USSR—no longer applies. In this way, the East Asian nations would come to understand that they need to put new systems in place not in order to protect American hegemony but to safeguard their own security.

This approach would draw on initiatives already taken in East Asia. The ASEAN nations have shown themselves willing to discuss security issues with outside “dialogue partners” in the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference and Regional Forum contexts. The most recent of these took place in Bangkok in July 1994. ASEAN is aiming to admit Vietnam in 1995; Cambodia, Laos, and Burma will follow later. China, though opposed to “internationalizing” territorial disputes, has not ruled out discussion of confidence-building measures in Southeast Asia. South Korea has spoken in favor of a Northeast Asian security forum. In the academic sector, the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was established in 1993 to bring together nongovernmental experts to discuss possible formats for regional security systems. Well before APEC was established, private sector business and academic groups, such as the Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Pacific Basin Economic Council, and Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference played an important role in distilling an intellectual consensus in favor of Asia-Pacific cooperation. CSCAP—or other like institutions—could carry out a similar function in shaping regional

³⁷ *The Economist*, July 23, 1994, p. 31.

agreement on the need for regional security links. This is the sort of forum from which an intellectual consensus could emerge.³⁸

Tentative expressions of agreement in principle and scholarly concepts do not of themselves allow the United States to force the pace on security matters. Formidable obstacles remain to be overcome. In addition to the deep-seated Asian cultural antipathy to formalized security pacts, political problems in the shape of the uncertain future course of both China and Russia, the future status of Taiwan, dispositions on the Korean peninsula, and so on, lie across the road of potential security agreements.

No easy solutions suggest themselves, other than that the problems urgently require discussion. Informal forums may provide part of the answer, just as they did for APEC. But once intellectual agreement is reached that existing security provisions are unsatisfactory, the next major stage can be entered: discussion of what specific measures might be acceptable for a new East Asian security order.

In current political circumstances, the most likely form for these would be confidence- and security-building measures. Lee Kuan Yew has spoken in favor of these.³⁹ There is certainly ample scope for them in East Asia: on the Korean peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea, in the Sea of Japan.⁴⁰ As a major military power in Asia, the United States could contribute to this process by, for example, a fuller exchange of military data with China.⁴¹

The Foundations of an East Asian Security Community

An approach that concentrates on functional details would avoid the traditional Asian distaste for treaty-defined institutions and might just lay the foundations on which an East Asian security "community" can be built. At this stage, it seems unlikely that this can come into existence through a process of formal CSCE-type negotiation. A more modular approach in which the various parties agree to identify their differences and suggest ways for handling them short of conflict promises greater results. The Indonesians are fond of the image of a "web" of understandings and mutual obligations. This appears to correspond well to the American interest mentioned earlier: maintaining Asian stability on a self-policing basis.

³⁸ Douglas Paal, senior director for Asian Affairs at the NSC from 1989–1993 and now president of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington, D.C., has suggested that the CSCAP develop a regular format for security discussions based on the European *Webrkunde* model.

³⁹ *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 11, 1993, p. 15.

⁴⁰ The efficacy of confidence-building measures as a means of achieving regional security is discussed in Michael Krepon, ed., *A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security* (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993).

⁴¹ For a concise review of these problems, see Henry Harding, "Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Janne Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 419–46.

This may sound like a prescription for a *laissez-faire* approach, or waiting, like Mr. Pickwick, for “something to turn up.” It is not. Asian security holds vital implications for American welfare. The United States needs to have in Asia an effectively functioning conflict prevention and resolution system. Given that APEC stands at an early stage of its existence, it would be rash to take any controversial action that might threaten its future growth. Indeed, it may never be the correct venue for security issues. But APEC does point the way towards intra-regional cooperation. The United States should nudge that forward. Otherwise, its gains on the economic front will sooner or later be more than canceled out by losses in the security field.



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The Rules of Engagement for U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Former Yugoslavia: A Response

by Major-General John A. MacInnis

In the Fall 1994 issue of *Orbis*, Bruce D. Berkowitz airs several criticisms of the rules of engagement (ROEs) employed by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. ROEs are indeed a vital tool for assuring the consistency of military operations with policy objectives. I agree with Berkowitz on this point. I also share his evident concern that the ROEs must always be clear and comprehensible to the soldiers, like myself, who have to follow them. Unfortunately, Berkowitz is mistaken on several other key points and falls prey to existing misconceptions about the United Nations's role in former Yugoslavia. Let me take this opportunity to set the record straight.

During my tour of duty with UNPROFOR, I directed a review of the ROEs at the behest of Lieutenant-General Bertrand de LaPresle, the current force commander. The updated ROEs are little changed from those contained in policy directive 13, issued by the previous commander, General Jean Cot. The only significant change was to modify the details of "Cordon and Search" Operations so that they appeared as guidance, rather than rules. This standard military maneuver lost most of its significance as a peacekeeping tool in Croatia following the Croatian army attack of January 22, 1993, an event that reversed the successes achieved by UNPROFOR in implementing the Vance Plan. Heavy weapons, previously secured under a "double lock" system, were removed by the Krajina Serbs, ostensibly to protect themselves. Nevertheless, the maneuver was used successfully by Canadian troops in Croatia's Sector West up until August 1993, and by British and Canadian troops in May of this year, to disarm Serb militia near Gorazde.

Berkowitz suggests that UNPROFOR's ROEs are hampered by their complexity. I disagree. Policy directive 13 and its successor directive provide

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Documentation

guidance to UNPROFOR's three major commands (Croatia, FYR Macedonia, as well as to Bosnia-Herzegovina) and they apply equally to all contingents, from the Ukrainian troops in Sector North to the American troops in Macedonia. As force-wide guidance, such directives *need* to contain a good deal of "how to" information in order to promote uniformity of action. When subordinate commanders, including Lieutenant-General Michael Rose in Bosnia, receive such guidance, they distill it into streamlined instructions so that junior commanders, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers know how to react when necessary. The key point is that *force-wide* guidance does not pass to individual units without refinement.

During my visits to the units, I made a habit of asking individual soldiers to explain to me the conditions under which fire may be opened automatically. In return, I expected three items: the fact that they, their mates, or their positions were being targeted; that they could identify the source of the fire; and that they could engage their attackers without causing harm to non-combatants. Rules such as these are concise and straightforward. And their characteristics derive from the peacekeeping mission and the need for protection, and not, as Berkowitz suggests, by whether the operation itself is led by the United Nations or one or more of its member states.

I also strongly disagree with Berkowitz that UNPROFOR's ROEs expose the force to certain vulnerabilities. There are, to be sure, many hazards in ex-Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR's units operate in dispersed locations and difficult terrain; they often must move along and across confrontation lines; and these units vary in terms of training and equipment. But the rules themselves, based as they are on proportionality criteria, do not impede robust self-defense. Certainly, they do not inhibit the planning and execution of more aggressive action by higher-level commanders, including, for example, the use of NATO-provided air support.

The key issue here is not UNPROFOR's ROEs but rather what the force is expected to do. When Berkowitz compares UNPROFOR with Operation Desert Storm and questions whether the U.N. military commitment is sufficient to lever a political settlement in Bosnia, he is reflecting a widespread misimpression that UNPROFOR's job is to stop the bloodshed and to somehow compel the parties into a settlement, presumably through force. But UNPROFOR is a *non-combatant* in this conflict. It is neither configured nor mandated for peace enforcement.

When fighting broke out in Bosnia in the spring of 1992, the international community was prepared neither to abandon Bosnia to its own fate, nor to intervene militarily. Instead, the United Nations's member states dispatched UNPROFOR into Bosnia to support the delivery of humanitarian relief and to provide protection for released detainees. By performing these two seemingly apolitical, impartial humanitarian activities, UNPROFOR's basic aim was to reduce the level of suffering while at the same time to stand ready to exploit any hint of peace that should emerge. An added bonus would occur if the presence of UNPROFOR and other international agencies over time would help to diminish the overall level of conflict.

Two factors have confused public perceptions of this mission. First, there is a new image generated by peacekeepers themselves, which gives the mistaken impression that they have become war fighters. In UNPROFOR, and certain other U.N. operations, blue berets and light arms have given way to heavier weapons, armored personnel carriers, and tanks. For higher risk missions, peacekeepers need a visible means of protection combined with the capacity to respond with force if necessary. But it would be wrong to infer from this that UNPROFOR is constituted to perform missions other than peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. No force deployed for combat would ever choose to paint its equipment white with black lettering, a technique designed to enhance, rather than decrease, visibility.

Confusion has also been heightened by extensions to UNPROFOR's mandate that tend to portray it as an instrument of enforcement. In 1993, for example, the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to help protect designated safe areas. This mandate was crafted narrowly. The Council authorized UNPROFOR *inter alia* to "deter attacks" against safe areas and to "promote the withdrawal" of attacking forces. UNPROFOR was not authorized to "defend" safe areas or "to ensure or enforce" the withdrawal of attacking forces, because the Council was not prepared to outfit UNPROFOR with the troops or the capabilities necessary to secure hundreds of kilometers of territory against armed attack. UNPROFOR's main deterrent capacity, in true peacekeeping fashion, would flow from its presence in the safe areas, as had already been demonstrated in Srebrenica. Air support from NATO was sought, essentially, in a self-defense role.

Unfortunately, the precise contours of UNPROFOR's authorizations are often overlooked by outside observers. Indeed, the Council's reference to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in several of its Bosnia-related resolutions, conveying compulsory authority for certain actions, has created unrealistic expectations that UNPROFOR is postured to repel attacks against safe areas by force, to "punch through" humanitarian aid, and generally to assume a hostile posture vis-à-vis one party or another. UNPROFOR's role in monitoring the heavy weapons exclusion zones in and around Sarajevo and Gorazde has contributed to this misperception. As a result, the operation has come under attack for failure to apply force more vigorously against the Bosnian Serbs, when in fact, apart from some increases in size, it remains configured, equipped, and mandated for peacekeeping.

UNPROFOR has done a great deal, in concert with other agencies, to see the humanitarian effort through two difficult winters in Bosnia. It has registered a notable success in implementing the Muslim-Croat cease-fire agreement in Central Bosnia. But UNPROFOR is not a partisan in this conflict, and its military posture is not designed to compel the parties into settlement. Political solutions can only come from the parties and their supporters.

Bruce Berkowitz Responds:

I can sympathize with General MacInnis; he is carrying out a difficult military assignment. He also is required to explain the political policies under which he must operate. He conducts himself as a professional on both counts—in the first case, by making sure his soldiers are no more exposed than necessary, and, in the second case, by not criticizing the U.N. policies that define his options, however questionable they may be.

As I originally wrote, the basic problem with UNPROFOR's ROEs is that they are based on bad policy. The United Nations has deployed a peacekeeping force in a situation in which no peace exists to be kept. The various factions in the former Yugoslavia continue to carry out combat operations and seek military advantage in the field.

U.N. forces are in the middle of the conflict, and the ROEs are inappropriate for effective military operations in a combat situation. It is good to know that UNPROFOR officers and soldiers are not expected to read and decipher the ten pages of definitions, guidelines, and flow charts while under fire, but the ROEs are clear: no initiation of force, no retaliation.

Peacekeeping forces work when they are deployed between two sides that have agreed to stop fighting but who need an impartial outsider to monitor the cease-fire. Such situations may call for carefully nuanced instructions. Peacekeeping forces can also afford to be lightly armed and paint their vehicles white. But when politicians deploy such a force in the middle of a cease-fire that is a sham—as in the case of Bosnia—they will inevitably be vulnerable.

General MacInnis writes that it is just a "mistaken impression" that the U.N. peacekeepers have become warfighters. Given the level of combat routinely occurring in Bosnia, for the sake of his forces and himself, I hope that this is *not* a mistaken impression.



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Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War. By Howard B. Schaffer. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. 387 pp. \$29.95.)

Tension between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics. By Paul H. Nitze. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993. 212 pp. \$22.00.)

What a curious political culture America possesses! We define our democracy by its populist content, its Jeffersonian anti-elitism, and look with suspicion at all dynastic regimes as residual elements of feudalism embedded in a European past. And yet, so many American scholars who write on political subjects reveal an unabashed fascination for political leadership—especially executive authority, and strong executive authority at that. Whole journals are dedicated to studying the presidency, and the number of books that pour forth each year on past presidents and their senior appointments surely must exceed the volume of new works on British royalty by a considerable factor.

In preparation for the arduous task of driving populist pegs into presidential holes, I had occasion to reread one of my favorite books in this

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genre, the carefully researched but sadly neglected *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys* by Doris Kearns Goodwin.¹ To some degree, Goodwin exemplifies the dilemma of reconciling masses and elites in American politics, but at least she has a keen sense of this soft underbelly in American ideology. The book's opening—providing the reader with a pair of charts on the Fitzgerald family and the Kennedy family dating back to the end of the eighteenth century—suggests that major presidents are not so much made as manufactured over time and according to place. It is probably so, and one is therefore tempted to say that the movie *Kind Hearts and Coronets* (1949)—that wonderful spoof on British royalty in which it is plain that if enough members of the royal family are gently eliminated, there is room at the top for any pretender—may be a better guide to getting to the top than *Poor Richard's Almanac*.

One of the first tasks of an *incoming* president is to pick the site and directors of his *outgoing* legacy, specifically, the library, museum, or foundation that will house the presidential papers of his administration. Places such as the Kennedy Library and even the Gerald R. Ford Foundation serve as castles for the rich and watering holes for the acolytes, reflecting a strange attempt to satisfy constituencies at the poles as well as those in the middle. It is not that such private, nonprofit corporations are evil or even propagandistic but that they protect and protract the dynastic idea in politics while presuming to serve the larger public good. In these efforts to enhance the memory of a particular administration, truth is a frequent victim. The photo adorning *Beyond Peace* is of Richard Nixon with clenched fists “at ceremonies announcing the creation of the Center for Peace and Freedom at the Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace.” It may not be Windsor Castle, but it will have to do.

Nor is the harkening back to a presidency as dynasty simply a cultural anomaly. For underlying this wheelbarrow of books is a barely disguised presumption that elites do indeed make history, including American history, and that the populist tradition merely makes good window dressing. What adds to the irony is that nary a president nor an adviser of this century would dare argue—in public at least—for an elitist conception of history. Theodore Roosevelt might be an exception. But even he, in his book *The Strenuous Life* (1902), began our century with a careful distinction between traditional elites and the venal bourgeois elites whom “the people” loathed. Our politicians are the first to claim to be motivated, even driven, by popular forces. So, compounding the cultural ambiguity is a causal dilemma: just what *are* the driving forces of political events?

This formidable array of books—extending from Dwight D. Eisenhower and Nixon as major leaders to Chester Bowles and Paul Nitze as worthy emissaries—illustrates a fascination with executive politics that has seized journalists and linguists as well as the usual suspects who would set such agendas: the scholars. Several titles reviewed here are decent additions to the literature.

¹ (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

Of course, the late President Nixon's *Beyond Peace*, his tenth and final book, is in a quite different class simply because it is written by a former president. Nevertheless, it includes the most up-to-date observations on the American future and, more important for our purposes here, Nixon delivers his views on presidential leadership in his characteristically regal style.

While Nixon accepts the division of government into "three equal branches"—what choice does he have?—Nixon manages an oblique criticism all the same: "We cannot afford government dominated by an imperial judiciary and an imperial Congress dedicated primarily to involving government in subjects it does not understand and problems it cannot solve" (p. 179). Speaking of the pot calling the kettle black! Here we have that most impervious, if not imperial, of presidents flaying the other branches of government while claiming that "presidents, with their limited terms, are more accountable to the electorate than is an imperial Congress" (p. 180). Old battle wounds do not heal quickly. Nixon informs us that "the problem is not an excessively strong Presidency, but a hobbled one" (p. 181). The wind-up is that "the President is subject to impeachments, congressional power over the purse, and other political and congressional constraints" (p. 193). For good measure, we are warned that "Presidents, particularly conservative ones, will always be restrained by an adversarial media" (p. 195). And we know from H.R. Haldeman's newly published memoir just who "runs" this ineluctably adversarial media.²

It is not that *Beyond Peace* is a poor book, or offers a weak set of recommendations. Far from it. On a wide range of issues, one can only nod hearty assent to the positions taken and proposals offered. A former president has a perfect right to declaim on what it means to be American. (It does not mean multiculturalism for Nixon, but dedication to a country that offers virtually limitless opportunity to all, regardless of their background.) But the constant shifting from useful if often platitudinous recommendations to useless if often correct objects of animus becomes downright irritating. It may well be that "Hollywood is sick" and that "its values are not those of mainstream America" (p. 229). But in the final analysis, one is struck by this doyen of limited government warning the film industry that "unless Hollywood does even more self-censoring, it will inevitably face censoring by government" (p. 229). Throughout, the undulation from firm limits on government when it comes to taxes and policies, to demands to "beef up" government when it comes to police, prisons, and courts, stamps this final effort by Nixon as stumbling in internal contradiction.

There is also a wider contradiction here on view. One senses from the assured, avuncular style typical of Nixon that he well understood that this would be his final effort. Not unnaturally, Nixon wants his parting shot to be a conservative manifesto—but this from a president whose administration was anything but conservative in practice.³

² H.R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: Putnam, 1994).

³ On this point, see Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994). Unfortunately, this volume was received too late for full inclusion in this essay.

Moreover, Nixon brings strong statements and profound observations to all manner of foreign and domestic policy issues—from the need to deal with postcommunist Russia in a supportive way to the importance of caring for families in need. Nixon is a shrewd observer of developments in Russia, the Middle East, and Asia, but he's far less knowledgeable about Cuba and Latin America—a weakness especially notable when he urges a soft rather than hard line towards Fidel Castro. "What has worked in China now has the best chance of working in Cuba" (pp. 138–39). But just what it is that has "worked" in the former or that would work in the latter if the embargo were lifted is left obscure.

And yet, it all sounds like a nomination speech dressed up with nowhere to go, like the ghost of an executive authority of old, haunting or trying to haunt, today's political process. But isn't this what we would expect and even hope for from the authorial Nixon? Nixon's pronouncements are boldly frank, and there is merit in that alone. If he is not entirely original, then certainly he has a keen sense of the American national interests at stake in each theater of conflict. Especially refreshing is Nixon's realistic appreciation of the limits to American power and hence the need to get beyond instructing other nations and leaders on how to run their economic and political systems. This fits Nixon's style and views perfectly; after all, potentates rarely concern themselves with the internal management of other lands, but rather learn how to reach accommodation with each other.

But here we run up against the last limit of *Beyond Peace*. "Beyond peace" for Nixon is "freedom." But appeals to a world of learning from Alexis de Tocqueville to Walter Lippmann cannot resolve the deep contradictions between Nixon's impulse to dynastic dictate and the occasional plebeian appeal therein. Alas, the tenth and last book in Nixon's literary career does not quite take us to the promised land. The libertarian ideal remains as slippery as ever, at least when Richard Nixon tries to espouse it.

With the accession of Gerald R. Ford we had the good fortune to see a brilliant paranoid (and as it turns out from the Halderman *Diaries* also a racist and an anti-Semite) replaced by a true, loyal, if utterly pedestrian American. That, at any rate, is the picture that emerges in this half-biography, half-hagiography—otherwise known as official biography—of "Gerald Ford's Appointment with History" known as *Time and Chance*. The author of *Time and Chance*, James Cannon, served as domestic policy adviser to President Ford, and has since remained close to the former president. The work is based on the presidential papers and personal participation of Ford, but it has such a deep filial connection that nary a criticism can be found that is not somehow sanctioned, if not uttered, by the former president himself. Thus, only after Ford himself acknowledged as "a mistake" the effort to impeach Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas as "unfit" and "exhibiting the first sign of senility" (p. 101) does Cannon feel at liberty to second this judgment, albeit *sotto voce*.

When it comes to writing about Ford's family life, not even the official works of a court historian on the Queen Mother could top such stuff as, "Life in the Ford family was a schedule of obligations. Ford was always there for

his sons' football games, when they received an award, and on Sunday morning for church" (p. 79). We are supplied with an alibi for Betty Ford's later substance abuse and alcohol problems. Cannon says an early "pinched nerve" required a treatment of "traction and pain-killing drugs" (p. 88). We are reminded that the rise of the thirty-eighth president is a story as American as apple pie: "The qualities of character that placed Ford in the Presidency run like golden threads to his childhood, leading back to a time and a place and a family that instilled in the boy the integrity, loyalty, courage, stamina, ambition, patriotism, idealism, and the habit of hard work that became part of his being" (p. xvi).

If such pabulum were all that *Time and Chance* had to offer, it would join the list of books called "inspirational" but meaning insipid. And yet, buried in this strange tale of the life and loves of the "stolid" Gerald Ford is a crackling good story of how Washington worked to heal a nation during and after the fall of our own King Richard. Cannon assures us that "Betty Ford's first thought was for the Nixons"; indeed, "in her daily prayers she had been fervently asking that President Nixon could remain in office" (p.

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298). Mrs. Ford might well have been the only person in official Washington with such prayers! Back at the White House, Alexander Haig was making preparations for the transition; James St. Clair was expressing shock at the withholding of evidence by Nixon; advisers to Ford, like Fred Buzhardt and Philip Buchen, were arranging shadow cabinets; and Ford himself was explaining to advisers the need to develop a stronger set of transition officers. Every adviser to Nixon—from Barry Goldwater, Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, George Bush, and, of course, Ford—spoke in whispers, conveying the sentiments of the House and Senate. Tragedy and comedy merged into political opera. Junior assistants were running about asking, "Has the President killed himself?" Everybody—including Nixon and Ford—were praying in public for one another. What they were muttering in private was something else again.

The Great Pardon was the great moment in Gerald Ford's presidency. Whether a deal had been struck between Haig and Ford remains obscure; certainly, we don't learn anything about it from Cannon. In his letter to Cannon dated April 22, 1993, Ford, while genial and decent, does little to resolve issues of political causation and succession (pp. 421–22). Ford's testimonies and responses to Congressional prodding hardly clarified matters either.

Much still depends, therefore, on how one interprets a causal chain—whether the chain started with a question by Ford to Haig or a suggestion from Haig to Ford concerning the best way to end a succession crisis in the making. Whether it was an act of cowardice or statesmanship, the pardon was the start, not the end, of Ford's troubles as president. And while Ford's nine hundred days never measured up to John F. Kennedy's one thousand in dramaturgical terms, the fact is that in the act of returning to a politics of normalcy, Ford achieved something spectacular in a decidedly quotidian way.

Despite himself, perhaps, Cannon ultimately triumphs over his own terrible tendencies to maudlin hagiography. He well appreciates that Ford "was an ordinary man called to serve America in extraordinary circumstances. . . .

Ford was Everyman become President" (p. 411). Perhaps it is even fair to say that the best act performed by Ford was the entirely ordinary one of losing the 1976 election. The victory of James Earl Carter—an even more ordinary man called upon to serve America in extraordinary circumstances—proved something important: that the two major parties could produce two such ordinary men, and that the party system and the national structure could survive them both. Cannon is too gentle a soul to push us into a study of the Ford administration as interregnum, or the failed if Herculean efforts of a Bryce Harlow as presidential adviser and the new breed of Republicans to save the man and his party from defeat. Still, at least with respect to Nixon's resignation, we are left with the impression that the two-party system has special properties that encourage a faith in leadership far more than a regard for justice.

If I may be forgiven a breakdown in historical sequence, I should now like to take up *Eisenhower's War of Words*, for this will complete our consideration of recent Republican presidents before Ronald Reagan and show links between them. For while presidential regimes follow few party rules, political parties reveal deep internal consistencies that require consideration apart from a strict chronological accounting.

Dwight Eisenhower was the first Republican to hold major office since Herbert Hoover. His movement from the military to the polity sanctified the Republican postwar dynasty. Dynasties have discontinuities as well as continuities. The Stuarts and the Tudors of post-feudal England indicate just how vital a factor struggle at the top can be in the history of nations. In like manner, Ford hitched his wagon to Eisenhower and that helped him carry his Michigan district. Ford hailed Eisenhower's presidential candidacy of 1952 as "the surest way to preserve your efforts in Europe and to promote peace in the world" (Cannon, p. 60). Nixon was even more fervent in his praise for Eisenhower, although he let slip that Ike "was a far more complex and devious man than most people realized, and in the best sense of these words" (Medhurst, p. 137). Just how "devious" could have a "best sense" we will leave to linguists to figure out; perhaps the choice of words reflects Nixon's belief that his loyalty was reciprocated by Eisenhower somewhat coolly.

Eisenhower's War of Words better illustrates problems in today's division of social science labors than tensions in the two Eisenhower administrations, however. Boundary maintenance devices, such as "rhetoric and leadership" and "strategic communication," enable contributors to this book to overcome their own tendencies—or perhaps those imposed on them by the framework of this compendium—to frame questions in terms of linguistic choices rather than political realities. But, to say the least, such language distorts an otherwise thoughtful cluster of papers.

A quite decent paper by Thomas Rosteck tells us that Eisenhower succeeded in combatting McCarthyism by the particularly effective mode of using McCarthy's rhetoric while maintaining strict adherence to law. While recognizing Eisenhower's great achievement, Rosteck nonetheless blames him for "likely legitimating the Cold War paranoia of the McCarthy movement" (p. 90). The essay has nary a word on real-world circumstances that gave substance

to the McCarthyite shadows. Instead, an emphasis on “rhetoric” and “strategy” leads to the analytical collapse of political judgment, not to mention moral principles.

One finds the same sort of strained effort at polarity in the essay by Steven R. Goldzwig and George Dionisopoulos on Eisenhower’s handling of educational integration at Little Rock. Everything is reduced to “three acts” in a drama involving propaganda battles, rhetorical templates, image concerns, and news coverage. With the drama thus defined, Eisenhower is then charged with “conspicuously avoiding the ethical questions raised by resistance to desegregation” (p. 215)—as if ethical considerations were lacking in this crisis and confrontation. A similarly mixed assessment of Eisenhower’s presidency is contained in the article by David Henry on his handling of Sputnik. Here the need for a “rhetorical leader” to reaffirm faith in America was crossed by a presumably poor “initial choice of strategies” (p. 245).

My favorite essay in the book is Charles J.G. Griffin’s paper on Eisenhower’s farewell address. The paper is both fair-minded and appropriate to the task of a student of language communication and decision. But, ultimately, the book is less an analysis of strategies than a critique of principles. Starting with the first paper by Robert L. Ivie to the penultimate paper by Lawrence W. Haapanen on the U-2 overflight and the “missed opportunity to pursue a peace project in Paris and Moscow” (p. 251), the volume reflects both a distorted certainty that rhetorical devices are central to political decision making, and a disastrous belief that many, if not most, of the issues faced by the Eisenhower administration were a function of American pathology rather than Soviet intransigence. In its own way, then, the book emphasizes the president as king, with rhetoric always used to convince, persuade, and cajole the unsuspecting masses. Communications experts evidently assume that presidential leadership has little relation to the actual state of the American commonwealth or any sense of reciprocal obligation between the president and the American people.

In contrast, the relationship between leaders and led is presumably the central purpose of Garry Wills’s new book, *Certain Trumpets*. Alas, it is the least impressive book of the lot by far. For if the Medhurst collection displays some of the follies of communication experts’ approaches to messy political issues, Wills displays the far worse folly of using the trappings and pretensions of such approaches in an uproariously populist manner. *Certain Trumpets*, subtitled *The Call of Leaders*, intends to be a dialectical treatment of the leadership qualities of important people. Instead, it turns out to be a confused pastiche of important and foolish people.

First we have leadership types Wills likes: Franklin Roosevelt, Harriet Tubman, Eleanor Roosevelt, Andrew Young, Napoleon, King David, Ross Perot, John XXIII, George Washington, Socrates, Mary Baker Eddy, Carl Stotz, Martha Graham, Martin Luther King, Cesare Borgia, and Dorothy Day. These are juxtaposed to anti-types, or simply leaders that Wills does not especially care for. These anti-types are (feel free to match these names against the leaders to whom they contrast!): Adlai Stevenson, Stephen A. Douglas, Nancy Reagan, Clark Kerr, George McClellan, King Solomon, Roger Smith, Celestine V, Oliver

Cromwell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Phineas Parkhurst Quimby, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, Madonna, Robert Parris Moses, Piero Soderini, and Ammon Hennacy. The book is 336 pages long; thus, essentially ten pages are allocated to each the famous and the infamous, the leaders and the anti-leaders. To say that the treatment varies from the trivial to the superficial is to give Wills exaggerated credit at both ends of the scale.

Ignoring the ludicrous pairings in content, Wills violates both history and context. What is one to do with Socrates versus Ludwig Wittgenstein, the two separated by 2,500 years? The mind boggles at this sort of television docudrama style. Even that is not as far-fetched as the pairing of Martha Graham and Madonna. Then there are kings who follow each other like David and Solomon, and would-be saints who worked with each other, Dorothy Day and Ammon Hennacy. What Andrew Young and Clark Kerr have in common with respect to careers, race, vocation, and calling simply eludes me. Indeed, Kerr—one of the most distinguished leaders of higher education in the entire century—is called the Bull Connor of Berkeley. Wills either does not know or chooses not to acknowledge the fact that Kerr *opposed* involving local police or troops in the 1964 Berkeley demonstrations. Wills's two pages on Wittgenstein reek of pop psychology of the worst sort. His great sin: "An observer on the margins of human society, not a man busy in the midst of life" (p. 172). But then with Ammon Hennacy it was his activism; his "flamboyant protests" were no match for Dorothy Day, who quietly "shed a radiance from all she did" (p. 265).

And so it goes, this embarrassing madcap litany of fake polarities and false pretenses. My favorite is the one with which the book ends: "A Napoleon would be a poor leader of PTA [Parent-Teacher Association] meetings; but Lincoln would be a superb one" (p. 270). Given the state of affairs in elementary education, perhaps we deserve a book on leadership that seems to have been hatched in a literary agent's mind and executed by a literary mouse that roars.

There is not a shred of awareness in Wills's accounting of the literature on leadership beyond a nodding acquaintance with Max Weber's essays on charisma. The works of Alvin Gouldner, Aaron Wildavsky, and Harold Wilensky, for example, are just unknown to Wills. But behind this intellectual mess lurks a problem: in the world of leadership, are we faced with the problem of membership, or checks and balances within elite society as such? In a broader sense, the issue is between the importance of politics, a mass activity in search of heroes, and that of policy, an elite activity. One might say that dynastic forms of rule lean to and prefer to think of courts and subjects rather than constitutions and citizens.

Clearly, the very nature of foreign policy permits those who serve and service rulers—like secretaries of defense and state—to state their claim as the real source of leadership, or at least the source of those fundamental ideas that permit leadership to develop with a clear mandate and rationale. Paul Nitze opens his book with the stunning pronouncement that "most of what has been written and taught under the header of 'political science' by Americans since World War II has been contrary to experience and to common sense" (p. 3).

He clearly implies more than just the trans-scientific nature of diplomacy. He is trying to tell us that people live in a world of competing elites, not elites unified against masses. And, in truth, whether we are looking at the works of Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, or Henry Kissinger, we find ourselves in the presence of men for whom democracy is the deep background of their beliefs, but service to the ruler is the operational basis of their conduct. Nitze's insight is a good way of examining Howard Schaffer's treatment of Chester Bowles.

In an amiable, well-crafted book, Schaffer, himself a former ambassador to Bangladesh and a seasoned foreign service officer who served on the staffs of both John Kenneth Galbraith and Chester Bowles in India, gives us a definitive study of Bowles. Bowles was twice ambassador to India, Democratic Party spokesman on foreign-policy issues, Congressman from his home state of Connecticut, foreign-policy adviser to Kennedy, undersecretary to Dean Rusk at the State Department, and special adviser to Kennedy on Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But when all the credits are listed, it is obvious that Bowles remained a peripheral figure in making foreign policy. Bowles himself appreciated that the deaths of Kennedy and Jawaharlal Nehru simply put to an end any pretense he had to being a maker and shaker of history.

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One finds especially intriguing the extent to which a consensus existed throughout the postwar period—at least in government circles—that the issues to be determined in the cold war were essentially tactical, not principled: how to handle situations and countries with whom the United States was allied or in opposition. And while Ambassador Schaffer tries valiantly to make Bowles a primary thinker concerned with long-range issues of democratic reform, the fact remained that he was a key figure precisely in the area of advice and agenda-setting on those areas covered by his various assignments. He was, in short, a loyal adviser, both to Kennedy and Johnson.

While Schaffer is overwhelmingly positive in his assessment of Bowles, one must wonder whether he does not shortchange his subject in the very premise of the book. In describing Bowles as “a product of his times in believing that there was a serious Communist threat to the ‘free world’ promoted by Moscow and abetted by Peking” (p. 322), Schaffer suffers the same myopia as his more academic colleagues. To recognize the Soviet Union as a genuine adversary and threat does not weaken Bowles's judgments or commitments to democracy. Only when one raises the notion of “cold war” to an abstract struggle of worthless proportions do contradictions with another abstraction, “The New Deal,” come into play. The great value of the book is in its narrative portions, in the telling of the Bowles story. The specific accomplishments of New Deal liberalism from the Tennessee Valley Authority to support for the United Nations are not overlooked, and, indeed, are woven into this effort.

But seeing Bowles as representative of a “long view” while everyone else in government locks into “immediate problems” is unconvincing. More likely, Bowles's congenital dislike of military action and intervention of any

sort—a characteristic that dated back to his pre-war participation in the America First Committee—simply placed him at odds with most government assessments. One might argue that the wisdom of his vision was borne out by the Vietnam tragedy, but what is one to make of his constant drumbeat of early support for negotiated peace between England and Adolph Hitler's Germany? He was forceful enough to have made Neville Chamberlain blush and Charles Lindbergh joyous.

As a result, it seems somewhat fatuous to imply that had Bowles been, by turns, rougher, tougher, more cynical, less decent or congenial, he might have prevailed in his approach to foreign policy. That simply ignores the obvious: ambassadors do not make policy. They recommend and perhaps even gently sway those who do make policy. The knight errant does not tell the king what to do. He does tell the king his options in such a way as to hopefully persuade him of the specific option the knight—in this case Bowles—recommends. Lyndon Johnson's quip that Bowles was the second Indian ambassador to the United States was a wonderful way of defining the difference between those who make foreign policy and those charged with carrying it out. That is in no way to disparage the contributions Bowles made during his long tenure of public service. It is to caution those who think that a patrician background as captain of the Yale Gold Team and sailing a yacht to Bermuda is itself a high road to serving the public interest. Rather, an elite background—and it would be hard to deny that the co-founder of the advertising firm of Benton & Bowles was anything less—made for the perfect servant of presidents and secretaries of state who in fact define those interests.

As large as the book is, one would have liked a far larger one—which in itself speaks well of this effort. So much of Schaffer's work is given over to the two terms of Bowles as ambassador to India that one is left with only a small sense of the complete man. There is too little on Bowles's many writings, his early congressional career, and his considerable success in the business world. Just how a man described as lonely and shy could operate in the rough and tumble first of commerce and then major-league foreign policy is simply not explained—nor is his relationship to his two wives, who are dealt with kindly and peripherally in a single page. Ultimately, we have a public statement about a public figure—thoroughly decent, respectful, and useful. What we don't have is the whole story of a man.

One is tempted to say that if Chester Bowles was a New Dealer in the service of the cold war, Paul Nitze was a reluctant Democrat in the service of the Republic. It was not an ideology that motivated Nitze but foreign policy as service. Whether for Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, or Nixon, whether as secretary of the navy, deputy secretary of defense, director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, or chief American negotiator to various arms-control talks, Nitze was a senior adviser to presidents. If Bowles was the perfect outsider looking in, Nitze was and remains the consummate insider looking out. But it must be said that Nitze was by far the weightier of the two. He is one of the very few figures in public life willing to formulate a broad political and ethical

framework for decision making that extends beyond categorical imperatives, such as thou shalt not fire a weapon unless fired upon.

It is fair to say that *Tension between Opposites*, for all its brevity, might well stand the test of time, and join the handful of authors and titles—and here I would list Acheson, Kennan, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and Kissinger—who have been able to rise above the pedestrian obligations of their quotidian chores into a general theory of foreign policy. But such a general theory has to be teased out of this slim book. This is, first, because of Nitze's bromides against political science ("Most of what has been written and taught under the heading of 'political science' by Americans since World War II has been contrary to experience and to common sense . . . of limited value, if not counterproductive, as a guide to the actual conduct of policy" (p. 3). Secondly, much of his thinking is seen in contrast to people rather than precepts. So we must tease out the theory from wonderful capsules on James Forrestal, Kennan, Acheson, George C. Marshall, Will Clayton, and George Shultz. A brief review cannot do justice to the psychological insights Nitze provides—which are invariably incisive and probing—not only about the personalities involved but the political values that motivated their behavior. It is the tension between virtue and service, or more generally, values and politics, that drives the men he describes and, indeed, drives this book. I doubt that we shall ever have a more able and sympathetic portrait of Forrestal, for example, and for this alone we should be grateful.

But then, what is the "theory" behind this volume? What thoughts set it apart as worthy reading? Nitze finds the answer in classical sociology, especially the work of Émile Durkheim and Pitirim Sorokin: to study a nation is to examine a group, and to probe a group is to appreciate the intensity of value systems on individuals adhering to the group. So to look at policy making is to examine the scope and value of a social system; the range of value issues on which relevant subgroups sense the need for guidance and support; internal consistencies and internal contradictions that plague values; claims of legitimacy, that is, how broadly do its members support and participate in actions taken in the group's name; and to what extent a value system is relevant to current problems, challenges, and ideologies.

The essence of Nitze's response to his own queries comes rather late in the volume, as a footnote to Kennan. Given its importance to his dialectical vision of *Tensions between Opposites* it is worth a comment: "The lens of the concept of the complementarity of opposites [is] that it is through the tension between opposites that truth, beauty, and life is to be found. In this context it is the tensions between man's humanity and the constraints of the cultures of which he is a part that produce the rich life that makes it worth living" (p. 132). This kind of Hegelianism is so unusual, dare one say, so old-fashioned, that it may be viewed as Nitze's rebellion against pragmatism of the sort practiced in the Foreign Service. For that matter, it is the complement to Bowles's own theoretical revolt, based more on Kantian premises of universalism and the peaceful potentials of free societies.

Nitze has modesty, not a word that comes easily in describing Washington insiders, that is reflected in his sense of credits. His Hegelianism clearly derives

from George Petee's *The Process of Revolution* (1971) and Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1957). And his appreciation of the collapse of communism was presaged by a reading of Leszek Kolakowski's *Main Currents of Marxism* (1978) and *The Presence of Myth* (1989). It is little wonder that Nitze's energies in later years turned to higher education—especially the founding of a School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. That he wears lightly his erudition in sociology and philosophy—without embarrassment but also without pretentiousness—is perhaps the best argument for a liberal arts background in those who aspire to manage foreign policy. It might well be that its overall stylistic elements will serve more eloquently than any specific theorem to make this book well read in professional circles.

Still, his sound intellectual instincts and appreciation that only action keeps one in touch with reality do not always prevent Nitze from going off the deep end. Nitze joins the long list of diplomats who have sought the “solution” to the “Jews problem” in strange homelands. Rather than allowing unlimited emigration to Palestine after the Holocaust, he argues that “the highlands above the escarpment in Surinam offered an almost wholly uninhabited but naturally rich area suitable for creating such a homeland” (p. 101). Nitze's astonishing proposal that this “alternate location for a second Jewish home” (p. 101) was ideal no doubt derives from his service during World War II as the Foreign Economic Administration adviser for financing the mining refinement of bauxite in Surinam (formerly Dutch Guiana). That President Truman was strong and courageous enough to buck a cohort of those opposed to “Zionist points of view,” and that such a cohort included George C. Marshall, Robert Lovett, Loy Henderson, Chip Bohlen, and James Forrestal, is indicative of the real power of the Arabist lobby in American foreign policy. The immense impact of Clark Clifford in supporting Truman's decision to recognize the state of Israel is grudgingly acknowledged. It might better have been celebrated. That Nitze raises, nearly a half century later, this old suggestion about shipping Jews to South America as one would a rare breed of cattle—and in a quarrelsome way no less—is decidedly odd.

This collapse of sound judgment is sufficiently unusual in Nitze that it simply cannot be ignored. For he is not only uneasy with the very existence of Israel, but he hardly has a flattering view of the fate and placement of a people for whom Jerusalem is a destiny no less than a history. Perhaps this lapse also calls attention to the problem of developing a theory of foreign-policy practice as such. We must move beyond Hegelianism no less than Kantianism in the formation of a twenty-first-century foreign policy. For what one finds at the end of this trek through assorted books on presidents and by presidents, on diplomats and by diplomats, and by journalists—but, thank God, not on journalists—is that the touchstone is the essential goodness of America, as that goodness is defined by an electorate rather than by select appointed advisers. When the king goes naked in this country, we all know it, and the king is replaced. That is the limit of all analogues with the European dynastic tradition, and the enduring value of the American democratic tradition.

The Peace Movement's Last Hurrah? **by Guenter Lewy**

Polite Protestors: The American Peace Movement of the 1980s. By John Lofland. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1993. 336 pp. \$34.95; \$16.95, paper.)

Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze. By Robert Kleidman. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1993. 276 pp. \$34.95.)

Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War. By David Cortright. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993. 288 pp. \$65.00; \$19.95, paper.)

One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953. By Lawrence S. Wittner. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993. 456 pp. \$29.95.)

Learning Peace: The Promise of Ecological and Cooperative Education. Edited by Betty Reardon and Eva Nordland. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 234 pp. \$49.50; \$16.95, paper.)

The impression made by the American adversary culture at any given time may be likened to the electromagnetic spectrum: some of it is visible, and some of it isn't. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war have resulted in the virtual disappearance of the peace movement from public view. Indeed, many of those who in the past decried the "arrogance" of American power and branded American assertiveness in the world a manifestation of imperialism, today loudly demand American military intervention in trouble spots such as Bosnia and Haiti.

But the adversary culture has not gone away. Some of the same individuals who today advocate using force to install democracy in Haiti and right wrongs in the Balkans, quite paradoxically, still insist that the road to world peace lies not through reliance upon military force but through forms of international cooperation that relegate national sovereignty to the dustbin of history and that otherwise "speak truth to power." Not a few of them claim that it was their work for peace and disarmament that ended the cold war and prevented a nuclear holocaust.

The authors of the books reviewed here make all the aforementioned points with varying degrees of emphasis. Some of them played leading roles in the peace movement, David Cortright being the best case in point. This fact in itself, of course, need not disqualify them from contributing to our knowledge about the events of the recent past. Yet the value of several of these books is impaired by the ideological agenda that former peace activists are still pursuing—their endeavor to justify policies that have proven failures and that in

Guenter Lewy, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, is the author of *America in Vietnam* (Oxford University Press, 1978).

some instances positively retarded the achievement of a more stable world. Seeking to save their place in history, some of these writers present us with an interpretation of events that is highly self-serving, to put it mildly. It was the good sense of the American people that made them reject inequitable proposals such as the Nuclear Freeze, which would have frozen in place existing inequalities in military strength. Unmoved by fear mongering and the prophecy of nuclear annihilation that was said to be the inevitable outcome of a policy of peace through strength, America stayed a course that demanded sacrifice in both lives and treasure but ultimately proved highly successful. I will return to this theme, anathema to all the authors reviewed here, at the end of this essay.

John Lofland, professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis, is the author of several books on the theory of social movements. His *Polite Protestors: The American Peace Movement of the 1980s* seeks to achieve “a productive melding of two topics: the American peace movement of the 1980s and the generic, sociological analysis of social movements” (p. 1). Unfortunately, students of world affairs will learn little from this jargon-laden work. The structures of the peace movement are treated under the rubrics of “change theories, consensus movements, movement culture, and organizational profile.” The rise and fall of the movement are discussed in the framework of a “focusing, soaring, faltering, slumping, and percolating” (p. 5) citizen action. A welcome relief from the book’s tedious compiling of categories is the description of the city twinning movement. Among the assumptions of this woolly-headed exercise in municipal foreign policy was the belief that the American and Soviet people had the same desire for a peaceful world and that this identity of aspirations would become obvious when ordinary people from the two sides talked to each other. The activists of the twinning movement, Lofland relates, tried to hide their involvement with the Nuclear Freeze movement and other protest activities; they presented themselves as average citizens concerned about work, family, and recreation. But as was to be expected, the Soviets showed little interest in such sentimentalities. The attempt to twin 1,052 American and Soviet cities yielded sixty replies from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet people who were allowed to respond to these initiatives were not “ordinary people,” and many of their communications were laced with political lectures on such topics as the failure of the United States government to pursue a course of genuine peace.

Robert Kleidman, assistant professor of sociology at Cleveland State University, is another social scientist interested in social movement theory. He is also a former Nuclear Freeze activist whose world view includes worries about “the establishment and defense of a global ‘economic empire’ in which American-based multinationals would have free reign in the Third World” (p. 91) as well as concern about the militarization of American society. Originally a doctoral dissertation, *Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze* seeks to show how three peace campaigns—the Emergency Peace Campaign of 1936–37, the Atomic Test Ban Campaign of 1957–1963, and the Nuclear Freeze movement of 1979–1986—“managed organizational tensions, and how this affected their courses and outcomes” (p. x). Kleidman concludes

that all three movements failed to achieve their key goals because of organizational problems: they were unable to overcome the centrifugal forces undermining the coalitions of peace groups involved and to allay the tensions between local activism and national work. While factors such as these need not be ruled out as contributory causes, a more obvious explanation for the failures incurred would seem to be that these movements never managed to obtain lasting support from the American people. All three initially benefited from momentary fears pervading the nation, but the simplistic solutions offered by them did not find enough takers to have more than a short-lived impact. The post-World War II peace movement, in particular, lived in what could be called a "peace and justice ghetto" that had little appeal to middle America.

David Cortright, the author of *Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War*, has been involved in numerous peace movements. He helped organize opposition to the war in Vietnam within the ranks of the military, and in 1975, he published *Soldiers in Revolt*, a book prepared during several years of study under Marcus Raskin at the Institute for Policy Studies. In his introduction to that book, Raskin praised Cortright for teaching us that the "struggle was not only against the war, but also against an authoritarian military machine oiled for world imperialism."¹ In 1977, Cortright became executive director of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), a post he held until 1987. He was also an active participant in the Nuclear Freeze and Central America solidarity movements. Following the American air raid on Libya in 1986, Cortright called this act of retaliation "part of an orchestrated campaign to whip up military frenzy in this country so that the President can stampede Congress into supporting his request for aid to the Nicaraguan terrorists."² Cortright's new book was written during his tenure as a visiting faculty fellow of the Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

The thesis of *Peace Works* is that "the road to peace is through military restraint and international cooperation" (p. 2). Thus, Cortright recalls with great feeling his experience as a passenger on the Mississippi Peace Cruise in 1986. On board the old riverboat *Delta Queen*, bedecked with banners reading "No Nuclear Tests" and "Let's Make Peace Together," were 46 Soviet and 120 American "goodwill ambassadors." As the ship paddles down the Mississippi, Cortright writes, "a crescendo of favorable responses rises from local communities. Everywhere the ship is welcomed warmly and enthusiastically" (p. 196). People cheer and wave U.S. and Soviet flags. These direct people-to-people contacts, Cortright concludes, helped to enhance international understanding and to overcome the enemy images that blocked peaceful relations. Together with similar voyages on the Volga and Dnieper Rivers in the Soviet Union, these exercises in "citizen diplomacy" helped dispel deeply rooted fears and mistrust

These peace movements failed because their simplistic solutions did not find enough takers.

¹ Raskin, in David Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt* (New York: Anchor Press, 1975), p. xi.

² David Cortright, "SANE at Forefront of Libya Raid Protest," *Sane World*, May/June 1986, p. 1.

of the Soviet Union and thus “brought real progress in reducing the threat of war” (p. 198).

In Cortright’s view, the primary threat to the peace during those years came from the extremist, militaristic policies of the Reagan administration. Peace cruises and citizen exchanges, he argues, enabled Americans to see the Soviets as people rather than enemies. Such activities weakened “anti-Soviet hysteria” and the image of an “evil empire.” Cortright undoubtedly exaggerates the impact of these efforts, but he is correct in his overall assessment. The activities of the peace movement indeed did put pressure on the American government to make concessions in arms-reductions negotiations while no comparable pressure was possible in the Soviet Union. Many of the Soviet people who told Americans of their desire for peace were no doubt sincere, but their wishes, unfortunately, were strictly irrelevant. The Soviet leadership did not have to justify its military budget before representatives, who, as in the American Congress, would rather spend money on social programs to help their reelection. Neither did it have to worry about a press free to criticize toughness towards the country’s opponent. In other words, the pressure for peace exerted by the American peace movement was all on one side and one side only.

The danger to world peace created by this disparity was recognized by Soviet dissidents. As Andrei Sakharov put it in his book *Alarm and Hope*, “As long as a country has no civil liberty, no freedom of information, and no independent press, there exists no effective body of public opinion to control the conduct of the government and its functionaries. Such a situation is not just a misfortune for citizens unprotected against tyranny and lawlessness; it is a menace to international security.”³ Sergei Batovrin, who attempted to organize an independent peace organization in the Soviet Union and was rewarded for this effort by being incarcerated in a psychiatric institution, sent an appeal to peace activists in the West in which he asked them to be more evenhanded: “You have the opportunity and the right to request disarmament from your government. Here there is no such opportunity. Therefore include in your peace march programs also requests directed to the Soviet government to dismantle all the SS-20s, to stop persecuting peace advocates in the USSR.”⁴

Such appeals for the most part fell on deaf ears. Cortright claims that the Western peace movement supported the independent peace and human rights groups that emerged during the 1980s all over Eastern Europe. The actual record is far less flattering, however. Some Western peace activists did protest the suppression of the independent Soviet peace movement, but, for fear of contributing to “anti-Soviet hysteria,” few heeded the request to criticize Soviet arms policies. Some American peace movement functionaries did more than turn their back on the oppressed dissidents. Norman Solomon, director of the disarmament program of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, in 1985 defended

³ Ed. Efrem Yankelevich and Alfred Friendly, Jr. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 173.

⁴ *Return Address, Moscow*, Sept. 1984, p. 8.

the official Soviet Peace Committee as a genuine manifestation of the Soviet Union's desire for peace. The Soviet government sponsored disarmament rallies; the United States did not. Soviet society had economic and other problems, but it was wrong to identify the Soviet government as the enemy. The main threat of war came from the United States—"the world's single greatest threat to the future existence of humanity."⁵

Lawrence S. Wittner is professor of history at the State University of New York, Albany. One of the merits of his new book *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953* is that it includes a detailed and historically accurate narrative of the communist-led peace movement. Wittner shows that campaigns such as the Stockholm Peace Appeal, launched in 1950 and demanding "the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon" (pp. 182–83), served the interests of the Soviet Union rather than the cause of world peace. By attaching a moral stigma exclusively to the atomic weapon, the appeal sought to neutralize the only significant form of military power in which the West still had an advantage. The same held true for the World Peace Congress, another communist front organization, which because of its obvious cold war partisanship for the most part could rely only on those forces already fond of the Soviet Union—communist parties and their sympathizers.

In those early years, pacifists kept their distance from the communist-led peace movement. In December 1949, the World Pacifist Meeting resolved that it was unwise for pacifists to collaborate organizationally with the Communist Party or groups dominated by the Party. Since the communists supported wars of their own choosing, such collaboration left "the pacifist witness . . . confused and weakened" (p. 186). In February 1951, the chair and secretary of the War Resisters' International announced his organization's refusal to associate with the World Peace Council "because we know that those who control this organization . . . do not believe in peace fundamentally, and advocate it only when it suits their political ends." Furthermore, "we know that they are prepared to advocate and support war and violent revolution in certain circumstances." Their "primary concern is to support the U.S.S.R. in its world power conflict with the U.S.A." Finally, "we feel that it is impossible for us to ally ourselves with, or have confidence in, those who frankly and systematically use lies for political ends and are prepared at a moment's notice to turn on those whose support they now seek. Such an alliance would, we are certain, in no way further the cause of peace" (p. 187).

Some fifteen years later, under the crucible of the Vietnam War, these sensible views were forgotten, and most segments of the peace movement not only supported the "just violence" of communist-led national liberation movements but saw no problem in working with communists and their front organizations in domestic politics. Joint demonstrations between pacifists and various hard-left groups became a regular occurrence. In October 1980, *Sane*

⁵ *The Guardian*, Oct. 23, 1984, p. 19.

World, dismissing the candidacies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan as linked to a cold war mentality, recommended the candidates of the Communist Party “which is on the ballot in more than 20 states and has traditionally emphasized the issues of peace, disarmament and detente.”⁶

Since Wittner’s work covers the history of the world nuclear disarmament movement only through 1953 (two further volumes will bring the story up to the present), he is spared the necessity of relating the moral decline of the peace movement in the years since the Vietnam War. Wittner thinks that after World War II, the world missed the opportunity to restructure international relations. Such a global solution, in his view, is the only real safeguard against the use of the bomb. However, given the confrontation between the West and an expansionary Soviet Union, it is difficult to see how such a restructuring could have taken place. In his concluding remarks, Wittner reluctantly acknowledges the impossibility of achieving nuclear disarmament “as long as nations remained at one another’s throat” (p. 339).

During the 1970s and 1980s, many on the left embraced what amounted to a theory of moral equivalence, which saw no difference between the Soviet Union and the United States. This construct is alive and well in *Learning Peace: The Promise of Ecological and Cooperative Education*, edited by Betty Reardon, director of the Peace Education Program at Teachers College, Columbia University, and Eva Nordland, professor emeritus at the Institute of Pedagogical Research, University of Oslo. In the eyes of the Norwegian professor, both communism and capitalism have failed. Communism has collapsed because human beings cannot exist for long under an autocratic regime; capitalism has failed because it “destroys our values The capitalist system has built a world of profit for the few and a world of poverty for hundreds of millions of people” (p. 15). Reardon makes a similar argument by invoking dependency theory: American affluence has been built “at the cost of increased poverty for many in the developing countries” (p. 27).

When will they ever learn, one is tempted to ask. There is no recognition here that some of the poorest countries of the globe are precisely those *without* trade and investments from the developed world, while countries such as Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan have made gigantic strides forward as a result of strong links to the “Northern industrialized” countries. When multinational corporations are absent or leave, a country’s fortunes generally suffer. Spain, one of the less-developed nations of Europe, is a case in point. As a result of extravagant social benefits enacted by the Socialist government of Spain and related factors, multinationals are increasingly departing that country. Because of this exodus, Spain has lost since 1990 510,000 industrial jobs—17.2 percent of its total industrial employment. Total unemployment stands at a staggering 24.5 percent, the highest in Europe.

According to Reardon, the peace movement was correct in its insistence that “true security involves much more than the capacity to defend against or

⁶ *Sane World*, Oct. 1980, p. 2.

prevent military aggression. Authentic security lies in the welfare and dignity of people, in relationships that reduce conflict and prevent violence, and in a viable environment that can sustain life on this planet" (p. 26). Nordland quotes with approval a U.N. speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989 in which he declared that "the use or threat of force can no longer be an instrument of foreign policy" (p. 8). Yet much of the misery and suffering in today's world, one wants to remind these self-titled peace educators, is due to the unfortunate fact that the world community cannot marshal and apply force in a timely fashion. Many thousands of humans might be alive today if the United Nations had gotten its act together and early on sent adequately equipped military forces to Croatia, Bosnia, or Rwanda. The usefulness of force has not yet ended and, pending the arrival of the Millennium, probably will continue to be a necessary ingredient of any foreign policy.

The end of the cold war and the specter of nuclear annihilation were brought about not by one-sided concessions and shows of good will on the part of the West, as incessantly demanded by the peace movement, but by the collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse had many causes, including strictly internal factors, such as the incompatibility of socialist economics with the requirements of industrial development in the age of the computer. Yet just as the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 were set off by international defeats, it has been recognized by most knowledgeable students of the subject that the striking failures of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s were a crucial factor in the Gorbachev revolution and the eventual demise of the Soviet regime. The arming of the *mujaheddin* that helped force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, the liberation of Grenada, the deployment of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces in Europe, large increases in the U.S. military budget, and, last but not least, the Strategic Defense Initiative, which highlighted Soviet technological inferiority—all represented serious Soviet setbacks. All of them were made possible by the steadfastness of the Reagan administration, and all of them were carried out over the vociferous opposition of the peace movement that branded Reagan as the most deadly danger to world peace.

It was the peace movement, claims Cortright, that restrained Reagan and pulled the world back from the brink of nuclear destruction: "In a very real sense, we helped to save the world" (p. 248). In point of fact, the so-called peace movement never impeded Reagan administration policies in any significant or effective manner. Even the popular claim that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a public-relations ploy to offset the popularity of the Nuclear Freeze movement does not stand up to scrutiny. Too bad, perhaps, for that would have been an important, if wholly unintended, contribution of peace activism to actual peace.

No, the truth is that the world was made safe for both peace and freedom by the very hard-line strategy that the peace movement had opposed every step of the way. The activists of that movement may seek to deny these facts, but history is unlikely to honor their claims.

**One is
tempted to say
of these
leftists: when
will they ever
learn?**

Nor is the American adversary culture ever likely to be driven out of business, certainly not through a heart-to-heart with reality. There are malcontented types in every society; in America, many of them work in universities and publish books. If anything is for certain, it is that there will be more such books. With the cold war over, however, this is an ever smaller price to pay for intellectual freedom.

The Soviet Tragedy **by Michael Radu**

The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991. By Martin Malia. (New York: The Free Press, 1994. 575 pp. \$24.95.)

While few would dispute that communism was the most important political phenomenon of our century, it is amazing how quiet most Western intellectuals, particularly our erstwhile “Kremlinologists” and “Sovietologists,” have been concerning communism’s other notable distinction: that of being history’s most criminal ideological system. While Hollywood bombards us still with anti-Nazi movies, neither the Gulag nor Katyn Forest, the Ukrainian famine nor Stalin’s ethnic deportations, ever seem worth mentioning.

The reason for such moral and intellectual obliquity lies within Western culture itself. Unlike Nazism, whose vicious entirety has been justly stigmatized as evil, emotional fragments that made up the Marxist utopia are still with us. Many of us, intellectuals in particular, cannot seem to make peace with the truth that an idea so “nobly motivated” could have produced such unmitigated disaster. Even today, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there is no consensus as to why the Soviet system acted in such a uniquely repressive, barbaric, and imperialist manner for more than seventy years. As before, in the academy and outside it, there is a powerful reluctance to connect the horrors of Soviet reality to the errors of the socialist idea.

Attempts to separate reality and idea come in two forms, one a sycophancy of the Left, another a cultural version of anti-Sovietism that has concentrated more on what was Russian about the Soviet Union than on what was Marxist-Leninist. In *The Soviet Tragedy*, Martin Malia takes them both to task.

It is hard to take seriously nowadays the arguments of the self-confessed Western Left, those who first engaged in decades of denial—what Gulag?—and then found themselves left with the view that socialism was a great idea

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misrepresented and misapplied in the USSR. The majority of recent American “experts” on the Soviet Union, in particular, detached communism from its crimes by deeming them temporary aberrations wrought by Stalin, the invocation of whose bizarre personality also facilitated the discounting of the role of ideology in Soviet communism as a whole. It was this school of thought that gave us John Kenneth Galbraith’s 1970s theory of convergence between Brezhnev’s USSR and Nixon’s U.S.A., and similar pearls of academic delusion.

More serious was cultural anti-Sovietism, which agreed on the fundamental criminality of the Soviet system but explained Marxism-Leninism’s 1917 success and its subsequent longevity by dint of peculiarly Russian cultural and historic characteristics. This thesis was most prominently advanced in this country by Richard Pipes and in Europe by H  lene Carr  re d’Encausse.

A second anti-Soviet interpretation, by the far the least popular of all explanations over the past three decades, saw Marxism-Leninism itself as the key source of Soviet behavior. Marxism-Leninism was as alien to Russian traditions as it was to Angolan, Cuban, or Czech ones—it was forcibly imposed and maintained, becoming ultimately unworkable not because it was successfully resisted but because it was fundamentally wrong. But it took nearly three-quarters of a century to finally fail.

Since the collapse of both communism and the USSR in 1991, most of those still possessed of the socialist idea in the West have propounded two contradictory ideas: that the collapse of the Soviet Union was fully “internal” and had nothing to do with Western policies; and that this internal collapse does not prove that the theory that motivated the Soviet system is flawed. It is as if Soviet communism had to die, all on its own, to make the world safe for “real” socialism.

Moving on to more serious arguments, two major books have recently appeared whose respective postmortems on the Soviet epoch refine and redescribe the original analytical divide of the anticommunist thinkers. Richard Pipes’s *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime* has revived the Russian culture argument;¹ Martin Malia’s *The Soviet Tragedy* has revived the Marxism-Leninism argument with special force and clarity.

We all owe Malia a debt of gratitude for having done so, and not merely for the sake of history. This least popular of approaches during the latter half of the cold war has not only turned out to be the most compelling but it also offers us practical insight about the future. If Russian political culture were the main factor in explaining Soviet behavior, then hopes for a democratic and free-market Russia have to be seriously discounted. But if Marxism-Leninism were the main culprit, then, all else being equal, the future may be brighter for the Russians and their neighbors, and for us, too. Indeed, much is at stake in what might superficially seem an arcane debate over matters now largely historical and of interest only to professional scholars and amateur pedants. It

¹ (New York: Knopf, 1993).

is, after all, from this debate about history that the basic premise of any intelligent future American policy towards Russia ought to emerge.

Malia gives us in *The Soviet Tragedy* the strongest, most persuasive, and purest interpretation of the ideological school of thought by making two complementary arguments, one about socialism in general and another about its late Soviet incarnation.² As he proceeds, he cannot help but comment on the sad legacy of Western Kremlinology, which has largely misinterpreted both.

Malia's main burden is to interpret the history of the tragic Soviet experiment with socialism. To do this, he takes a novel path: he takes communism seriously as an idea. Instead of either ignoring its importance or sharing its myth, Malia accepts communism's claim to be a comprehensive, logically and philosophically self-contained doctrine. He then looks closely at the political reality that formed after communism's ideological image.

Probably the most important contention of socialist apologetics for more than half a century is that "socialism," correctly associated with communism, was and is a great idea unfortunately distorted by the abuses of Stalin. But precisely because he takes ideas seriously, Malia emphasizes Marx's insistence that socialism means the end of private property and shows how Soviet reality formed after that insistence. As a result, Malia argues, Soviet communism was an inevitably doomed experiment, bound from the start for the Gulag, the Stalinist purges and show trials, and ultimate economic collapse. He argues that everything that followed the Bolshevik coup of October 1917 was largely preordained, even if most of those involved failed to understand it. As Malia puts it: "The Leninist adventure turned out to be what has been called a 'mistake of Columbus': the Party set sail for socialism but instead stumbled on Sovietism, thereby landing Russia in an inverted modernity" (p. 15).

This happened, again, not by accident but of necessity. Malia shows not only that Stalin was Lenin's admittedly crude intellectual and political heir, and that Stalin's career was made possible only by Lenin himself—personal arguments between the two notwithstanding—but that Stalin's basic policy options were the same as Lenin's because Marxism-Leninism offered no other choices. What Lenin tried—war communism or the New Economic Policy—Stalin tried too. Stalin "succeeded" better—if success is defined within communist political and ideological parameters—because he had more time, not because he did or *could have done* anything essentially different. It was not only, argues Malia, that "it was through Stalin's action that Lenin's failed Revolution was revived and projected across a third of the planet" (p. 312) but that "the only practical way to realize the Marxist purpose was through Leninism; and the only practical way to complete the Leninist project was through Stalinism" (p. 314).

Moreover, the "communism was a good idea badly applied" school of thought usually assumes that Leninism, and Marxism itself, were ultimately

² Strongest and best, but not the only such interpretation. See Sigmund Krancberg, *A Soviet Postmortem: Philosophical Roots of the "Grand Failure"* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994).

compatible with democracy and freedom. But as Malia insists—again because he takes the communist idea at its word—freedom without property and democracy without individual choice are impossible. All attempts to paper over these inherent problems of Marxism-Leninism have inevitably failed. In most cases, those attempts took the form of “de-Stalinization”; indeed, as Malia points out, the entire post-Stalin history of the Soviet Union was centered around one dominant issue: “How to bury Stalin?” But Stalin simply could not be buried without his would-be gravediggers.

Malia’s mastery shows through as he weaves the inherent constraints imposed by ideology with repeated but futile post-Stalinist efforts to escape those constraints. He shows in detail how Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Yury Andropov, and Mikhail Gorbachev all moved around and between the same two impossible means of reconciling Bolshevism with the goals of stable, legitimate government and a functioning economy, a reconciliation attempted by Lenin and Stalin before them. First came “war communism,” unbridled economic and political terror against the regime’s putative enemies ostensibly for the sake of the masses. Second came the New Economic Policy (NEP), also known in latter days as “reform communism,” “communism with a human face,” or *perestroika*, which sought to mix the oil of limited private property and freedom with the water of total Party control. Neither ever worked for long; either political controls killed private initiative, or economic freedom threatened the Party’s political monopoly.

Proponents of the notion that communism was a good idea badly applied have also tended to avoid discussing whether international aggression was inherent in communism. But, as Malia shows, in the Soviet Union, economic policy derives from political concerns, and not the other way around. If “détente” offered a shortcut to Western technology and capital, it was adopted, but in order to strengthen rather than weaken the regime’s totalitarian ambition, in order to subsidize economically a system inherently incompatible with economic success. In this respect, periodic Soviet support for détente was mainly an external reflection of those periods in which a new New Economic Policy was pursued at home, or, as Malia puts it: “On the Soviet side . . . the wager of détente and *Ostpolitik* had a very different meaning from that in the West. It was, to be sure, a means for obviating the danger of nuclear conflict. But it was also a means for palliating the East’s relative economic decline and growing technological lag” (p. 377).

Having completed a brilliant dissection of Soviet history, Malia then asks more generally: Is socialism, whether in its hard, radical, totalitarian version (communism) or in its “softer” incarnations (social democracy in Europe, left-liberalism in the United States), ultimately compatible with human freedom and economic prosperity? His answer makes this volume not only an important addition to Soviet/Russian studies but intellectually elegant in a broader sense. As Malia sees it, communism is not just a form of utopian thought, “integral socialism” as he describes it, for the economic libertarianism of a Friedrich von Hayek or Milton Friedman (“integral liberalism”) is also a kind of utopian

**Kreminology
failed because
Sovietologists
felt an affinity
with socialism.**

thought. Communism, rather, was a deadly utopia set against the “normal world” yet with the ability to transform that world into an “abnormal” but real tragedy. Hence, Malia warns us to learn from the tragic Soviet experience, for future conditions of international crisis and systemic stress could conceivably lead to new totalitarian temptations heralded, as in the past, by the moralistic romanticisms of the revolutionary will.

The Soviet Tragedy bares another lesson, too. Malia treats the craft of Kremlinology *inter alia* as his main historical narrative progresses, but the cumulative judgment is devastating. Malia exposes the essential irrelevance and phoniness of most Western—and particularly American—“Sovietology.” Others have preceded Malia in this, but no one has so relentlessly demonstrated the source of “common wisdom” in American analysis of Soviet affairs. Simply put, it was this: because most American Sovietologists felt an affinity with socialism as an ideal, they understood repeated failed Soviet attempts to “reform” at face value, seeing them pretty much as “reform communists” themselves did. The result was a combination of sycophancy and wishful thinking leading ineluctably to error—scholarly as well as moral. Indeed, at the base of Malia’s analysis seems to be his frustration that, despite communism’s having produced more victims in more countries over a longer period than even Nazism, socialism is still seen by many of his professional colleagues, even after its collapse, as a valid idea.

Also noteworthy—and praiseworthy—Malia does not fall into the trap of accusing failed Kremlinologists of *having* a bias; he rather shows that they had the *wrong* bias. Indeed, Malia’s insistence on the importance of being right about matters of value is precisely what has gotten him into trouble with Leftists, postmodernists, and other assorted Western remnants of what even Gorbachev would have called supporters of the stagnation period. Perhaps the greatest lasting strength of *The Soviet Tragedy* is precisely its determination *not* to examine the history of Soviet communism in a moral vacuum, or in the invented moral space of Western academics, but in the context of communism’s own declared amoral terms. After all, Marx, that universal philosopher and self-proclaimed disciple of Hegel, never bothered to develop an ethical system, while Lenin made it clear that morality was nothing other than what the Communist Party claimed it was—hence, in effect, nothing at all.

Finally, Malia’s insistence on looking at the real consequences of pernicious ideas does a special service to the American study of Soviet history and contemporary Russia. That is particularly pertinent because American idealist ideology tends to be unsystematically moral in nature. Even when totally possessed by pulses of ideology, Americans usually do not see it as ideology but as self-evident manifestations of good versus evil. But just because the American ideological style has little use for abstract formalisms does not mean that other political cultures are similarly inclined. Thanks to Malia, perhaps we will remember that while ideological styles differ from country to country, their practical implications—their crimes, too—touch us all.

We must take ideas, even socialism, seriously because they have serious consequences—in this case, consequences for which many millions paid with

their lives. Indeed, the essence of the Soviet tragedy, as Malia puts it, was that "there is no such thing as socialism, and the Soviet Union built it" (p. 496) through the sheer power of a bad idea. Let us hope, at the least, that we do not have to go through all this twice.

How Do Countries Become Rich? **by Patrick Clawson**

The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. By the World Bank. (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1993. 389 pp. \$19.95, paper.)

Miracle or Design? Lessons from the East Asian Experience. By Albert Fishlow, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1994. 109 pp. \$9.95, paper.)

Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The What, Why, and Who of Foreign Aid. By Sarah Tisch and Michael Wallace. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994. 182 pp. \$49.95; \$13.95, paper.)

Economic Progress and Prospects in the Third World: Lessons of Development Experience since 1945. By H.W. Singer and Sumit Roy. (Brookfield, Vt.: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1993. 187 pp. \$59.95.)

Paradigms in Economic Development. Edited by Rajani Kanth. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1994. 288 pp. \$49.95; \$19.95, paper.)

The debate about what explains East Asia's rapid growth has now entered round two. Round one, which trundled weavily through most of the 1980s, witnessed the acceptance by most industrial and developing governments alike of the Washington consensus about the prerequisites for economic growth: an orientation towards world trade; light regulation of the domestic economy; and fiscal and monetary discipline.¹

The second round of debate may be said to have begun in 1991, when the Japanese government criticized the World Bank for overemphasizing macroeconomic stability and for opposing the promotion of certain leading industries. The Bank's \$1.2 million response is the study entitled *East Asian Miracle*. The

¹ John Williamson, ed., *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).

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Bank argues in response to the Japanese challenge that three factors have been key in the East Asian economic miracle. The first was macroeconomic stability, which is to say: low inflation, prudent budget deficits, and stable and competitive exchange rates. The second was heavy public investment in education and other social infrastructure like health. The third was an emphasis on exports as the “standard by which all economic activity would be judged” (p. 324).

With *Miracle or Design? Lessons from the East Asian Experience*, the Overseas Development Council (ODC) has issued an excellent summary of the World Bank study along with what are described as an important set of critiques. Actually, the three authors from the Overseas Development Council—Dani Rodrik, Robert Wade, and Stephan Haggard—all agree, directly or implicitly, with most of the World Bank’s points. Indeed, they give the impression that they have no quarrel with the Bank’s central message: macroeconomic stability, high savings, and investment in education is the basic formula for success. To be sure, each criticizes the Bank’s study—Rodrik accuses the Bank of “export fetishism” (p. 33); Wade argues that the signal importance of the right (implicitly, high-tech) industries is understated through a “cooking” of the relevant data; and Haggard claims that authoritarian government was close to essential for the East Asian miracle to occur. But these are, clearly, critiques of the World Bank only at the margin.

The real sound and fury in the ODC volume, as in much of the debate about the Washington consensus, is about industrial policy, an issue somewhat off-to-the-side of the essential macroeconomic debate. The book’s title, *Miracle or Design?* gives a hint of what is really at issue here.

From the perspective of the detached analyst who simply wants to know what brings about national economic growth, it is hard to understand the obvious depth of feeling about what is innocently called industrial policy. In fact, the heat of this side debate can be explained only by moving away from economic analysis as such and into ideology. Simply put, industrial policy seems to have become something of an icon, a symbol of a greater debate about the merits of activist government.

As has been the case in other domains, the politicization of the industrial policy debate has led to authors taking more than occasional liberties with truth. Thus, contrary to accusations that the World Bank takes a hard-core ideological stance on industrial policy, it in fact bends towards agnosticism about government intervention in favor of specific industries. Such industrial policy was successful, and importantly so, in some countries, especially Northeast Asian states like Japan and Korea. It was not a major factor in some other countries, especially Southeast Asian mini-states like Hong Kong. The World Bank further notes that in other parts of the world, industrial policy has been a disaster. It concludes that the better experience in East Asia comes from limiting the costs of intervention and withdrawing aid when no successful results are obtained.

This kind of pragmatism does not satisfy Rodrik, Wade, Haggard, and Fishlow, all of whom argue that the World Bank understates important positive contributions from activist industrial policies. Regrettably, their comments are

unqualified by any recognition of the negative effects that industrial policies have had throughout much of the developing world, for example, in Africa and Latin America.

The disagreement about industrial policy not only brings to the fore hidden issues from other realms, it also occasionally warps common sense. For instance, the World Bank has argued in other reports that the private sector can play an important role in education, especially higher education, in those cases where governments lack the resources to provide services at a level that some in the private sector are willing to finance. The Bank's recommendation that governments should concentrate on that which they do best (like providing macroeconomic stability and basic infrastructure) seems unexceptionable. But it is precisely this kind of common sense advice that most outrages those for whom the government—any government—remains the last, best hope of humanity. They simply cannot accept the manifest fact that material progress comes mainly from relying on Adam Smith's hidden hand of the pursuit of self-interest.

Turning from the latest salvos in the professional debate to more popular literature, it is disturbing to see how slowly the content of such books changes to reflect modern research, as well as how strong remain the leftist biases of the field. The Tisch and Wallace volume, *Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The What, Why, and Who of Foreign Aid*, is an example of a basic primer on development, suitable for the smart high school student or the general reader who is unfamiliar with the main issues. Their discussion of what development is and what causes it is on the cutting edge of 1970s thought. Their analysis of the factors that make up development is strong on issues of concern then—such as distinguishing an increase in GDP per person from an improvement of living standards—without a single word about the importance of democracy or good government. They discuss at length all the various socialist theories of development. On the other hand, they are unconcerned about the policy environment for private business, as if a light regulatory environment, low taxes, and sound money make little difference one way or the other. Most striking, the reader is left without a clue that some of the world's poorest countries in 1960 are now at upper middle income levels and well on the way to becoming rich. Case in point: there is less than one full sentence about the East Asian miracle.

If Tisch and Wallace are stuck in the past, Singer and Roy are vigorously defending the old-time religion in *Economic Progress and Prospects in the Third World*, according to which growth depends primarily upon external factors rather than a country's own actions, resources, and energies. They argue that the real issue is not which countries did best but which time periods were most favorable generally to growth. Their thesis is that the 1950s and 1960s were a period favorable to growth, while the 1970s saw growth artificially maintained by debt-led investment, and that the 1980s was therefore a decade lost in recovering from this folly. Their case would be stronger if they explicitly confronted the more common view, which is that some countries have failed

Industrial policy symbolizes a wider debate about activist government.

and some have succeeded more for domestic reasons than because of broader global patterns. They too manage to ignore the East Asian economic miracle. The two cases they do examine in detail are a failure (Nigeria) and a case of perduring mediocrity (India). Despite themselves, they present evidence that India's relatively better growth record was in large part owing to the liberalizations gradually implemented since the 1977 Janata government.

Singer and Roy caution that a "polarized approach often leads to unhelpful debates" and recommend "selective use of the elements of truth contained in either of the contending doctrines" (pp. 8, 9). It is certainly worth recalling, as they do, Dr. Johnson's famous motto, "Seldom any splendid story is wholly true." However, their cautious note would be more credible if they were prepared to honestly critique their own past work, not just the fashion of the moment—a fashion with which they disagree.

The tradition of development economics that Singer and Roy uphold dates back to early post-World War II days. In *Paradigms in Economic Development*, Rajani Kanth has gathered into one very useful volume all the classic essays from that time through the early 1980s—to which he unfortunately adds a ranting leftist commentary. These authors of decades past tackled the grand question of why some economies were backward and others not. Each had a different theory about the essential problem: W. Arthur Lewis thought it was excess labor; Walt Rostow, a matter of time; Paul Baran, the fault of the industrial countries; and so on. What is striking is how little attention was paid back then to some of the issues that now are seen to be key: getting incentives right, maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium, focusing on exports, and concentrating state activities on those things that governments can do best. It would be nice to think that economists provided the theories that helped countries grow. But the sad reality is, as Hegel wrote, "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk."²

It is bad enough that most economists failed to understand and aid development in the past. It is even worse that they cannot seem to look present experience in the eye and see it for what it is. Proof of veracity in any debate about economic development lies in real-world experience. After years of arguing about whether the East Asian experience is replicable, academics might begin to notice that many governments have set out to learn as many lessons as they can from the East Asian experience and adapt them to their own conditions. Latin American countries, led by Chile, are showing that much of the East Asian experience is transferrable. They have established macroeconomic stability; they have made exports the criteria by which to judge economic performance; they are concentrating on doing what governments do best; and they are confining industrial policy to backing winners rather than investing heroic but futile and counterproductive effort into prolonging slightly the life of dying state-owned firms and assorted hapless para-statal. The result has been a return to solid growth rates after a decade of decline. So too the winners

² G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 13.

thus far in Eastern and Central Europe, like Estonia and the Czech Republic, have been those states that have gone furthest in implementing lessons from the East Asian experience. None of the authors of the books under review seem to have noticed.

Of course, East Asia does have certain unique features that cannot be transferred elsewhere. And, of course, other countries may start out with disadvantages not present in some of the East Asian countries. But rather than focusing on what makes East Asia unique, economists should be trying to understand what lessons it has to offer, because we see that those who study those lessons have much to show for it.

Hung Out to Dry or All Wet? Water in the Jordan Valley

by Adam Garfinkle

Water and Peace: Water Resources and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. By Elisha Kally with Gideon Fishelson. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 152 pp. \$47.95.)

Nabarot shel Esh: Ha-Maavaq al Mayim b'Mizrah ha-Tikhon (Rivers of fire: The struggle over water in the Middle East). By Arnon Soffer. (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992. 258 pp. NIS 22.70.)

Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. By Nurit Kliot. (New York: Routledge, 1994. 309 pp. \$150.00.)

Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. By Miriam R. Lowi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 291 pp. \$49.95.)

Writing about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab-Israeli peace process has become something of a cottage industry over the last few decades. Like other such industries, this one has its specializations, and, of these, writing about the water problem has lately prospered. Beyond the books here under review, magazine and journal citations on the general topic exploded in the late 1980s and have continued to do so ever since. Not since the 1953–1964 period, between Eric Johnston's remarkable diplomatic odyssey and the building of Israel's National Water Carrier, has the subject been so popular. Why?

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The most obvious reason is that the water problem is real and getting more severe. Given growing populations, the nature of regional economic structures, and the development ambitions of Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians, there simply isn't enough water to go around. Moreover, solving the water problem and solving the political problems of the region are bound up together. Unilateralist beggar-thy-neighbor water policies are incompatible with real regional peace and, without regional peace, successful solutions to national water problems become either very expensive, very technologically demanding, very hard on local ecology, or just impossible.

Hence, a solution to the water problem has long been seen as a *sine qua non* for stable regional peace. That means different things to different people, however. To some Israelis and their sympathizers, sacrificing water

**Kally under-
stands costs,
which too
many policy
wonks ignore.**

security is too high a price to pay for peace. To some Arabs and their sympathizers, the assumption that Israel will never compromise its commanding position over regional water resources is reason for deep pessimism about Israeli intentions in the peace process. Precisely because there are people who think like this, those in the region and outside of it who are committed to the peace process see the need to transform the image of the water problem's solution from zero-sum to win-win. They

hope that, rather than blocking progress towards peace, the solution of the water problem can be turned into a positive goad to peace.

But there is heated argument over how to do that. Some, who seem to have psychic reparations more in mind than a lasting solution, demand the redivision of regional supplies in the context of Israeli territorial concessions that would leave Israel with less water and the Arabs with more. Others suggest alleviating water stress by shifting economic orientations away from the export-oriented agriculture that consumes the majority of water supplies on both sides of the Jordan River. Still others want to augment supplies by bringing water from afar in bags or pipelines, or through desalination, or by building major water infrastructure projects—or by some combination of these strategies. Everyone agrees, too, that scientific advances in desert hydrobiology, geobotany, meteorology, and plant genetics can expand the area's arable land within a sensible microwater economy, but estimates vary as to how much of a contribution such efforts can make.¹

Clearly, studying the water problem in the Eastern Mediterranean is a complicated affair. Aspects of it are technical, or at the least rely on scientific and engineering knowledge both for its basis in fact and for judgment about its many proposed solutions. And yet, the problem is political in its essence no less than water problems in other parts of the Middle East, in Central Asia, or, for that matter, in California and Nevada. Added to the technical side are legal issues, and added to the political side is the legacy of history, not just of the

¹ For a good, brief discussion of some of the scientific data in an otherwise oddly imbalanced book, see John Stebbing, *A Structure of Peace: the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (London: New Cherwell Press, 1993).

local protagonists but also of the longstanding diplomatic efforts of third parties, not least those of the United States.

For any one writer to become a master of the technical and the political, the legal and the historical, the local and the international, is no mean feat. Perhaps this is why so few masters are to be found, and why students and policy practitioners alike are invariably forced to read and weigh several volumes to reach their own conclusions. Having said that, one senses nevertheless that the literature has improved. Even though none of the books reviewed here is a synoptic masterpiece, all have some value. Perhaps that is because the quality of the Arab-Israeli conflict itself has improved. Most of the local protagonists have become less maximalist and shrill, more pragmatic and temperate. The literature on water, too, with unfortunate exceptions now and again, has become less politically didactic and more analytical. This is a good sign.

The Engineer

Elisha Kally is one of Israel's preeminent water experts. He is an engineer by training, but his practical experience with water impresses most. A founding member of Kibbutz Nirim in the Negev, Kally headed TAHAL, Israel's water planning agency from 1964 to 1976, the period from the inception of the National Water Carrier to the completion of the full integration of Israel's hydrological system after the June 1967 War. Since 1976, he has worked as a consultant to several developing countries where, as in Israel, politics ever intrudes on technical issues.

Water and Peace demonstrates well Kally's technical expertise and experience. For example, he requires exactly two paragraphs to demonstrate why the Johnston Plan, while innovative in the 1950s and moderately useful to Israel and Jordan ever since, is no longer adequate as a basis for discussing regional water-sharing plans (pp. 33–34). He also presents a technically sound method of solving the problem of storing the winter waters of the Yarmuk River, the only major uncontrolled surface source in the region and an issue that has bedeviled planners and politicians since the early 1950s. The short text is also spliced with many tables and charts containing the essential data needed to understand the discussion around them.

Kally is also experienced enough to understand the crucial factor of cost, which many engineers and too many policy wonks manage somehow to ignore. Certainly it is technically possible to lay pipes and build pumps to bring water from the Arctic to Jericho if one likes, or to desalinate half the Mediterranean Sea, but if the system costs more than twenty cents per cubic meter for irrigation water, no one will pay for it.

He also wisely admits a distinction between what is maximally efficient from a technical point of view and what is maximally efficient politically. A canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea makes better technical sense than one between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea, but the former would be wholly within Israeli territory while the latter would have to be a bilateral

Israeli-Jordanian project. Kally understands that outsiders are prepared to pay for the “costs of dissociation” in the service of peace. Translation: it’ll be easier to get Europeans, Japanese, and Gulf Arabs to pay for a Red-Dead Canal than for a Med-Dead Canal, and without external financing, the project is beyond the means of the concerned regional actors.

But beyond these merits, *Water and Peace* disappoints in many ways. First, the historical introduction by Gideon Fishelson, an economist at Tel Aviv University, is very short, bare-bones descriptive, and does not convey either the passions or political interconnectedness of water issues and high politics over the years. It is useful to novices only.

Secondly, the book is somewhat out-of-date. The process of translating out of Hebrew and into English took longer than it might have,² and while some of the English text was edited anew from the original Hebrew, mainly in the introduction, most of the book is exactly the same.

Thirdly, much of the background that Kally presents is too sketchy. Chapter 4, “The Region and the Utilization of Water Resources,” is four pages long. Chapter 5, “Water and International Relations,” is three and a half pages. Chapter 7, “Agreements Concerning Allocation and Utilization of Water,” beats all: one and a half pages! Israelis and engineers both have a reputation for terseness of expression that is often a blessing compared to the gratuitous loquaciousness of many social scientists. But one can go too far even in being brief.

Fourthly, while it is less a flaw than a matter of taste, Kally seems to be a proponent of peace mainly because war gets in the way of his technical schemes. He does not take a strong interest in the connection between high politics and functional issues one way or the other. He is not oblivious to political inhibitions; indeed, his table 9.5 illustrates what level of political comity is required to implement various cooperative schemes in the region (p. 74). But he appears to care about political matters only insofar as they intrude on his single-minded devotion to showing that a regional problem must have a regional solution, and to demonstrating the technical (including economic) means for achieving it. The closest Kally comes to an explicit political judgment is this sensible if succinct declaration on a scheme to import water to the West Bank and Gaza: “The project is dependent . . . upon a regional political settlement, and would also be a factor in helping to shape and strengthen such a settlement” (pp. 104–5).

Kally’s interest in the wider world of politics is so mild that he even includes a short section on potential cooperation between Israel and Lebanon over the Litani River, a gleam in the eye of Zionist planners since the turn of the century. Technically, there is nothing objectionable about the scheme, and it might one day come to fruition; indeed, in a wonderfully ironic turn of events,

² I know this because an editor at Praeger asked Dr. Fishelson to be more specific in some of his citations. When he went to recover certain books from the Tel Aviv University library in early 1993, he discovered them to be in my possession. He called, we met and talked—and he got the books.

a few Palestinian hydrologists have recently begun thinking again about the uses of the Litani for Palestine! But in the current political context, with the IDF battling Hizbollah in southern Lebanon, and Beirut rather more than less of a Syrian satrapy, it's still a bit jarring to read about the scheme.

Lastly, as those conversant with the Israeli debate over water issues know, Kally has staked out a distinctive position as an advocate of importing water, rather than conserving it or using less of it by shifting the profile of the Israeli economy away from agriculture. He has also favored importation from Egypt over Turkey. He has not opposed desalination projects, but he has seen them as generally less cost-effective than regional schemes augmented by importation. None of these issues generate much heat outside of Israel's professional community of water planners and policy makers, but they generate plenty of heat inside. Kally, or Fishelson, might have outlined these arguments for the benefit of uninitiated readers. All the same, it is good that we finally have something by Elisha Kally available in English now that all options and alternatives have become of greater interest to the peace-process academic cottage industry and policy-making community worldwide.

The Geographers

Arnon Soffer is another Israeli who has been active in the study and debate over the region's water problem. Soffer is a geographer, not an engineer, and an academic at Haifa University, not a calloused refugee from Israel's bureaucratic wars. Soffer doesn't push projects; he just describes, in glorious detail, where the water is, how it flows, and what problems it causes in the three principal river systems in the region: the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Jordan. Soffer also examines the Litani and Orontes Rivers in Lebanon and potential groundwater disputes between Libya and Egypt as special examples of the geopolitics of water. He spends most of his concluding chapter on the promise of the Turkish option—the Peace Pipeline dreamchild of the late Turkish President Turgut Özal.

Unlike Kally, Soffer has tended to be politically centrist in Israel or even a bit to the right when it comes to hydrological issues and Israel's security. Be that as it may, he's a very good geographer, and the level of detail in Soffer's descriptions of how land rolls and water flows is excellent. His description of hydrological developments and plans, notably in Syria, is very useful, too. When it comes to political analysis, Soffer spends much less time and spends it less surely. The Israeli perspective that attends the end of every section is sometimes engaging as, for example, his discussion of the implications for Israel of the Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi dispute over the Euphrates (pp. 128–30). But the statement that a Syrian intimation in July 1991 that it would engage in direct talks with Israel (via the Madrid Conference) owed much to Syrian concern about having to face off against Turkey in a dispute over water is not very convincing (p. 129).

Much of Soffer's description of the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates basins—and quite a lot of the Jordan Valley material, too—is derived from English and other non-Hebrew sources, and mostly well presented to a Hebrew-reading audience. But because it does not add detail to the stock of knowledge otherwise available, and because it is cited in this fashion, it need not concern us here—partly because an equally competent English presentation is found in Nurit Kliot, an associate of Soffer's at Haifa University's geography department. Nevertheless, Soffer's account is the best so far in Hebrew and, were it not for Kliot's work, would have deserved an English translation.

Nurit Kliot's *Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East* follows an organization very similar to Soffer's, only in English and with several bonuses. The main bonus is a review of the Helsinki and International Law Commission rules governing water division on international rivers. As anyone who has ever tried to work on this subject knows, the legal dimension is very slippery. Not only does Kliot manage to state the basic principles in language that anyone can understand, but she also applies them smoothly to the three main Middle Eastern cases at hand and, in appendices, provides the basic relevant texts.

Beyond providing clarity on the legal questions, *Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East* contains nearly one hundred figures, maps, and tables, which, the narrative aside, make it an important reference work. Moreover, the publisher's presentation of the data, especially the maps and tables, is superb. This is a most handsome book and, for once, justifies its considerable price.

Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East is also reference-like because, like fellow geographer Soffer, Kliot is more or less content to describe the political intersection of the hydrological and technical data whenever it is relevant, but really attempts no analysis of it nor any ambition to see hydropolitics in the wider diplomatic and political context. Given that it does so well what it claims to do, the slighting of the political side is forgivable. Certainly, it is preferable to trying to do too much, to claiming too much, and to delivering too little—which is precisely Miriam Lowi's problem in *Water and Power*.

The Academic

Miriam Lowi's *Water and Power* is a very ambitious book, wanting to speak to international-relations theorists, historians, and policy makers all at once. Despite much effort and the occasional provision of new information thanks to interviews and digging around in tedious documents, *Water and Power* disappoints on each score and a few others besides.

As to theory, Lowi wants to address the long-standing debate between political realism and liberal institutionalism. When it comes to riparian disputes over water, Lowi argues that the evidence is such that the realists win the argument hands down. She is right, of course, arguing essentially, in this case, that cooperation over international rivers is a function of who is strong and upstream as opposed to who is weak and downstream. But outside the cloistered

academic world, such a conclusion isn't very novel or interesting. It's a little like learning where babies come from; once you know it, further inquiry on the subject generally turns to details and aesthetics.

Lowi's theoretical discussion carries other problems. First, she footnotes everything in sight from E.H. Carr to Kenneth Waltz in a veritable orgy of fluff and padding, a feature that gives away the origin of this book as a doctoral dissertation. Other such indications are generally stiff writing and a whole chapter on Nile, Indus, and Tigris-Euphrates riparian disputes that should have been reduced to a subsection within the opening chapter.

Another convolution of relative youth is the attempt suddenly to heap cognitive psychology on the pile. Chapter 5 is called "Perception and Misperception: The Jordan Waters Crisis (1964) and the Onset of War," in which Lowi tries to apply Robert Jervis's famous approach to the Jordan River dispute *after* she sketches the main action of the period.³ (No attempt is made to apply cognitive theory to the earlier period, but we aren't told why.) A brief chapter 6 charts Israeli and Jordanian water project developments, but then the logical order of chapters 7 and 8 are reversed. Instead of presenting what happened first and then subjecting it to cognitive analysis, chapter 7 starts with "Cognitive Variables" and then chapter 8, "Riparian Disputes since 1967," gets down to details. Why the reverse order? Again we aren't told and are left confused.

But then again, cognitive theory itself is never explained anyway—not a word about evoked sets, cognitive dissonance, the centrality principle, or learning theory. So the entire exercise ends up being a gratuitous overlay in order to make a few points about perceptions that would have been more persuasive and much clearer spoken in plain English.

Second on the theoretical side, Lowi seems to confuse classical realism with the more recent notion of "hegemonic stability," which holds that cooperation occurs when a single dominant power insists upon it (p. 5). Nowhere is the central mechanism of classical realism—the balance of power—given its due. Thirdly, her attempts to distinguish realism from neo-realism, and liberalism from neo-liberalism and functionalism are very confusing. Good thing, then, that none of this stuff matters very much.

Lowi's attempt to apply the theses that *do* matter for the book's success fails for two reasons: her interpretations lack nuance, and her history is flawed.

For example, Lowi argues, quite rightly, that disputes over water in the Jordan Valley have been tied historically to larger existential and political disputes. As a realist anti-functionalist, she argues that regional cooperation cannot proceed before the political conflict is settled (p. 9). But her view is put so starkly that it winds up making a basically correct point into an error. That is because she claims that limited cooperation, as has occurred between Israel and Jordan for many years and which she herself documents fairly well, "have no implications for the end of the political conflict. . . . These highly delimited, highly specific arrangements have no conflict resolution potential" (p. 200).

³ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Such categorical statements defy credulity, common sense, and the testimony of those who have been involved in Israeli-Jordanian functional cooperation over the years. Functionalists claim too much for such episodes of limited cooperation, true, but Lowi errs on the other side. Contrary to her claim that limited cooperation does not involve efforts “to enmesh” the other side in “an ongoing process of interaction” (p. 200), Israeli-Jordanian cooperation over water was joined over the years by cooperation on many other functional matters, some *ad hoc* and local, and some the subject of secret Israeli-Jordanian summits. Over time, a web of expectations did develop from the routines, personal cordiality, and mutual interest in third party (U.S.) participation in the informal “regime” that was evolving. And a lot of that had to do with water.

Not only did a common interest in cooperation work as a limiting factor in the always potential deterioration of relations in the face of regional pressures and unpredictable domestic politics, it also provided a useful backdrop against the day that the Israeli-Jordanian political relationship could go bigger and go public. As Israel and Jordan got down to the serious business of negotiating a peace treaty in the summer and autumn of 1994, no one involved could possibly have thought that the legacy of discrete cooperation between the two did not contribute to the prospects for a successful negotiation. That is because the public negotiations started from a far more advanced stage, among people who already knew each other, and in an atmosphere of basic trust. To say that such factors “have no conflict resolution potential” is to talk nonsense.

Lowi also pushes the anti-functionalist argument too far when she excoriates the Eisenhower administration for naïveté in thinking that the Johnston mission of the 1953–55 period could ever work (pp. 75, 106, 197). Lowi claims that the principals involved saw the Johnston Plan to create a regional water sharing scheme in the Jordan Valley as an ill-conceived functionalist attempt to solve the region’s political ills. There are two problems with this accusation.

The lesser one is that Johnston in fact got close to achieving major political gains through the functionalist backdoor, and he did achieve some minor ones. The Arab League in the end did refuse to ratify the deal that had been worked out, but its technical committee approved it and in so doing broke down several symbolic barriers in negotiating indirectly with Israel. The Arab League, in effect, acknowledged that Israel existed and that it had rights. Also, had local political conditions been different in Syria and Lebanon at the time, the Arab League might well have voted yes.

The greater problem is that Lowi mischaracterizes the Eisenhower administration’s total approach. True, the Johnston mission had the look of a functionalist crusade, and some administration principals doubtlessly suffered from the functionalist bug that all too often grips Americans. But the Johnston mission was only one dimension of the administration’s effort.⁴ The other was

⁴ Ironically, Lowi does not mention that the U.S. government *did* adopt a functionalist policy in the 1971–73 period, hoping to use water cooperation and other kinds of functional cooperation to keep Israel and Jordan close to the threshold of a political deal, which had seemed tantalizingly close at times between November 1968 and March 1971.

Operation Alpha, a major Anglo-American attempt at a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute. There was nothing functionalist about it: it concerned territorial adjustments, turning armistice lines into international borders, and producing international guarantees for those borders. The Johnston mission was soon subsumed within Alpha, and Israel's often anguished responses to Ambassador Johnston during his visits to the region simply cannot be understood except in the context of pressures emanating from Alpha and Israel's interpretation of American intentions.

But Lowi *never even mentions* Operation Alpha and evinces no knowledge of it whatsoever despite the fact that the basic documents have been available for some years.⁵ For a book that claims the primacy of high politics in the context of delimited diplomacy over functional issues like water, that is a lot to miss.

Similarly, if less significant, in discussing U.S. mediation in Israeli-Jordanian water issues in the 1978–1981 period, Lowi neglects the larger context: the Camp David Accords and the concerted, repeated U.S. attempts to bring Jordan into the great spinning wheel of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. So much, then, for *Water and Power* being of use to those historians interested in the interactions of theme and detail, of high diplomacy and issues like water.

That isn't the last of the basic problems with *Water and Power*. To return to Lowi's central thesis, she argues that "in the absence of coercion from outside," cooperation over international rivers will occur "only if: (1) the dominant power's relationship to the water resources in question is one of critical need, linked to its national security concern, and (2) it is not the upstream riparian" (p. 203). Now, Lowi acknowledges that Israel wanted the Johnston Plan to succeed. For her thesis to stand, therefore, it must be the case that Israel was not the upstream riparian during this period, and Lowi says as much. Speaking of Israel and Jordan, Lowi writes: "Because of their acute need and the fact that neither of them was the upstream riparian, nor the dominant power in the basin, both were anxious for the implementation of a regional plan, despite the political conflict" (pp. 10–11).

Now technically, yes, two of the three sources of the Jordan River spring outside of Israel's pre-1967 borders—the Hasbani in Lebanon and the Baniyas in Syria. But in no practical manner did that make Israel a downstream riparian with respect to the Jordan River. Lebanon did not need the Hasbani waters or plan to use them, and Syria did not need the Baniyas or plan to use it. Both were also located very close to Israel's pre-1967 border—the Baniyas literally less than two hundred meters away. Neither Lebanon nor Syria demonstrated

**Cooperation
on water
helped de-
velop Israeli-
Jordanian
expectations.**

⁵ The key text is Carl N. Raether, ed., *Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955*, vol. 14 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989). Additionally, *Arab-Israeli Dispute*, vol. 9 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954*, pp. 1683–1741, published in 1988, covers the earlier period. In Lowi's appendix I, on page 206, she cites this latter volume. The mystery of how she could possibly have missed Operation Alpha is thus deepened.

a technical capability to divert either stream just to spite Israel, and Israel's military advantages over both were such that attempts at diversion would have failed had they been tried—as was demonstrated in the Syrian case in the 1964–66 period. Lowi's statement, too, that "Syria was the most powerful of the Arab riparians" (p. 11), seems to imply that Syria not only could stop the Banias from flowing into Israel, but could stop Israel from doing anything about it. Such a statement is wildly at variance with the reality of the local balance of power throughout the 1950s, which greatly favored Israel. This is what comes from trying to stuff reality into a model, instead of letting reality speak for itself.

No, Israel's interest in the Johnston Plan did not flow from palpable fear of being denied water in the absence of a regional plan. It was because Israel desired recognition, peace, and normal relations with its neighbors—as Lowi acknowledges on p. 75 and p. 197—and also because of pressures from Washington in the context of the Alpha Operation. Indeed, as a close examination of the archival material clearly shows, Israel's willingness to engage in discussions over the Johnston Plan for larger political reasons actually threatened to *lessen the amount of water* Israel would otherwise have been able to use, and jeopardized full Israeli sovereignty over Lake Tiberias. By a combination of mere gravity and the credible threat of force against Arab attempts at diversion, Israel could have had virtually 100 percent of the Jordan waters, and exclusive use of Lake Tiberias as a reservoir for them, without any regional sharing plan. That, clearly, is how Israeli decision makers at the time saw the matter. So here, too, Lowi's thesis—and it's the central one—just doesn't hold water.⁶

The *Arak* Factor

The water problem in the Jordan Valley is getting worse at a time when the chances for a real peace were never better. Peace will help the local parties deal with the water problem, but it will still be a problem. Conversely, water problems didn't cause the Arab-Israeli conflict, and needing to solve water problems won't make the conflict go away. But water problems did make the conflict worse, and cooperating to solve them certainly makes peace more attractive to all concerned.

In other words, the relationship between the water problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict writ large is real, but the two do not subsume one another. Perhaps a liquid metaphor can clear things up: it's like *arak*. *Arak* is a strong licorice firewater popular in the region. It is clear in the glass, but almost undrinkable. When cool water is added, however, *arak* suddenly turns milky, smooth, refreshing, and delicious. Let us hope that adding water to the achievements of the present advanced round of Arab-Israeli diplomacy will have the same delightful effect.



⁶ Elsewhere (p. 74), Lowi says that "in international river basins, the interest in cooperation on the part of the dominant power, *irrespective* of riparian position, is key." Emphasis added. Now this is a correct statement, but it contradicts the thesis statement on p. 203.

La Longue Durée

The following passage is from *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, written by Peter Schweizer (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994).

"The fact that the collapse and funeral of the Soviet Union occurred immediately after the most anticommunist president in American history had served eight years does not prove cause and effect. But it does demand investigation, particularly in light of evidence just beginning to appear. . . .

"Ronald Reagan's belief in the fundamental weakness of the Soviet system appeared in more than his speeches; it was translated into policy. The Reagan administration wanted to use Soviet weaknesses to its strategic advantage. . . .

"In early 1982, President Reagan and a few key advisers began mapping out a strategy to attack the fundamental economic and political weaknesses of the Soviet system. . . . It was a strategic offensive, designed to shift the focus of the superpower struggle to the Soviet bloc, even the Soviet Union itself.

"The goals and means of this offensive were outlined in a series of top-secret national security decision directives (NSDDs) signed by President Reagan in 1982 and 1983. . . . In many respects these directives represented a fundamental break with American policies of the recent past.

Signed by the president in March 1982, NSDD-32 declared that the United States would seek to 'neutralize' Soviet control over Eastern Europe and authorized the use of covert action and other means to support anti-Soviet organizations in the region. Approved by Reagan in November 1982, NSDD-66 declared that it would be U.S. policy to disrupt the Soviet economy by attacking a 'strategic triad' of critical resources that were deemed essential to Soviet economic survival. Finally, in January 1983, Reagan initialed NSDD-75, which called for the United States not just to coexist with the Soviet system but to change it fundamentally. Several of these orders point to an aggressive American policy to roll back Soviet power and engage in an economic or resource war against the Soviet Union. The administration did not create the Soviet crisis, but it did exacerbate it."

Thirty-six years ago, Robert Strausz-Hupé, editor of this journal through its first eleven volumes (1957–1968), published the following, under the title "The Protracted Conflict: A New Look at Communist Strategy," in the Spring 1958 issue of *Orbis*.

"The West can only hope to defeat the communists by giving battle on its own chosen terrain. It must carry the battle to the vital sectors of

communist defense. To do that it must learn to counter the [communists'] strategy of protracted conflict—to manage conflict in space and in time. . . .

“Pericles long ago was confronted with a similar problem. As the leader of the open society of Athens, locked in an irreconcilable conflict with the garrison state of Sparta, he recognized a relatively simple fact which many of the theorists of war in the nuclear age have overlooked, namely that there are subtle alternatives to the risky and blunt strategy of engaging the enemy in direct and decisive military action. In the protracted conflict known as the Peloponnesian War, Pericles chose to pursue an *extended strategy* which was designed to wear down, by a

campaign of economic, political, and psychological attrition, the enemy's will to resist. Liddell Hart pointed out that the Periclean plan was simply a war policy aimed at ‘draining the enemy's endurance in order to convince him that he could not gain a decision.’ In today's protracted conflict, the United States must maintain and use its power for the same ultimate purpose: to turn the tide of battle against the communists, to induce them to overextend themselves, to exploit the weakness of their system, to paralyze their will, and to bring about their final collapse. . . .”

We are pleased to report that Ambassador Strausz-Hupé, now ninety-one, has outlived the Soviet Empire.



Auguries

Franc-ly, My Dear, We Don't Give a Damn

Much attention has lately been given over to “failed states” and the potential collapse of entire economies in some regions of the world. Much of this worry is generated by Malthusian specters of overpopulation and underdevelopment, aggravated by environmental degradation and infectious disease, above all in sub-Saharan Africa.

Alas, if sub-Saharan Africa's future turns out to be grim, it will not be due to inexorable ecological patterns alone. Rather, a persuasive argument can be made to the effect that the region's troubles are traceable mostly to very bad government. Now the locals may have some “help” from abroad.

Back in December, barely noticed by the English-language press, France decided to de-link the franc from the currencies of Francophone Africa by halving their nominal value. In the long run, the end of artificially valued currencies may be healthy, especially in West Africa, but in the short- and mid-term, the drop in hard currency reserves and living standards could prove politically volcanic.

Does this seismic shift in French policy amount to “tough love”—a not-so-gentle invitation to African governments to put their houses in order and cease depending

on Paris to subsidize failed, and often corrupt, statist “development” projects? Or is the French Finance Ministry throwing a large chunk of Africa overboard in order to buoy up a sinking French franc? Whatever, it marks the end of an era dating back to Charles de Gaulle's post-colonial policies of the early 1960s . . . and the end of the dream of *la plus grande* France.

Bridges to the Future

Communications is the future and transportation is the past, right? Well, don't tell it to:

China, which is planning to build an 83-mile rail and road link between its Shangdong and Liaodong peninsulas in northeast China, combining bridge sections as long as 4.4 miles and a 36-mile underwater tunnel.

Argentina and Chile, which are planning a tunnel under the Andes to complete the first “coast-to-coast” rail and road link in South America. Likewise, Uruguay and Argentina project a bridge over the River Plate, at long last linking those two feuding neighbors.

Denmark and Sweden, which are negotiating for a bridge-tunnel across the Ore Sound to unite Copenhagen and Malmo.

Japan, whose visionary engineers dream of earthquake-proof

bridges and tunnels connecting Hokkaido with the Eurasian mainland.

Scared to Death of Freedom

What happens to former communist states when their people shed the cocoon of state support? Demographer Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research has recently turned up some appalling data concerning the people of eastern Germany following their liberation in 1989.¹ For women of that region, aged thirty-five to forty-five, death rates rose by nearly 20 percent in the years 1989–1991; for men of the same ages, death rates jumped by nearly 30 percent. Comparing death rates for these groups with western Germany, most of the difference is attributable to cirrhosis,

injuries (including suicide), and heart disease. At the same time, birth rates have mysteriously collapsed. While conceding that eastern Germany's rapidly improving living standards have been accompanied by psychological strain born of dislocation (for example, unemployment), Eberstadt insists that past dislocations have not produced demographic shocks of such magnitude.

If America's strategic goal is to "enlarge" the Free World, these demographic data are disturbing evidence of how difficult that may be. They probably help explain why a belief in democracy as the best political system has actually fallen in eastern Germany following its liberation, from 41 percent to 31 percent, with a steady 40 percent describing themselves as undecided.



¹ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 46, no. 3 (1994), pp. 527–28.



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